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Abstract 
 
     
In recent time efforts are observed in re-evaluating the linkage between 
economic development and international migration. The thesis can be considered as 
an attempt to add something to those efforts. In this thesis we mainly analyse the 
effects of competition among the countries in international labour market and effects 
of migration on the research activities of firms. As appeared, these two issues so far 
have not received much attention of economic literature.  
 We analyse the above mentioned two issues in chapters 4, 5 and 6 of the 
thesis. Before conducting the main analysis of the thesis, we have explored available 
data and literature on international migration in chapter 2 and 3. The two chapters 
were designed to give a global overview of international migration. In chapter 2 we 
have discussed about international migration using available statistics obtained from 
secondary sources. The data shows a steady but relatively slow growth rate of world 
migration since the World War Two. It has however been observed that migration of 
educated people has increased in recent times. We also have observed that 
remittances as a percentage of GDP and export are very high in many countries which 
confirm the importance of remittances. The data also shows that proximity of a 
wealthy country is an important determinant of international migration destination. 
 In chapter 3 we have reviewed some issues of international migration. The 
discussion has covered the issues like the determinants of international migration, 
SHUIRUPDQFH RI PLJUDQWV DQG FRQVHTXHQFHV RI PLJUDWLRQ LQ KRVW FRXQWU\ µ%UDLQ
'UDLQ¶RUµ%UDLQ*DLQ¶PLJUDWLRQUHPLWWDQFHVDQGHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWLQLWLDWLYHV
of international bodies in international migration. Temporary migration has received 
special attention in the discussion. Many insights of the research conducted in the 
thesis have come directly from the reviews conducted in chapter 3.  
 Chapter 4 and 5 set up models where two countries are engaged in 
competition with each other in sending people aboard. The competition in 
international labour market is immensely important in many developing countries. 
Many countries are highly dependent on the remittances thus competing with other 
countries in sending people to work abroad. These competitions play an active role in 
intergovernmental negotiations as the countries require to balance between 
µSURPRWLRQ¶RIRYHUVHDVHPSOR\PHQWDQGµSURWHFWLRQ¶RIPLJUDQWV:LWKLQHFRQRPLF
literature we have not seen efforts to model this competition of labour exporting 
countries. 
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  Chapter 4 has modelled a situation where two exporting countries send labour 
to a third country.  This chapter assumes unskilled migration as such labour migration 
is entirely controlled by the respective governments. The governments want to send 
labour to get remittances in return thus engage in a Cournot-type competition with the 
other labour exporting country. The importing country on the other hand acts as a 
Stackelberg leader as it sets up its immigration tax policies by moving first. We have 
observed that the labour importer uses discriminatory tax policies for the different 
labour exporting countries to fulfil its national objective. The tax rate is higher for the 
country with higher labour endowment.  
 Chapter 5 has adopted a similar model as chapter 4. However the assumption 
of unskilled migration has been replaced by the assumption of skilled migration. It is 
WKXV DVVXPHG WKDW PLJUDQWV GR QRW QHHG JRYHUQPHQWV¶ DVVLVWDQFH WR PLJUDWH RU
governments are not in a position to control migration. Thus they use taxes to control 
migration and maximise national income. In this regard the exporting countries 
engage in Bertrand type competition with each other in setting emigration tax rate. 
We have found that skilled migrants should be taxed by the exporting countries to 
maximise national income. The importing country again resorts to the discriminatory 
tax policy as obtained in chapter 4. The tax rate is as before higher for the country 
with higher labour endowment 
 The analysis of chapter FDQ EH OLQNHG ZLWK WKH UHFHQW OLWHUDWXUH RI µ%UDLQ
'UDLQ¶:HKDYHDVVXPHGDPRGHOZKHUHWZRFRXQWULHVDUHHQJDJHGLQVWUDWHJLFWUDGH
with each other. We have then analysed effects of labour market openness and 
migration on research and development of countries. It is assumed that the wage rates 
RI RQH FRXQWU\ LV KLJKHU WKDQ WKH RWKHU FRXQWU\¶V ZKLFK JLYHV WKH UDWLRQDOH IRU
migration. With the opening up of labour market and threat of possible migration, 
wage rates of both skilled people who conduct research and unskilled people who 
conduct production fall. We have analysed mainly three cases ± (1) only labour-
importing country conducts R&D, (2) only labour exporting country conducts R&D 
and (3) both countries conduct R&D simultaneously. The analysis shows that the 
possibility of migration of only skilled people always increases R&D. It also 
increases welfare by reducing the price of output. However the migration of unskilled 
people may not always increase welfare. 
We expect that the analysis done in the thesis will be able to provide some 
guidelines in migration policy making. Firstly we observe no strong coalition among 
the labour sending countries to manage and control international migration, though 
labour importing countries are to some extent managing migration jointly. This thesis 
III 
 
along with any possible future work may provide guidance in joint management of 
international migration by the exporting countries. Secondly, many exporting 
countries are subsidising skilled migration by providing training and other supports. 
The thesis is suggesting that labour exporting countries should tax the skilled 
migrants. In this regard the issue of skilled migration may need re-evaluation. Thirdly, 
the thesis is pointing towards some possible gains from skilled migration through 
increased research and development.  This position is to some extent at a par with the 
OLWHUDWXUH RI µ%UDLQ 'UDLQ¶ WKDW SRLQWHG WRZDUGV WKH EHQHILFLDO HIIHFWV RI VNLOOHG
migration. 
In summary it appears that we have obtained some interesting results in the 
analysis done in the thesis. We hope that they will be proved useful in migration 
policies and will contribute in future progress of both developed and developing 
countries. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The history of human being and migration is truly indistinguishable. Since the 
appearance, human being is moving from one place to another place of the 
earth in search of food, shelter and security. The same trend is continuing in 
the present world. Viewed in this manner migration appears as an outcome of 
human decision making process trying to fulfil some objectives. There is 
nothing surprising or new in the present migration regime that drastically 
makes it different from the previous migration regimes. However, the present 
age is sometimes referred as the age of migration. But the volume of migration 
as observed in the present world is really not unprecedented. As mentioned in 
Hass (2005) the share of international migrants in the world population 
underwent a certain increase in the 1990s, but there were periods of drastically 
equal international migration over the 19th and 20th centuries. The percentage 
of international migrants in the total world population was at almost similar 
levels (2.5% ± 3%) to those of today.  The common perception that the late 
WK FHQWXU\ DQG HDUO\ VW FHQWXU\ DUH µWKH DJH RI PLJUDWLRQ¶ LV WKHUHIRUH
appears incorrect. 
What appears unprecedented is the changing patterns of international 
migration. Now people are moving from all over of the world to all over the 
world. In the 19th and early 20th century, the world observed mainly North-
North or South-South Migration such as Irish and European mass migration to 
USA or Japanese Migration to South America. But after the World War Two, 
the world experienced increasing number of people moving from South to 
North which has changed the demographic profile of North substantially (Hass 
2005). In past migration was mainly driven by push factors such as famines, 
wars etc. but recently we observed active government policies to attract 
migrants (especially skilled migrants) from other countries. In past centuries 
such widespread active persuasion was not present.  
Migration is now increasingly viewed as linked with issues of 
economic development. Migration in general provides solutions to two 
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problems. Firstly migration meets labour shortage of receiving countries 
which are normally the developed countries of North or rich countries. On the 
other hand many countries of the world are facing problems like 
unemployment, high poverty and low investment. Migration though not the 
only means (Hass 2005, Taylor 2006) provide a solution of this problem 
through labour outflow and remittances inflow. Migration is therefore 
receiving attention from governments and international bodies like United 
Nations, OECD and IOM as a vehicle of fulfilling the development objectives.     
The literature of international migration is enormous. They are 
comprised of theoretical and empirical literatures as well as policy papers 
published by various government and international bodies. They cover issues 
like causes and consequence, wage determination, human capital formation 
and µ%rain Drain¶ UHPLWWDQFHV LOOHJDO PLJUDWLRQ PLJUDQW¶V ULJKW UHWXUQ
migration, migration and trade, international factor mobility, migration 
cooperation, policy related issues etc. But it seems that within the literature the 
competition among the countries in international labour market and effects of 
migration on the research activities of firms have not received much attention. 
We have addressed these two issues in this thesis.  
The competition of the countries in international labour market carries 
immense importance for many developing countries. Many countries are 
highly dependent of the remittances. The importance of remittances has 
resulted in strong competition among the countries in international migration. 
This competition always plays an active role in the intergovernmental 
negotiations in international migration. For example IOM report on labour 
market in Asia (IOM 2003) has several times mentioned about such 
competition among stakeholders that severely undermines the bargaining 
power of the countries, as the countries require to balance between 
µpURPRWLRQ¶RIRYHUVHDVHPSOR\PHQWDQGµpURWHFWLRQ¶RIPLJUDQWVReference 
of such competition also can be often seen in newspaper articles.  
In this thesis we propose models incorporating the competition in the 
international labour market. We analyse the issue in chapter 4 and chapter 5. 
In chapter 4 we assume that two countries are competing with each other to 
send migrants to a third country.  The chapter considers unskilled migration as 
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such labour migration is entirely controlled by the respective governments. 
The governments want to send labour abroad to get remittances in return. As 
the other country also does the same it gives rise to a Cournot type 
competition. The labour importing country acts as Stackelberg leader by 
setting immigration tax policies. We observed that the labour importer uses 
discriminatory taxes for different labour exporting countries to attain its 
national objective.  
 Chapter 5 explores competition in international labour market with the 
presence of skilled migration. Similar to the chapter 4, the model consists two 
labour exporting and one labour importing countries. The exporting countries 
are there not in a position to control migration directly. They use taxes to 
control migration and maximise national income. Hence the exporting 
countries compete with each other in setting the emigration tax policies. The 
result shows that uncontrolled skilled migration does not enhance the income 
of the exporting countries. The importing country again resorts to the 
discriminatory taxes as obtained in chapter 4.  
 The analysis of chapter 6 can be linked with the literature of µ%UDLQ
Drain¶. This chapter explores the effects of labour market openness and 
migration on research and development of countries engaged in strategic trade 
with each other. We have distinguished the migrants in two groups- skilled 
who conducts research and unskilled who conducts production. The openness 
and threat of migration reduce the wage rates of both types of labour in labour 
importing country. We analyse some situations where the openness and 
possibility of migration can benefit both countries through increased research 
and development. 
 Chapter 4, 5 and 6 constitute the main contributions of thesis. The 
chapter 2 and 3 discuss the available data and literature on international 
migration. The two chapters were designed to give a global overview of 
international migration. The starting point of such global overview should be 
the statistics of international migration. Thus in chapter 2 we have discussed 
about international migration using the available statistics obtained from 
secondary sources. We look at the data of world migration since World War 
Two. In addition it looks at bilateral migration, skilled migration and the 
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statistics of remittances. Chapter 3 looks at some issues of international 
migration such as the determinants and consequences of international 
migration, performance of migrants, µBrain Drain¶, migration and economic 
development, bilateral and multilateral aspects of international migration etc. 
Temporary migration receives special attention in the discussion. These two 
chapters are immensely important in our thesis as they play direct roles in 
formulation of the models and in analysing the results. The chapter 2 and 3 
therefore can be regarded as the literature review chapters.  
To summarise, we can say that this thesis analyses the effects of 
competition in international labour market and the effects of international 
migration on the R&D and economic welfare. The thesis has been organised 
by presenting the data and literature of international migration in chapter 2 and 
chapter 3. The chapter 4, 5 and 6 constitute the main contribution of the thesis 
where the models have been proposed and analysed. In the final chapter we 
provide the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 
 
International Migration: Facts and Figures 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will look at some available statistics on international 
migration. The main contribution of this thesis is not empirical but this chapter 
still bear enormous importance as without looking at the data, the study of 
international migration will be largely incomplete.  
Our aim of the literature review chapters is to have an overview of the 
international migration. The starting point of the overview should be the 
statistics of international migration. The chapter is therefore aiming to provide 
an overview of international migration statistics since the Second World War. 
It has been supplemented by statistics on migration of high skilled people and 
statistics of remittances inflow as they are highly relevant to present migration 
regime and our thesis. We will also look at some statistics of bilateral 
migration. The statistics provided in this chapter are all collected from 
secondary sources, thus while discussing we will sometimes discuss about the 
methodologies used by the original collectors. Though the main aim of this 
chapter is to look at the statistics of international migration, time to time, our 
observations about the data and international migration situation will also be 
provided.  
 
 
2. Overview of World Migration 
 
In this section we will look at the statistics to have an overview of 
world migration since World War Two. The data on migration can be 
collected from International organisations like United Nations, International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM), OECD and other governmental and 
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international bodies. But they use different methods in collecting and 
compiling the data. Hence available data on world migration is really 
comprehensive but suffers from the problem of lack of uniformity. A notable 
attempt to overcome this problem is the database compiled by Parsons et al. 
(2007). We will discuss about Parsons et al. dataset in relevant section. But 
this problem of uniformity of data does not pose a big threat to us as the aim 
here is mainly to look at some descriptive statistics to have a global overview. 
Further studies using advanced econometric technique would require higher 
precision and uniformity.  
The dDWDFRPSLOHGE\8QLWHG1DWLRQ¶V3RSXODWLRQ'LYLVLRQJLYHVDQLFH
overview of international migration since the Second World War. We have 
utilised that data set. It has been obtained from the website of Population 
Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United 
1DWLRQV6HFUHWDULDWWLWOHGµ7UHQGVLQ7RWDO0LJUDQW6WRFN7KH5HYLVLRQ¶
(http://esa.un.org/migration).  It contains migration statistics of 228 countries 
or areas. The international migrantV¶ stocks at particular points in time were 
estimated mostly from population censuses corresponding to the decennial 
rounds of censuses from 1950 to 2000. In the majority of cases, the censuses 
gathered information on place of birth of enumerated population and thus allow 
identification of foreign-born population. However, in some countries 
information on place of birth was not recorded. Instead, the citizenship (that is, 
their legal nationality) provided the basis for identification of international 
migrants.   
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Table-2.1 
 
Estimated Number of International Migrants at Mid-Year (Both Sexes) 
        (In Millions) 
Year Africa Asia Europe 
Latin 
America 
Northern 
America Oceania 
More 
De-
veloped 
Less 
De-
veloped 
Least De-
veloped World 
1960 9.1 28.5 14.2 6.0 12.5 2.1 32.3 43.2 6.4 75.5 
1965 9.4 28.2 16.7 5.9 12.7 2.6 35.4 43.0 7.0 78.4 
1970 9.9 27.8 18.8 5.7 13.0 3.0 38.4 43.0 7.2 81.3 
1975 11.0 28.1 20.2 5.7 15.3 3.4 42.5 44.3 6.8 86.8 
1980 14.1 32.1 21.9 6.1 18.1 3.8 47.5 51.8 9.1 99.3 
1985 14.4 37.2 23.5 6.3 22.1 4.2 53.6 57.4 9.1 111.0 
1990 16.4 49.9 49.4 7.0 27.6 4.8 82.4 72.6 11.0 155.0 
1995 17.9 47.2 55.3 6.1 33.6 5.1 94.9 70.2 12.2 165.1 
2000 16.5 50.3 58.2 6.3 40.4 5.1 105.0 71.7 10.2 176.7 
2005 17.1 53.3 64.1 6.6 44.5 5.0 115.4 75.2 10.5 190.6 
%  
change 87% 87% 350% 10% 256% 136% 257% 74% 62% 153% 
Popu- 
lation 
2005 
921.073 
(1.86%) 
 
3936.536 
(1.35%) 
 
729.421 
(8.79%) 
 
556.512 
(1.19%) 
 
335.175 
(13.28%) 
 
33.559 
(14.90%) 
 
1216.55 
(9.49%) 
 
5295.726 
(1.42%) 
 
761.846 
(1.38%) 
 
6512.276 
(2.93%) 
 
Source: United Nations Population Division, http://esa.un.org/migration and  
http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm 
Figure -2.1 
Estimated Number of International Migrants at Mid-Year (Both Sexes) 
        (In Millions) 
 
Source: United Nations Population Division, http://esa.un.org/migration 
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Table-2.1 and 2.2 and Figure-2.1 and 2.2 have been compiled using the 
data obtained from the above source. Table-2.1 provides the estimated number of 
international migrants as of mid-year for each of the years indicated. The table 
has been later used to make Figure -2.1 to visualise the trend. From the table it 
can be clearly seen that the numbers of migrants have gradually increased over 
the time. From the Figure-2.1 we can also observe a potential break in data in 
the year around 1990. It was not clear from the website of UN as to what 
extent the break had been caused by disintegration of former USSR and East 
European countries. Another interesting feature of the data is observable from 
calculated percentage change from 1960 to 2005. The highest growth on 
international migrants¶ stock had been registered in Europe (350%), North 
America (256%), Oceania (136%) and in developed countries (257%). Again 
it is not clear as to what extent the growth had been effected by disintegration 
of former communist blocks. But such disintegration is obviously not the 
UHDVRQIRULQFUHDVHRIPLJUDQWV¶VWRFNLQ1RUWK$PHULFDDQG2FHDQLD We also 
have presented the world population data obtained from the Population 
Division of the United Nations in the last row of Table-2.1. The figure in the 
parenthesis shows the ratio of migrants to total population. As can be observed 
from the data at the world level only about 3% of the people are migrants but 
in Europe, Northern America, Oceania and more developed countries about 
10% of people are migrants.  
In Table-2.2 we have the statistics of growth rate of migrants¶ stock 
over the period of 1960 to 2005 as obtained from the United Nations data set. 
Again the data has been plotted in Figure-2.2 to visualise the trend of growth 
of migrants¶ stock. Figure-2.2 has been separated in two panels to look at 
continents and countries with income classification differently.  As we can see 
from the Table-2.2 growth rate of stock of migrants in the last decade is higher 
in Europe and Northern America. Oceania started with a higher migration rate 
of 3.6 percent in 1960-65 but the growth rate gradually declined and turned 
negative in recent years. As we can see that the growth rate is higher in more 
developed (1.9 percent) and less developed countries (1 percent) but low in 
least developed countries (0.4 percent). Again more developed countries 
experienced highest growth rate of 10.40 percent during the period of 1985-90.  
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As the population of developed countries is gradually declining, the rate of 
growth of migrant population should be in general higher than the population 
growth of developed countries. Another interesting feature is that the rate of 
increase of migrants stock is kind of steady over the period and the world 
average was just about 1 percent. It is demonstrating that the proposition that 
the world is observing unprecedented migration is not true. As only 3 percent 
of ZRUOG¶VSRSXODWion is migrants, about 1 percent increase in migrants stock, 
even if the growth rate is higher than the population growth rate, is not 
VXEVWDQWLDOO\JRLQJWRFKDQJHWKHZRUOG¶VGHPRJUDSK\LQQHDUIXWXUH However 
as observed from the data of last row of Table-2.2, population growth rate is 
much lower than the growth rate of migrants in Europe, Northern America and 
More Developed countries. Thus migration may induce substantial changes in 
demographic patterns of those parts of the world. 
 
Table-2.2 
Growth Rate of Migrants¶ Stock from 1960-2005 
 Africa Asia Europe 
Latin 
America 
Northern 
America Oceania 
More 
Developed 
Less De-
veloped 
Least De-
veloped World 
1960-65 0.7 -0.2 3.1 -0.6 0.3 3.6 1.8 -0.1 1.6 0.8 
1965-70 1 -0.3 2.4 -0.6 0.4 3.4 1.6 0 0.7 0.7 
1970-75 2 0.2 1.4 0.2 3.3 2 2 0.6 -1.1 1.3 
1975-80 4.9 2.7 1.6 1.1 3.4 2.3 2.2 3.1 5.7 2.7 
1980-85 0.5 2.9 1.4 0.6 4.1 2.2 2.4 2 0 2.2 
1985-90 2.5 2.4 3.1 2.2 4.4 2.5 10.4 2.4 3.7 6.7 
1990-95 1.9 -1.1 2.3 -2.9 3.9 1.2 2.8 -0.7 2.2 1.3 
1995-00 -1.7 1.3 1 0.7 3.7 0 2 0.4 -3.5 1.4 
2000-05 0.7 1.2 1.9 1.1 1.9 -0.1 1.9 1 0.4 1.5 
Pop. 
Growth 
(2000-05) 2.34 1.25 0.08 1.31 1.01 1.48 0.36 1.47 2.36 1.26 
Source: United Nations Population Division, http://esa.un.org/migration 
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Figure -2.2 
Growth Rate of Migrants¶ Stock from 1960-2005 
 
 
 Source: United Nations Population Division, http://esa.un.org/migration 
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3. Regional and Bilateral Migration 
 
The database UN gives a nice overview of worldwide migration but it 
is not possible to have an outlook of regional and bilateral migration from it. 
In order to do so we have used Parsons et al. (2007) who built a database of 
bilateral migrants stock of 226 countries and territories. As noted by them, the 
lack of comprehensive and reliable data on bilateral flows of migration caused 
only a few attempts that took a global view of the patterns of international 
migration between countries and regions. OECD produces detailed stock and 
flow data on immigrants in OECD and few other countries. The United 
Nations adopts a global perspective when summarising international migrants¶ 
movements but its work provides only total migrants stock in each country. 
National data sources allow disaggregation but there is problem of 
comparability from one country to another. The data set of Parsons et al. 
(2007) tried to overcome these problems by introducing four versions of two 
origin-destination matrices using mainly the data from the year 2000 round of 
censuses. The four versions reflect different points of trade-off between the 
comprehensiveness of coverage and use of the assumption for interpolation to 
compensate for missing data. The first version simply contains raw data and 
later versions contain more bilateral entries despite the fact that individual 
entries are less accurate. Thus as versions progress the data become complete 
but less accurate.  
Even with the inaccuracy, the database allows us to compare country 
data from both global and regional perspective. It portrays that proximity to 
regional wealthy country is a powerful determinant of international migration 
destinations. As a starting point in Table-2.3 we have bilateral migration data 
for seven South Asian countries. In columns we have statistics of first three 
host countries for migrants of these countries. For example the second column 
shows migration from Bangladesh to other countries. The first country in 
ranking is India where number of migrants is 3805844. India is followed by 
Pakistan as the second major host country of Bangladeshi migrants where 
number of migrants is 1508256. The table reveals interesting facts about 
international migration in particular of South-South migration. The major host 
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countries for all South Asian countries are not the Northern developed 
countries but rather the countries of South. Even for India, which is not a 
Muslim majority country, first two host countries are UAE and Saudi Arabia. 
It may be argued that for skilled people, Northern developed countries are the 
major destination countries. But volume of remittances inflow does not just 
depend on the skills of people working abroad but also on the total number of 
people working. This statistics gives the notion that South-South and regional 
migration can be much more important in linking migration to development 
policy agendas. 
 
 
Table-2.3 
 
Migration from South Asian Countries to other countries 
 
Source 
Countries 
Bangladesh India Sri Lanka Bhutan Maldives Nepal Pakistan 
 
 
Host 
countries 
India 
(3805844) 
UAE 
(1299439) 
India 
(186264) 
India 
(7977) 
India 
(239) 
 India 
(651642) 
India 
(1327671) 
Pakistan 
(1508256) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
(1045985) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
(114981 
Pakistan 
(3153) 
UK   
(201) 
Pakistan 
(256125) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
(661383) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
(379207) 
USA 
(1037360) 
Canada 
(91942) 
 
Nepal 
(426) 
Australia 
(175) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
(14026) 
United 
Kingdom 
(322178) 
Source: Version_4, Parsons et al. (2007) 
http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html 
 
With the observation from the above table it is expected that similar 
type of regionalism will be observed in other regions of world. With this view 
in mind Table-2.4 has been compiled from the Parsons et al. (2007) database. 
The major sending countries of the table has been obtained by sorting the 
countries in descending order that have migrants in other countries and then 
selecting first 16 countries. In the table we only have data of countries which 
do not fall within the criteria of highly developed or rich countries. Former 
communist block of East Europe, USSR and Afghanistan also have been 
excluded. Given that a simple observation of the table shows that migrant 
population is likely to be concentrated in one or two countries based on 
regional proximity and social and/or historical ties. About 92 percent of 
Mexican migrants are living in USA. In Turkey about half of the migrants are 
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living in Germany. Similar feature is observed in Morocco and Algeria. A 
large percentage of migrants from Asian countries are residing in Gulf 
counties especially in Saudi Arabia. For Mali the major host countries are 
&RWHG¶,YRLUH%XUNLQD)DVRDQG*XLQHD7KHGDWDDJDLQUHYHDOVWKDWSUR[LPLW\
is an important determinant of migration destination. 
 
Table-2.4 
 
Migration from Major Source Countries to Other Countries 
Source 
Countries 
Host Countries Total 
Migrants 
 (In Millions) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Mexico 
United States 
(92.07%) 
Pakistan 
(1.22%) 
Kuwait 
(0.58%) 
Germany 
(0.50%) 
Israel 
(0.47%) 
10.14 
(100.00%) 
India 
UAE 
(14.34%) 
Saudi Arabia 
(11.55%) 
USA 
(11.45%) 
Bangladesh 
(10.58%) 
Pakistan 
(6.69%) 
9.06 
(100.00%) 
Bangladesh 
India 
(55.70%) 
Pakistan 
(22.07%) 
Saudi Arabia 
(5.55%) 
Nepal 
(2.98%) 
UK 
(2.27%) 
6.83 
(100.00%) 
China 
Hong Kong 
(37.69%) 
USA 
(17.31%) 
Canada 
(5.95%) 
Malaysia 
(4.62%) 
Japan 
(4.35%) 
5.82 
(100.00%) 
Pakistan 
India 
(38.75%) 
Saudi Arabia 
(19.30%) 
UK 
(9.40%) 
USA 
(6.70%) 
Germany 
(2.88%) 
3.43 
(100.00%) 
Philippines 
USA 
(42.79%) 
Saudi Arabia 
(11.27%) 
Malaysia 
(9.07%) 
Canada 
(7.05%) 
Australia 
(3.06%) 
3.40 
(100.00%) 
Turkey 
Germany 
(49.88%) 
France 
(6.36%) 
Netherland 
(6.03%) 
Austria 
(4.18%) 
Bulgaria 
(3.07%) 
3.02 
(100.00%) 
Morocco 
France 
(29.29%) 
Spain 
(12.11%) 
Germany 
(11.35%) 
Italy 
(7.26%) 
Israel 
(6.38%) 
2.59 
(100.00%) 
Egypt 
Saudi Arabia 
(46.69%) 
Jordan 
(5.84%) 
USA 
(5.67%) 
Palestine 
(4.76%) 
Libya 
(2.56%) 
2.17 
(100.00%) 
Poland 
USA 
(23.02%) 
Germany 
(14.85%) 
Belarus 
(13.38%) 
Canada 
(8.78%) 
France 
(5.50%) 
2.08 
(100.00%) 
Algeria 
France 
(64.38%) 
Germany 
(10.53%) 
Libya 
(2.61%) 
Israel 
(1.53%) 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
(1.52%) 
2.07 
(100.00%) 
Vietnam 
USA 
(49.93%) 
Australia 
(7.71%) 
Canada 
(7.50%) 
France 
(6.08%) 
Germany 
(5.75%) 
2.01 
(100.00%) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
(40.59%) 
Saudi Arabia 
(16.19%) 
Netherland 
(9.04%) 
Philippines 
(7.55%) 
USA 
(4.17%) 
1.83 
(100.00%) 
Columbia 
Venezuela 
(36.92%) 
USA 
(31.85%) 
Spain 
(10.59%) 
Germany 
(2.87%) 
Ecuador 
(2.26%) 
1.65 
(100.00%) 
Puerto 
Rico 
USA 
(90.18%) 
Italy 
(1.93%) 
Germany 
(1.27%) 
Pakistan 
(1.18%) 
Kuwait 
(0.59%) 
1.60 
(100.00%) 
Mali 
Cote d'Ivoire 
(30.82%) 
Burkina Fuso 
(27.74%) 
Guinea 
(10.32%) 
Nigeria 
(5.77%) 
Ghana 
(5.22%) 
1.58 
(100.00%) 
Compiled from: Version_4, Parsons et al. (2007) 
http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html 
 
 One should however be careful in interpreting the data set. As can be 
seen from the table that Bangladesh, Pakistan and India are sharing as large 
stock of migrants with each other. The three countries in previous time were 
known as British India which became Independent as India and Pakistan in 
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1947. Later in 1971 the two parts of Pakistan named East and West become 
separated.  East Pakistan became Bangladesh and West Pakistan became 
Pakistan. Still a large number of people born in Former East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) are living in Pakistan. A recent newspaper article1 reported that 
about 1.2 million people of Bangladeshi ethnicity are living in Karachi of 
Pakistan. Same is true for people born in Pakistan and living in Bangladesh. 
To a lesser extent it is in general applicable to the whole Indian Subcontinent. 
Thus the Indian subcontinent has experienced a similar break up like former 
communist block of East Europe. It is likely that many other countries of the 
world have also gone through similar type of transformation in last few 
decades that changed the number of foreign born population. It may also have 
some effects on the reports of population censuses. Thus without looking more 
deeply at the data collection process for individual countries it will be unwise 
to provide any final comment. Another thing to be noted is that this database 
may overrate the economic importance of migration in some countries. For 
example many people born in Pakistan moved to Bangladesh after 1971. 
Similarly many people born in Bangladesh moved to Pakistan. The same also 
happened between Bangladesh, Pakistan and India. The economic significance 
of this migration in term of remittances is very low. Therefore even if the 
statistics in Table-2.4 is showing that the about 77 percent of Bangladeshi 
migrants are living in India and Pakistan, these migrants are probably 
economically less important compared to the migrants (only 5.5%) living in 
Saudi Arabia.  
 
4. Skilled and Unskilled Migration 
 
 Migration of skilled people from developing and developed countries 
is one highly debated issue of international migration. It is often observed that 
the developed countries are practising special screening programme only to 
allow entry of skilled people like engineers or doctors. Migration of high 
VNLOOHG SHRSOH IURP GHYHORSLQJ WR GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV LV UHIHUUHG DV µ%UDLQ
                                                 
1
 )DUXN&KRZGKXU\¶V$UWLFOHµ'DLO\Prothom-Alo, date May 14, 2009 
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'UDLQ¶ 7KH VL]H RI OLWHUDWXUH GHDOLQJ ZLWK WKH Brain Drain issue is quite 
enormous. We will discuss the literature in next chapter. In this section we 
will look at some statistics of skilled and unskilled migration in developed 
countries. 
The problem of looking at the data is again the availability of 
comparable data. Carrington and Detragiache (1998) is one of the first 
attempts which has been referred by Commander et al. (2002) as a benchmark 
of empirical analysis of skilled migration in 1990. Carrington and Detragiache 
attempted to examine the magnitude of skilled migration by estimating 
migration rates from 61 developing countries to OECD countries for three 
educational categories (primary, secondary and tertiary) using 1990 U.S. 
FHQVXV GDWD %DUUR /HH¶V GDWD VHW RQ HGXFDWLRQDO DWWDLQPHQW DQG 2(&'
migration data. They found substantial migration of educated people from 
Caribbean, Central America and some African and Asian Countries. It was 
found that individual with little or no education generally have limited access 
to international migration and migrants tend to be much educated then the rest 
of the population of the country. Almost for all countries the highest migration 
rates are for individual with a tertiary education. In some countries migration 
rate with tertiary education is very high. For example the estimates show that 
in Gambia 59%, Jamaica 67%, Guyana 77% people with tertiary education 
have migrated to United States.  
 Docquier and Marfouk (2006) noted that Carrington and Detragiache 
(1998) had some severe limitations. Carrington and Detragiache used OECD 
migration statistics for non-US countries which report limited information on 
origin of immigrants. They transposed skill structure of U.S. immigrants on 
the OECD total immigration stock. Relying on OECD statistics produced an 
average underestimation of 8.9 percent. Docquier and Marfouk constructed 
their data set using stock data of 192 independent territories (including 
Vatican City and 191 UN member states) and 39 dependent territories. They 
count as migrants all working age (25 and over) foreign born individual living 
in OECD countries. Skilled migrants are those who at least have tertiary level 
of education wherever they have completed schooling.   
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 In Docquier and Marfouk the set of receiving countries are restricted to 
OECD countries. They argued that the skill levels of Non-OECD countries are 
expected to be very low except for South Africa. Focusing on OECD countries, 
they stated to capture a large number of world educated migration ( about 90 
percent)  but they were aware of the fact that by disregarding Non-OECD 
countries like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, South 
Africa etc. they probably underestimated Brain Drain for a dozen of countries 
like Egypt, Sudan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Swaziland, Namibia etc. In addition 
as there was no systematic information on age of entry, it was impossible for 
them to distinguish the emigrants who were educated at the time of entry and 
who acquired education after settling in receiving countries.      
 In spite of the stated incompleteness and limitations, the database of 
Docquier and Marfouk is an important source of information on high skill 
migration in OECD countries. Table-5.2 of the paper provides an overview of 
the empirical observations. We have summarised it in Table-2.5 and calculated 
the last two columns- e and f. As can be seen from the table, total stock of 
migrant labour forces in OECD in 1990 was 42 millions which rose to 59 
millions in 2000.  In absolute term there was a 41% increase in migrants stock. 
On the other hand migrant labour with tertiary education was 12.46 millions in 
1990 which rose to 20.40 million in 2000. Migrant labour with tertiary 
education was 29.80% of total stock of migrants in 1990 which became 
34.60% in 2000. Stock of migrants with tertiary education was 64% higher in 
2000 compared to 1990. Comparing the stock of migrants with tertiary 
education as percentage of total stock we see a 4.80% increase from 1990 to 
2000. While migrants with secondary education also have increased, migration 
with less than secondary education has decreased in relative term as seen from 
the table. Comparably, we observe similar increase in the education level of 
labour force of the world. On the other hand, both OECD and Non-OECD 
labour forces with tertiary level of education have increased within this period. 
It can be said that from the period of 1990 to 2000 the growth of OECD and 
ZRUOG¶V labour forces was biased toward the educated compared to less 
educated people. Nevertheless migrants still remain as a small fraction of 
OECD labour force. Total stock of migrants in OECD countries is only 7.87 
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percent of total OECD labour force which increases to 9.84 in case of tertiary 
education.  Given the ethnic diversity of migrant population, this small 
fraction of migrants probably has no social and political bargaining power in 
OECD labour market. 
 
Table-2.5 
Migration by Educational Attainment  
        (In Millions) 
Source: Table-5.2, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) 
 
 
5. Migration and Remittances  
    
 The last statistics we are going to look at is the statistics of remittances 
received by the labour sending countries. It is often noted that the remittances 
is playing an important role in developing countries such as it is now one of 
the main sources of export earnings (Taylor 2006). In the Table 2.6 we have 
FRPSOLHGGDWD IURP:RUOG%DQN¶VGDWDEDVH³:RUOG'HYHORSPHQW ,QGLFDWRUV
'HFHPEHU´:HKDYHVHOHFWHGILUVWUHPLWWDQFes recipient developing 
 
1990 2000 e= 
(c-a)/a f=d-b A b c D 
Total stock of migrants in 
OECD countries 41.85 % of stock 59.02 % of stock 41%  
Migrants with tertiary education 12.46 29.80% 20.40 34.60% 64% 4.80% 
Secondary education 10.58 25.30% 17.11 29.00% 62% 3.70% 
Less than secondary education 18.80 44.90% 21.51 36.40% 14% -8.50% 
       
World labour force 2568.23 % of labour force 3187.22 
% of labour 
force 24%  
Tertiary education 234.69 9.10% 360.61 11.30% 54% 2.20% 
Secondary education 755.10 29.40% 945.84 29.70% 25% 0.30% 
Less than secondary education 1578.43 61.50% 1880.78 59.00% 19% -2.50% 
       
OECD Total labour force 657.72 % of all groups 750.09 
% of all 
groups 14%  
OECD labour force with 
tertiary education 144.05 21.90% 207.35 27.60% 44% 5.70% 
       
Non-OECD total labour force 1910.51 % of all groups 2437.14 
% of all 
groups 28%  
Non- OECD labour force with 
tertiary education 90.64 4.70% 153.26 6.30% 69% 1.60% 
  
18 
FRXQWULHVRIWKHZRUOGDFFRUGLQJWRZRUNHUV¶UHPLWWDQFHVUHFHLSWLQ7KH
data is available in current US dollar. We have then calculated per capita 
remittances dividing the remittances by total population. The last two columns 
have been calculated dividing remittances respectively by GDP and Export. 
As can be seen from the table the importance of remittances varies largely. In 
some countries per capita remittances is quite low such as India, China and 
Bangladesh, whereas in Lebanon per capita remittances is about 1140 dollars. 
The remittances as a percentage of GDP and Exports also varies. In 
Philippines, Morocco, Bangladesh, Lebanon, and El Salvador remittances is 
respectively about 23 %, 25%, 46%, 85% and 65% of export of goods and 
services. Remittances as percentage of GDP is not that high but in some 
countries like Lebanon and El Salvador it is about one fifth of GDP. In 
Philippines, Bangladesh, Guatemala and Morocco it is about one tenth of GDP. 
The table is confirming the importance remittances in the economy of many 
countries.  
 
Table-2.6 
:RUNHUV¶5HPLWWDQFHVUHFHLSWVE\0DMRU5HFHLYLQJFRXQWULHV 
       (In Millions, current US$) 
Country 
:RUNHUV¶
remittances, receipts  
Total 
Population 
Per capita 
Remittances 
Remittances 
as % of GDP 
Remittances as 
% of Export 
India 25108.88 1109.81 22.62 2.74% 12.41% 
Mexico 23742.10 104.22 227.80 2.83% 8.86% 
Philippines 12481.00 86.26 144.68 10.62% 22.89% 
China 6830.46 1311.80 5.21 0.26% 0.64% 
Spain 6068.29 44.12 137.55 0.50% 1.90% 
Indonesia 5560.25 223.04 24.93 1.53% 4.91% 
Romania 5508.60 21.59 255.17 4.53% 13.32% 
Morocco 5454.25 30.50 178.85 8.34% 25.26% 
Bangladesh 5417.66 155.99 34.73 8.75% 46.13% 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 5329.50 74.17 71.86 4.96% 16.56% 
Pakistan 5113.00 159.00 32.16 4.03% 26.35% 
Lebanon 4623.00 4.06 1139.99 20.31% 85.82% 
Colombia 3889.58 45.56 85.38 2.87% 12.76% 
Guatemala 3609.81 13.03 277.07 11.96% --- 
El Salvador 3315.69 6.76 490.32 17.78% 65.39% 
Source: World Development Indicators, December 2008 
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6. Conclusions 
 
 In this chapter we have explored the statistics of international 
migration. At first we explored the data of the world migration and found that 
the world is experiencing a steady increase of stock of migration. But the total 
number of migrants is still not very high given the world population. As 
expected the rate of growth of migrants stock is higher in the most developed 
parts of the world. We have also looked at the data on bilateral migration. It 
appears that regional wealthy countries are the major destinations of migrants 
all over the world. We then have looked at migration of skilled people and 
found supports for the hypothesis that migration of skilled people has 
increased in the last decade. Lastly we have looked at the data of remittances 
and found that in some countries ratios of remittances to GDP and export are 
very high. It confirms the importance of remittances in the economy of many 
countries. These findings of the chapter are truly interesting. They will also 
guide us in the analysis of the coming chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Issues of International Migration 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we discuss about some issues of international migration. The 
chapter serves as a literature review chapter where we discuss about the 
determinants of international migration, consequences of immigration on host 
country, µBrain Drain¶ or µBrain Gain¶, migration and economic development, 
and global initiatives on linking international migration and economic 
development. 
 The discussion of this chapter will give us an overall idea of the 
literature and issues of international migration. The issues discussed in the 
international migration literature are just enormous. Concentration on one or 
two of them may render poor understanding of the true picture of the 
international migration. The chapter therefore attempts to overcome this 
problem by extending the scope of discussion. The discussion sometimes may 
appear not directly linked to the main research conducted in the thesis. But 
without this discussion the literature review of international migration may 
appear largely incomplete. We start the chapter by fist discussing about the 
basic migration theories that analysed the determinants of migration. Then we 
cover two important topics- the performance of immigrants and consequences 
RILPPLJUDWLRQLQWKHKRVWFRXQWU\DQGWKHHFRQRPLFVRQµ%UDLQ'UDLQ¶7KHVH
two themes are the centrepieces of debate within economic literature and 
highly relevant to the analysis done in the upcoming chapters. We then discuss 
about the linkages between international migration, economic development 
and remittances. The last section reviews the issues linked the initiatives of 
international bodies and multilateral aspects of international migration. The 
chapter is mainly a review chapter but our views regarding the issues time to 
time accompanies the discussion.  
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2.  Determinants of International Migration 
 
 A number of papers have analysed the determinants of migration of 
people within the regions of a country. The literature is largely applicable also 
for international migration. In this section we will discuss about them. The 
determinants of migration are more or less an empirical matter and they can 
substantially vary depending on the characteristics of sending and receiving 
regions (countries) as well as the attributes of migrants. But most notable and 
common is probably the wage differential arguments. One of the earliest 
literature by Ravenstein in 1885 (Greenwood 1997, Arango 2000) also pointed 
out that the employment and wage opportunities were the major determinants 
of migration. It had been also mentioned that bad oppressive laws, heavy 
taxation, unattractive climate, uncongenial social surrounding, slave trade, 
transportation all produced and producing the currents of migration.  
 Wage differential model of migration has special implication for 
developing countries. A few works took wage differential motive of migration 
as given and proposed models that are highly influential in policy making in 
developing countries.  Here we will mainly concentrate on two highly 
influential wage differential based models namely Lewis model (1954) and 
Harris-Todaro model (1971). Lewis model postulated that the internal 
economic structure of an underdeveloped economy can be sub-divided into 
two sectors. One is a rural technologically backward agricultural sector and 
another is a technologically advanced urban manufacturing sector.  The 
producers of manufacturing sector act as profit maximisers, that is employ 
labour up to the point where marginal product equates wage. The rural sector 
provides subsistence wage and there is excess supply of labour in that wage 
such that marginal productivity of labour is nearly zero. This labour has been 
termed by Lewis as surplus labour. As marginal product is almost zero this 
surplus labour can be removed from agriculture without sacrificing the 
agricultural output. Lewis argued that the goal of economic development can 
be achieved by transferring the surplus labour to the industrial sector by 
enabling industrial sector to increase production. It is assumed that the wage 
UDWHLQPDQXIDFWXULQJVHFWRULVKLJKHUWKDQWKHDJULFXOWXUDOVHFWRU¶VZDJHDQG
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this wage difference can induce labourers of agricultural sector to migrate to 
industrial sector. With reinvestment of accumulated profit, manufacturing 
sector can uninterruptedly grow by using the surplus labour until all surplus 
labour of agriculture is fully exhausted. 
  Lewis model was a significant advancement in the field of 
development economics. But urban area based industrialisation policy 
gradually started to loss the favour as other consequence of such policy started 
to emerge. It was found that urban area itself had been suffering from 
unemployment problem. What really appeared surprising was the continuum 
of rural to urban migration in the presence of urban unemployment. Harris-
Todaro model (1971) came with an explanation of this phenomenon.  Harris-
Todaro model assumed that rural urban migration proceeds in response to the 
expected wage differential instead of actual wage differential. That is as long 
DVWKH³SUREDELOLW\RUUDWLRRIXUEDQHPSOR\HGZRUNHUVGLYLGHGE\WRWDOXUEDQ
ZRUNHUV´ PXOWLSOLHG E\ XUEDQ ZDJH UDWH LV KLJKHU WKDQ WKH UXUDO ZDJH UDWH
rural labourers find it rational to migrate to urban sector to get higher urban 
expected wage. In the model, urban wage rate is assumed 
institutionally/politically fixed above the market clearing wage rate. In 
response to the higher urban fixed wage, rural labourers start to migrate to 
urban sector but not all of them find employment as the urban producers 
employ labour only up to the level where marginal product equates the fixed 
wage rate. But the migrants stay in urban area as urban producers picks 
labourers randomly from the pull of urban workers comprising permanent 
urban proletariat and migrant workers. If expected urban wage is still higher 
than rural wage, more people migrate to urban sector to get higher urban wage 
even some people in urban sector remained unemployed. With this flow of 
migration from rural to urban sector urban unemployment increases, urban 
expected wage falls and the equilibrium in the labour market is reached when 
urban expected wage become equal to rural wage1. Thus urban fixed higher 
wage results in unemployment in urban sector and consequently the economy 
                                                 
1
 Here we have provided a general idea of the labour market equilibrium in Harris-Todaro 
economy. The equilibrium can differ depending on the structure of the economy. The 
equilibrium expected wage rate can be higher, equal or less than the market clearing wage. 
( See the geometric interpretation of the model given by Corden and Findlay ( 1975) 
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produces and consumes less than what it is capable of producing and 
consuming with full employment. It is assumed that the socio-political 
situation of less developed countries does not permit reduction of the fixed 
urban wage rate. Therefore use of subsidy becomes a necessary instrument to 
increase the employment and output of the economy. The outcome of the 
subsidy, however, differs depending on the model and the form of subsidy. It 
is usually found that if subsidy is given to agricultural sector it improves 
welfare, but if subsidy is given to manufacturing sector it may not improve 
welfare all the time. The best policy suggestion by Harris-Todaro model is 
usually uniform subsidy to both sectors.  
 The original Harris-Todaro model was a closed economy model. Later 
on economists like Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974), Corden and Findlay 
(1975) and Batra and Naqvi (1987) and others reanalysed and restated the 
model to allow for international trade and wider ranges of policy analysis. 
Harris-Todaro model is still highly influential in policy making. It had special 
role in changing the industrialisation paradigm.  Earlier the economists were 
favouring import substituting industrial policy. Urban area based 
industrialisation policy is now no longer unquestionable. Krugman and 
Obstfeld (2003, page 266-267) stated that Harris-Todaro model served as a 
severe blow and consequently changed the paradigm of industrialisation.  
 The wage differential explanation is broadly applicable to both internal 
and international migration. But wage differential in reality as noted by 
Ravenstein does not provide the only reason of migration. Sometime 
migration fails to occur even in the presence of substantial earning 
differentials (LaLonde and Topel 1997, pages 805-806). Such as income 
uncertainty in the receiving country may deter risk-averse persons from 
immigrating, even if expected earning gains are higher. The cultural ties and 
cultural differences between source and receiving country add up to the cost of 
immigration. Therefore ethnic enclaves in receiving country encourage new 
migration.   
Migration can also be explained in term of relative deprivation (Stark 
1991, page 86, LaLonde and Topel 1997 page 806). It has been observed that  
rural to urban migration rates are not highest among the poorest villages, 
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migration rate are highest where distribution of income size is more unequal, 
the propensity to migrate from these villages is highest among the most poors.  
The phenomenon is explained by stating that people derive satisfaction not 
only from their own well being but also from their relative stands in the 
FRPPXQLW\ ,PPLJUDWLRQ PD\ RFFXU DV D UHVXOW RI SHRSOH¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR
change their relative standing position. In an empirical study, Stark and Taylor 
(Stark 1991, pages 119-139) estimated the influence of relative deprivation 
and found significant positive effects of relative deprivation on labour time 
allocation on Mexico-US migration.   
 Migration decisions are often made by households of families instead 
of a single individual member. Hence migration may act as a family/household 
decision to maximise earnings and diversify risk. For example rural 
households may diversify the sources of earnings by sending an individual 
member to work in urban area. The remittances sent by the migrants may be 
used to introduce new agricultural technology. On the other hand households 
act as insurers for the individual migrants which hedge them against turbulent 
urban labour market. Remittances help to establish the claim of a migrant over 
KRXVHKROG¶V SURSHUW\ 7KXV FRQWLQXDWLRQ RI UHPLWWDQFHV DSDUW IURP DOWUXLVWLF
reasons, in this regards can explained as an outcome of implicit contract 
between the individual members and the households (Stark 1991, Pages 216-
235). 
 Empirical works on the determinants of international migration are rare 
(LaLonde and Topel 1997). The reason for lack of empirical works is that 
large usable data sets on both individual immigrants and non emigrants are 
rarely available. Given the unavailability of data set, internal migration studies 
are regarded as source of information that drives international migration. 
Using micro-GDWDRQLQGLYLGXDOWKHVHVWXGLHVUHODWHPLJUDQWV¶VWDWXVWRDOLVWRI
observable personal, family and socio economic characteristics.  
 Rotte and Volger (1998) tried to find the determinants of migration 
flow from LDCs to an industrialised country. They used a data set on 
immigration from 86 countries to Germany. The study confirmed the 
importance of differences of living standards. It was found that a U-shaped 
relationship exists between migration and development from which it was 
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concluded that migration would increase in short and medium term if 
economic condition of LDCs improves. The political situation had significant 
negative and network effect had significant positive effects on migration. The 
effects of distances as expected were negative.  
 Another work is World Bank (2006) that used the approach developed 
by Timothy Hatton where migration acts as a form of human capital 
investment. It has been found that the migration rate is positively correlated 
with expected income differentials and negatively correlated with the 
expectations of improved quality of life at home. The significant negative 
effect of the stock of migrants rejects thHFRPPRQO\UHIHUUHG³QHWZRUN´HIIHFW
in some countries and suggested instead that the existence of factors such as 
increased competition in the labour market of the destination country, anti-
immigration policy, racial intolerance, and other factors may make migrant 
stock a poor predictor of future migrant flows. As was expected, distance is 
negatively correlated with the migration rate in all models. 
 We will end the section with some comments on return migration. It 
has been observed some people migrate back to home after some period of 
time. The explanation of return migration is given by risk spreading motive, 
location-VSHFLILF SUHIHUHQFHV KLJKHU SXUFKDVLQJ SRZHU RI KRVW FRXQWU\¶V
currency at home country, higher return to human capital, higher return to self 
employment activities. Optimal migration duration may have inverse relation 
with wage differential as if migration is temporary, then migrants may wish to 
stay in host country for longer period to earn desired income when wage gap is 
small ( Dustman 2003). 
 
 
3. Migrants and Host Country 
 
The most important reason for international migration is wage 
differential and employment opportunity in the country of immigration. A 
related concern of literature on immigration is the real performance of 
immigrants and the effects of immigration in economies of host countries. A 
substantially large and influential literature have discussed this issue. In this 
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section we will discuss them largely based on the reviews like Borjas (1994), 
Freiberg and Hunt (1995), LaLonde and Topel (1997), Gaston and Nelson 
(2007).  
 
 
3.1. Performance of Immigrants 
 
The performance of immigrants in the host country is eventually an 
empirical question. Given the substantial income gap between source and host 
countries, immigration should improve the well being of new immigrants. 
Another question received considerable attention from literature is how 
immigrants perform compared to the natives and other immigrants. In this 
section we will discuss the issues.  
 As mentioned in Borjas (1994) the studies have pointed out that 
immigrants start from a lower earning level compared to the natives. But 
earlier studies (Chiswick 1978 and others) in this regard showed that 
immigrants experience faster rate of growth of earnings compared to the 
native thus they catch up and eventually starts to earn more than the natives of 
similar characteristics (age, years of schooling, marital status etc.). Such as in 
US at the time of arrival immigrants earn about 17 percent less but because of 
faster growth rate immigrants overtake natives within 15 years of arrival. To 
explain the result, it is argued that at the time of arrival, immigrants earn less 
than natives as they lack the country specific skills (e.g. US requires English 
proficiency). It is argued that immigrants are more able and highly motivated 
than natives, that choose to work longer and harder than natives, thus they 
experience faster growth rate of earnings. 
 The empirical strategies of the early literature had been challenged by 
Borjas (1985) by stating that it might be the case that newly arrived 
immigrants were inherently different from those who migrated 20 years ago. 
7KDWLVWKHUHFDQEHLQWULQVLFGLIIHUHQFHVLQSURGXFWLYLW\RIPLJUDQWV¶FRKRUWV
Hence current labour market experiences of those how arrived twenty years 
ago cannot be used to forecast earnings of newly arrived immigrants. The 
cross section showed that immigrants who had been in US for several decades 
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had higher wages than natives. For example those who came between 1950 
and 1960 earned 19.6 percent higher than natives in 1990, those who arrived 
between 1985-1989 earned 31.7 percent less. Thus different cohorts 
experienced different wage growth rates. It was suggested that changes of 
wage structure and relative skills had caused the differences across different 
cohorts. Again when comparing the wage convergence between immigrants 
and ethnically similar natives, evidences showed substantial differences across 
different immigrant cohorts. It had been found that the relative wage of 
successive wave of Mexican immigrants declined in 1980 and 1990. The 
relative wages of other Hispanic and Asian immigrants also fell across 
successive cohorts. In contrast the relative wages of European and Canadian 
immigrants rose between 1970 and 1990. In general white immigrants 
experienced increase and other groups experienced decline in successive 
cohorts.  
 The idea of self selection of immigration had been used to explain the 
decline of relative wages of successive immigrant cohorts arriving in the 
United States. Borjas (1987) proposed the model of self selection that 
postulates that immigrants are not selected randomly from the population of 
source country. The idea is that in order to have immigration taking place we 
must have the expected earnings in host country higher than that of home 
country. Different types of immigrants may experience different earning gaps. 
,WFDQEHWKHFDVHWKDWLPPLJUDQWV¶HDUQLQJVDUHKLJKHULQERWKVRXUFHDQGKRVW
countries. In that case it is said the immigrants are positively selected and 
likely to belong to high skilled group. It can also be the case that in both home 
DQGKRVWFRXQWULHVLPPLJUDQWV¶HDUQLQJVDUHORZHUWKDQWKHDYHUDJHHDUQLQJV
It is then said that immigrants are negatively selected and are from lower tail 
of earning distribution.  It is also possible that immigrants earn lower than the 
average in home but end up in upper tail of earning distribution in host country. 
7KLVKDVEHHQWHUPHGDVµUHIXJHHVRUWLQJ¶7KHH[SHULHQFHVRILPPLJUDQWVWKXV
differ across different cohorts based on how they are selected.   
 Ladonde and Topel (1997, pages 835-836) however mentioned about 
further evidences that immigrants do catch up in 10-20 years with ethnically 
VLPLODUQDWLYHVRIVLPLODUOHYHORIHGXFDWLRQ%XWLPPLJUDQWV¶earnings do not 
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approach those of median native. For example earnings of Mexican 
immigrants approach those of Hispanic natives, but Hispanic natives earn less 
than the equivalent natives of European ancestry.  
 There are also few studies examining immigranWV¶DVVLPLODWLRQLQRWKHU
developed countries (LaLonde and Topel page 836). In contrast to Unites 
States, years spent yield relatively smaller return in countries like Australia, 
Canada, Germany and United Kingdom. To explain this finding, it had been 
argued that immigrants of those countries have skills that are more or less 
similar to the natives. Time spent in receiving country gives incentives to 
immigrants with significant earning disadvantages, to acquire country specific 
skills.  New immigrants, who can earn as much as natives are likely to have 
them already, thus do not experience any return by gradually acquiring them 
further during their stay in receiving countries. 
 
3.2. Impact on Host Country 
 
Another issue received considerable attention in literature is the 
economic effects of immigration in host country, in particular to wage and 
employment opportunities of natives of identical characteristics. This is quite a 
sensitive issue as such economists and policy makers are fairly divided in this 
respect. The general perception is that immigration increases supply of labour 
in host country and many of them are willing to work at a lower wage thus it 
should have a negative effect on wage and employment of native workers. The 
assumption here is that immigrants are in production perfect substitute to the 
natives. But as many studies pointed out immigrants can be complement or 
imperfect substitute, thus can have positive or modest negative effect on the 
earnings of natives. In this section we will have a brief overview of related 
literature. 
 The theoretical predictions of effects of immigration depend on the 
model used (Freiberg and Hunt 1995 pages 28-30). In the closed economy 
model immigration lowers the price of factors with which they are perfect 
substitute, have an ambiguous effect on the price of factors to which they are 
imperfectly substitute and raise the price of factors to which they are 
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complement. Such as if immigrants substitute low skilled workers and 
complement capital then price of low skilled workers will fall and capital will 
increase. In the open economy model wage rates across countries can differ 
when countries have very different endowment of factors. In that case 
migration can force the country to use a more labour intensive mix of products 
which will lower wage rate. If the migrant receiving country is a large one, 
then increase of output of labour intensive product may reduce world price 
which can reduce wage rate further.  
 This model however can not explain unemployment due to 
immigration. It can be explained using efficiency wage models in which wage 
is high above the market clearing rate to give workers incentive not to shirk, as 
if caught shirking may result in unemployment. Thus equilibrium 
unemployment is used as workers discipline device. In this model the influx of 
immigration increases the size of labour force, which allows firms to lower 
wage and raise employment. But lower wage must be accompanied by a rise in 
unemployment rate to maintain workers incentive not to shirk. The rise of 
unemployment rate can be distributed among the native and immigrants. 
 The empirical literature in this regards is enormous but full of 
contradictory results (Borjas et al. 2008). Some studies claimed substantial 
effects of immigration on wage and employment and others reported only 
negligible impact. The debates and controversies surrounding economic 
effects of immigration largely result from the methods used in estimation.    
 The early empirical studies used the so called area approach where 
large metropolitan areas were held as proxies of closed geographic units where 
immigration occurs (Freiberg and Hunt 1995, page 30-31). This approach is 
justified by saying that immigrants are small relative to the overall labour 
force but they tend to concentrate in major metropolitan cities. Thus the 
effects of immigration should be felt mainly within those metropolitan cities. 
For example proportion of immigrants in many cities and the level of wage in 
those cities can be used to identify the effects of immigration on wage. The 
empirical literatures based on this approach found only small and negligible 
effects of immigration on the wage and employment opportunities. For 
example in USA, Altonji and Card (1991, page 203) in instrumental variable 
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estimate found that an inflow of immigrants equal to 1 percent of population 
of standard metropolitan areas of USA reduces average weekly wage by about 
1.2 percent. LaLonde and Topel (1991, page 190) also found that immigration 
reduces the earnings of immigrants and their close substitutes but the effect is 
not large. For immigrants themselves, a sustained doubling of the rate of new 
immigrants may reduce the relative earnings of new immigrants by 3 percent 
but this effect tends to die out as immigrants assimilate to American market.   
 Borjas (1994, page 1699) criticised the area approach by saying that 
metropolitan areas are not closed economy. Labour, capital and goods flow in 
and out of the locality freely. As long as the native workers and firms respond 
to immigration by moving out of the locality there is no reason to expect 
correlation between wage of natives and presence of immigrants. In response 
to the criticisms, recent studies on the effects of immigration are incorporating 
the issue. Card (2001) again used area approach but incorporated internal 
migration by natives. He concluded that (page 56) new immigration has not 
generated any large offsetting outflow of natives and similarly skilled 
immigrants. As a result the cities experienced a rise in low skilled populations. 
Card concluded that immigrant inflow effects employment rate of natives but 
implied effect as a whole is small, even in the bottom of skill distribution only 
modest employment effect of new immigration was found. 
 Borjas (2003), instead of local labour market used national level data 
and found significant effects of immigration on wage of natives. From 1980 to 
2000, immigration increased labour supply by 11 percent. This immigration 
reduced wage of average native workers by 3.2 percent, high school drop out 
by 8.9 percent and 4.9 percent for college graduates.  
 The above discussion will give a brief idea about the debates 
surrounding the wage and employment effects of immigration on natives. The 
debate is still to be resolved. As stated by Ottaviano and Peri (2008), national 
data approach (e.g. Borjas 2003) found large negative effects on less educated 
workers. However cross area approach (e.g. Card 2001) have found small or 
insignificant effects. Ottaviano and Peri (2008) themselves reworked with 
national data approach of Borjas by enriching the methodology. They found 
that the finding of large negative effects of national approach is largely driven 
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by imprecise estimates of elasticity of substitution between workers of 
different education level. They found evidence of imperfect substitution 
between natives and immigrants. However Borjas et al. (2008) reworking with 
2WWDYLDQR DQG 3HUL¶V VWXG\ KDYH IRXQG WKDW WKH UHVXOW GHSHQGV RQ WKH ZD\
sample of working persons is constructed. For example finding of immigrant 
native complementarity disappear just by removing high school students from 
data. Borjas et al.( 2008) suggested that one can not reject the hypothesis that 
comparable native and immigrants are perfect substitute. Thus the studies are 
yet to arrive at a general consensus regarding the effects of immigration on the 
wage of natives of comparable skills. 
  
3.3. Temporary and Contract Workers  
 
Temporary and contractual workers constitute a significant part of 
WRGD\¶V PLJUDWLRQ 7KH SURFHVVes of determination of wage of such workers 
and their effects on host country have not been studied much. It can be 
presumed that wage of such workers are determined through negotiation 
between host countries (or their agents) and sending countries governments (or 
their agents) but exact process of such negotiation is rather obscure. In USA or 
Europe such migration is probably still negligible part of total immigration but 
in Asia it is the dominant form of labour migration. In Gulf countries, total 
number of temporary workers can be well above the total population such as 
in Dubai about 82 percent of the population is foreign born (Benton-Short et al. 
2005). Most of them are obviously temporary workers but it is really difficult 
to confirm how wage rates of such migrants are determined. One example is 
(IOM 2003) which has several times pointed to the competition among the 
sending countries, but provided no discussion on exact wage determination 
process. 
 The literature of wage determination and effects of immigration as a 
whole is probably not applicable for temporary /contract labour migration.  
Before employing foreign workers, employers are normally require to state 
that such employee is not available within the native labour market. One of the 
oldest successful coQWUDFWXDO ODERXU PLJUDWLRQ SURJUDPPHV LV &DQDGD¶V
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Seasonal Agricultural Programme initiated in 1960s. The reason of the 
initiation of the programme was the unavailability of agricultural workers in 
pick seasons even at a high market wage (Verma 2003). The contractual 
workers are often not allowed to change the job. Thus the question of labour 
market opportunities is not applicable to them. The wage the contract workers 
can also differ significantly on the basis of country of origin such as the wage 
rates of workers in gulf areas. Given this it appears that there is a great need of 
some empirical researches directed to evaluate wage determination process 
and effects of temporary workers on the economies of host countries.  
 
 
 
4. µBrain Drain¶ and µBrain Gain¶ 
 
4.1. A Review of the Literature 
 
 Since early 1960s, economists are debating about the potential cost or 
benefit of human migration. The general idea is that those who are migrating 
to developed countries are the educated/high skilled people of developing 
countries. For example scientists, doctors, engineers etc. Migration of the 
highly educated people was regarded as detrimental to the welfare a country, 
WKHUHIRUH WHUPHG DV ³%UDLQ 'UDLQ´ 7KH UHFHQW OLWHUDWXUH RQ KXPDQ FDSLWDO
formation is however trying to establish that migration opportunity may 
actually provide incentive to form additional human capital thereby causing 
Brain Gain in stead of Brain Drain In this section we survey the literature 
starting from influential paper of Grubel and Scott. 
Grubel and Scott (1966) argued against the view that migration is 
detrimental for those who left behind. They argued that a country loses by 
emigration of highly skilled individuals is almost always valid when the 
objective of the country is to increase military or economic power. They 
referred this concept as outmoded and instead proposed to use the concept of 
country as a collection of individual whose collective welfare is to be 
maximised. Most important determinants of human welfare in the long run is 
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the standard of living- the quantity of goods and services available for 
consumption thus emigration should be welcomed whenever two conditions 
are fulfilled that is emigrant improves his own income and his departure does 
not reduce the income of those remaining behind. If human capital embodied 
in emigrants is greater than the countries total per capita endowment of human 
and physical capital then emigration of high skilled people reduces the total 
income to be distributed among residents of a country. But in market economy 
where individuals are paid their marginal product, this reduction of income is 
just a statistical phenomenon which has no effect on the welfare of those 
remaining behind. Emigrants remove both his contribution of national output 
and income that gives him a claim of his share so that others income remain 
unchanged. Given this, any effect that the emigration of highly skilled person 
is likely to have is through short run adjustment costs or market failures. The 
short run costs are due to production losses, size of which depends on rate of 
short run substitutability of other factors of production or skills for those that 
have emigrated and the speed of replacement of emigrants. The market may 
fail to adjust in long run if the person possesses special skill which can not be 
replaced through training. If it is possible to train a doctor than the service of 
emigrated doctor is lost only for the period required to train another doctor. 
Thus emigration imposes only short run frictional cost to society which 
disappears in the long run. It is sometimes argued that public education is a 
social investment which the emigrants fail to repay. Against this argument 
they stated that the public expenditure is financed by tax and average burden 
of financing education IDOOLQJRQWKHHPLJUDQW¶VJHQHUDWLRQLVQRWFKDQJHGE\
his departure. The emigrant takes along not just his contribution of tax revenue 
but also his children on whom the share of revenue would have been spent. 
In addition of showing that emigration of highly skilled persons 
reduces welfare of remaining people only in rare circumstance, they also 
suggested that emigration may actually increase welfare in several ways. 
Emigrants are known to raise the income level of family through remittances. 
They can influence the policy of the country of new residence toward the 
native country. They can give counsel and advice. The potentially largest 
benefit of people remaining behind may accrue through pure research of 
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scientists and engineers in foreign country. The product of basic research is a 
free good available to all when it is published. As conditions of work in new 
country are better the productivity is high, so native country gains more from 
scientists emigrating outside. 
Berry and Soligo (1969) noted that benefit or loss of emigration is 
interlinked with ownership of capital. Their analysis includes both static and 
dynamic analysis of emigration. In both comparative static case and dynamic 
case emigration is found to cause loss to the remaining population as a whole 
except where emigrant groups own a relatively high proportion of capital 
stock or have a relatively high wealth holding propensity and when they leave 
some of their capital behind them in the home country.  
Kenen (1971) conducted standard trade theoretic analysis of 
emigration. In a one product economy with two factors capital and labour, 
emigration will have following impacts- total product should fall, marginal 
product of labour rise and capital decline and average product of labour rise. 
In a two product closed economy migration of labour reduces production of 
labour intensive commodity and increases the production of capital intensive 
commodity. The price of labour intensive product rises, which raises the 
marginal product of labour and reduced the marginal product of capital. 
However the gain of labourers can not compensate the loss of owners of 
capital.  In case of two product open economy the result is mixed. If terms of 
trade is fixed, then is there is no loss or gain of welfare as no redistribution 
will take place by emigration of a portion of labour. If price is not fixed, then 
when the country exports labour intensive good, a reduction of production will 
increase the price and thereby can improve the welfare. On the other hand if 
source country exports capital intensive commodity, international price of 
capital intensive commodity reduces and lower is the welfare of remaining 
population.  
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) marked starting of a new generation of 
models of emigration known as models with distortion. They reckoned that 
wage of high skilled individual of a developing country can be higher and 
fixed above the market clearing wage due to international emulation and 
associated wage fixation or wage legislation. The wage of the unskilled people 
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FDQDOVREH IL[HGGXH WR ³OHDS-IURJJLQJ´SURFHVV that follows the fixation of 
wage rate by skilled labour. Given this assumption they analysed the effects of 
migration in a general equilibrium framework. They assumed that the country 
produces two products, one using high and another using low or unskilled 
labour. For the labour market equilibrium expected wage of two types of 
labour must be same. The cost of education is borne by governments and 
therefore deducted from income equation. When a part of educated labour 
force can migrate abroad national income always decreases due to higher cost 
of educating more labour.  The supply of educated labour due to higher 
expected wage can be more or less than the amount of migration. As 
population decreases, average or per capita income decreases if cost of 
training of all educated labour is larger than the employment rate of educated 
labour. National welfare decreases unless reduced unemployment rate in 
unskilled sector offsets the loss due to decreased per capita income and 
increased unemployment in skilled sector. Bhagwati and Hamada also 
analysed the case where cost of education is internalised that is labourers 
themselves bear the cost of education. It has been found that internalisation of 
cost of education can improve the income of the country.  
Kwok and Leland (1982) argued that the cited cause of migration such 
as lack of employment opportunities, lower salary, and preference for living 
abroad is not enough for explaining migration of high skilled people from a 
booming economy. They argued that asymmetric information as a cause for 
foreign trained students not to return home after study. They showed that how 
the decision by an initially small group of graduates not to return home 
country may eventually cause almost all graduates to remain abroad. They 
assumed that employers of foreign country can explicitly observe productivity 
of each foreign trained individual but employers in home cannot. Thus the 
wage they offer is only the average wage which is not based on individual 
productivity. As a result workers will return if the wage in abroad is lower 
than the wage in home. As home producers gather information about 
productivity from market, return of individuals with lower productivity will 
lower the average wage. Thus the country loses its most educated individuals 
abroad which causes Brain Drain. 
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Miyagiwa (1991) pointed that the literature of Brain Drain is 
unsatisfactory in two respects. Firstly it typically treats skilled and unskilled 
labour as two separate factors of production fixed in supply and analyse Brain 
Drain as a special case in theory of international factor mobility. This 
approach however ignores the effect of Brain Drain on the process of skill 
formation. Secondly the literature so far focused on the consequences of brain 
drain rather than its causes except the paper by Kwok and Leland (1982).  The 
objective of this paper is to emphasis increasing returns to scale in advanced 
education. The basic idea stem from the observation that productivity of 
professional work increases with an increase in numbers of similar 
professionals concentrated in one location. Professional researchers engaged 
in interaction and communication with one another is more productive than 
the professionals working alone. Given this background Miyagiwa presented a 
model of brain drain emphasizing the scale effect of advanced education by 
assuming an economy endowed with individuals with different level of latent 
ability. The economy is assumed to produce a single aggregate commodity 
with labour alone. In the absence of advanced education all individuals remain 
unskilled regardless of their levels of ability. Acquisition of advanced 
education enables an individual to perform and earn an income according to 
his or her ability. The returns to higher education are assumed to increase with 
number of people receiving education. When students bear the cost of 
education a rational individual acquires education when the return to higher 
education is more than the wage of an unskilled individual. The paper then 
showed that the most gifted individual acquires education even if no one 
acquires that. He now considers two countries in one of which (America) 
greater percentage of people takes higher education implying that individual 
possessing certain number of skills earn more compared to the other country 
(Taiwan). Thus individuals from one country (Taiwan) have incentives to 
migrate to America.  The inflow of skills in America increases the returns of 
individuals in America and reduces it in Taiwan. Thus every Taiwanese 
individual with higher income after migration will migrate to America. The 
inflow of foreign worker increases national income of America in two ways, 
first economies of scale raises the income for the Americans who are already 
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educated. Secondly a higher professional income induces a segment of 
Americans who were previously uneducated to acquire higher education. In 
Taiwan, most gifted individuals always gain from migration. The second 
group of individuals migrate even though the wage after migration is lower 
than the present wage as migration of the most gifted individual reduces their 
wage rates at home. The third group does not take education when migration 
opportunity is possible while they would acquire higher education without 
migration of gifted individuals. The paper concludes that instead of the 
traditional view that migration reduces welfare of those who remain behind, it 
argues that professionals possessing intermediate level ability are actually hurt 
by Brain Drain.  
Recent works on Brain Drain literature are attempting to recognise the 
beneficial side of human migration through its positive incentives in human 
capital formation. The main message of the literature is that when migration is 
possible returns to human capital increases which give incentives to form 
more human capital. If newly formed capital is more than the amount migrated, 
we have Brain Gain instead of Brain Drain. 
One of the first papers of this literature is Stark et al. (1997). In this 
paper the economy consists of equally skilled high-skilled and low-skilled 
workers. The optimal levels of human capital acquired by high skilled and low 
skilled workers are different. The cost of acquiring human capital is higher for 
low skilled workers and lower for high skilled workers. Wages are higher in 
foreign country compared to home country. The home country workers have a 
preference for home country life style therefore wage received in foreign 
country is discounted by given rate to compare with home wage. It is assumed 
that the skill levels of migrants are unknown to foreign employers. Therefore 
in the first period they offer all migrants the average wage of high skilled and 
low skilled workers in foreign country. But in the second period individuals 
skill levels are identified using a screening device and wage is offered 
accordingly. Given higher average wage in foreign country, all types of 
workers migrate in first period. But in second period low skilled workers 
return to home country if the discounted wage of foreign country is lower than 
the wage of home. High skilled workers remain in foreign country. Migration 
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results in Brain Gain if optimal level of human capital acquired by low skilled 
workers is higher compared to the average level of human capital without 
migration opportunity. 
Mountford (1997) showed that when educational decisions are 
endogenous and if successful emigration is not certainty, Brain Drain may 
increase productivity. The possibly of migration raises the return of education 
that leads to increased human capital formation and may out weight brain 
drain. Additionally migration also has effects on income distribution dynamics. 
,WLVDVVXPHGWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV¶DFFXPXODWLRQRIKXPDQFDSLWDOLVDIXQFWLRQRI
SDUHQWV¶ OHYHO RI KXPDQ FDSLWDO DQG UHVRXUFHV invested in human capital 
accumulation. Thus, the greater the human capital of parents, the easier is the 
accumulation of human capital for offspring. The offspring of the parents who 
remain in home country now tend to acquire higher education and average 
level of human capital tend to rise in long run. Temporary migration 
opportunity is beneficial for the economy. But if Brain Drain is continued the 
economy ends up with low level of human capital. 
Stark et al. (2002) proposed a different model but came out with 
similar conclusion of Stark et al. (1997). They argued that the prospect of 
migration can induce individuals to form the socially desirable optimum level 
of human capital. The individuals do not consider positive externalities that 
human capital confers to production and acquire less human capital than the 
desirable level. There is a need to subsidise education in order to form socially 
optimum level of human capital. The paper argued that the prospect of 
migration may act as a substitute of subsidy by giving incentives to acquire 
more human capital. A controlled migration policy can be an effective 
instrument to enhance the level of human capital and increase welfare of the 
economy. The paper worked with both homogenous and heterogeneous 
workforces though the results are similar. The paper has assumed that 
production is a function of the level of individual human capital plus 
externalities arise from economy wide average level of human capital. 
Externalities in production arise as individuals acquiring human capital make 
each other more productive. The paper then derived the chosen level of human 
capital by workers. When all workers are identical, the chosen level of human 
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capital by individual workers is same as average level of human capital in the 
economy. When deciding to form about human capital, individuals do not 
internalise the economy wide average level as such the equilibrium level of 
human capital is less than the socially optimum level.  It was then showed that 
in absence of migration, government can use a combination of subsidy and tax 
policy to achieve the optimum level of human capital.  
The paper argued that migration can act as a tool to mitigate 
inefficiencies arising from human capital externalities. Given the possibility of 
higher earnings in foreign country, individual workers choose to form more 
human capital than they choose in absence of possibility of migration. The 
benefit of home country from migration arises when possibility of migration 
makes the non-migrants better off. The paper showed that benefit of migration 
increases up to a unique migration probability. Given that probability, the 
paper argued that restrictive migration policy by home country can achieve the 
socially desired optimum level of human capital. On the other hand a liberal 
migration policy can reduce welfare of workers who stay in home country. 
Another paper that forwarded similar proposition is Beine et al. (2001). 
In addition to proposing a theory, they also tried to provide empirical evidence 
in support of the theory. The model depicted a small open economy with over 
lapping generation of two period-lived individuals. In first period, the agents 
have possibility to allocate a share of their time to education. In second period, 
they supply a fixed quantity of labour and their productivity depends on their 
investment in human capital when young. It is assumed that individuals have 
different abilities to learn. The individual takes both domestic and foreign 
wage in comparison when deciding about investing in human capital but they 
all face a fixed probability of migration.  The ability of critical agent at which 
individual is indifferent between working abroad or home is higher when 
migration probability is low and high when migration probability is low. Then 
they showed that equilibrium growth rate is directly proportional to the 
number of educated people who remain home, which they called drain effect. 
On the other hand growth rate is decreasing function the ability of critical 
agent which they have called brain effect. Beneficial Brain Drain occurs when 
brain effects dominated drain effects. After identifying the conditions at which 
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migration can benefit a country through increased human capital formation, 
the paper attempted an empirical investigation from a sample of 37 developing 
countries. The estimation showed positive and significant correlation between 
migration and wage differentials, strong and significant negative correlation 
between migration and population size. The estimation depicted a positive 
relation between human capital accumulation and growth. The variable for 
migration, depicting drain effect was found insignificant. Though the 
estimation procedure had serious limitations, they concluded that empirical 
evidences do not reject theoretical analysis.  
There are a few other works but inherent messages are almost similar. 
Fan and Stark (2007) provided an alternative analysis of educated 
unemployment problem. The paper showed that given the prospect of 
migration and getting higher wage in foreign country, individuals can 
voluntarily remain unemployed in order to have time to search job in foreign 
FRXQWU\ZKLFKPD\FDXVH³HGXFDWHGXQHPSOR\PHQW´REVHUYHGLQGHYHORSLQJ
countries. Therefore a developing country may end up with more educated 
workers despite brain drain and educated unemployment. The paper assumed 
two countries titled as home (H) and foreign (F). Only educated individuals of 
H have a chance to migrate to F. In first stage, after graduating from university, 
the individual participates in a draw that results in probable work in F. In 
second stage, those who did not win in lottery faces the choices: to work in H 
or to face another draw. Waiting for another draw frees time for job search. It 
has been showed that the number of individuals taking university education 
increases as probability of migration rises but leads to increase in 
unemployment of university graduates. The paper then showed that the 
number of university graduates remaining in home country increases up to a 
unique migration probability. As there are fewer individuals in the country 
under feasible migration, the average level of human capital is higher with 
migration. The paper commented that higher average human capital can play a 
crucial role in determining long-run output growth. 
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4.2. &ULWLFLVPVRIµ%UDLQ*DLQ¶/LWHUDWXUH 
 
 In the above review we have discussed about some papers of the 
literature of Brain Drain. Though there are many concerns about Brain Drain 
within general public and politicians, in summary, it can be said that the 
theoretical literature does not necessarily argue against migration, in fact a few 
of them showed that migration can actually be beneficial for sending country. 
Nevertheless, the recent literature on beneficial Brain Drain appears too 
simple with the claim. They do not take into consideration a few common 
aspects of human migration. They just have classified skills as high or low 
skills but in reality, different types of jobs require different types of skills. For 
example, taking mathematics class would require skill in mathematics but 
working as a chef in restaurant requires skill in preparing different types of 
dishes. It is not possible for an individual to master all types of skills. In the 
planned immigration programme foreign countries demand individuals with 
special skills such as doctors, agriculturalists, chefs, electricians etc. Though 
some skills are expensive to acquire compared to others, foreign market 
demand does not depend on the cost of acquiring skill. For example, foreign 
market may demand more nurses, but the cost of training doctors may be 
higher. The foreign market may demand some skills that do not have much 
demand in home country such as language skills. Therefore in order to migrate 
if individuals want to form more human capital, they may form it in 
accordance to foreign demand. If they fail to migrate, the acquired human 
capital may find no use in home.  The investment and time spent acquiring 
additional or new human capital is hence just wasted. A country therefore 
should be careful in depending on receiving incentives from a foreign country 
in forming human capital to be used within its territory.    
 A criticism of new literatures can be found in Schiff (2006) though it 
to some extent failed to take into consideration the differences in skills as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. The argument of the paper can be 
summarised as follows: 
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a. Individual/group heterogeneity: 
 
 
Positive probability of migration increases expected wage of 
individuals of home country. Thus low ability individuals who previously 
deterred from investing in education now invest in education. Though more 
people are obtaining education, average ability level of individuals with 
migration is lower than no-migration situation. If the ratio of newly educated 
individuals to total educated individuals is equal or less than migration 
probability, migration will definitely result in lowering effective human capital 
stock. Migration may result in Brain Gain only if the ratio is higher than 
migration probability, though it is not certain.  
 
b. Unskilled migration: 
 
 
The brain gain literatures show that expected returns of education 
increase with migration. When both skilled and unskilled labours can migrate 
expected returns of education fall. Thus when both skilled and unskilled 
labours can migrate Brain Gain is small. 
 
c. Brain waste and negative Brain Gain: 
 
 
Foreign workers are often hired to do jobs for which they are 
overqualified. Some destination countries only hire unskilled workers, 
irrespective of qualification, but attract both types of workers as unskilled 
wage of foreign country is higher than skilled wage of home country, which 
reduces incentives to acquire more education. 
 
d. General equilibrium effects: 
 
 
An increase in education requires additional fund. Time spent on 
education means less work and lower income tax revenues. The fiscal 
authorities can increase tax or reduce educational subsidies or reduce other 
expenditures. A reduction in other public expenditures involves reduction of 
health expenditures. Because human capital depends on both education and 
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health, a reduction in health expenditures may reduce human capital. The new 
Brain Gain literature assumes that only education has positive externalities. 
But other sectors of the economy also have externalities. A reduction of other 
public expenditures constitutes loss of positive externalities thereby reduces 
the effects of Brain Gain on welfare and growth. 
 
 
e. Migration probability: 
 
In the literature, it is assumed that the home country controls migration. 
But except for a few countries like China, migration is controlled by the 
destination countries. It is also assumed that migration probability is 
H[RJHQRXV WKDW LV LQGHSHQGHQW RI LQGLYLGXDO¶V HGXFDWLRQ GHFLVLRQ %XW PRVW
destination countries keep a quota for new immigrants. Thus the migration 
probability is likely to change with the change in stock of educated people. 
When migration raises educational expenditure, stock of educated people 
increases and migration probability falls. The stock will thereby increase at a 
decreasing rate and become zero in steady-state. On the other hand if 
migration causes Brain Drain, that is, net increase in human capital is less than 
the migrated amount, steady state stock is smaller than the initial one. Thus 
migration may result in lesser Brain Gain than argued by new literature and 
even can have negative Brain Gain. 
  
4.3. Empirical WRUNVRQµ%UDLQ'UDLQ¶DQGµ%UDLQ*DLQ¶ 
 
 A few papers have attempted to empirically investigate the hypothesis 
of Brain Drain (Gain). One attempt as mentioned before is Beine et al. (2001). 
The work is however not quite up to the point in examining Brain Drain 
(Gain) hypothesis. We have found two recent attempts that have explicitly 
tried to address this issue. We will discuss them below.  
 One of the papers are Commander et al. (2004b) that tried to 
investigate the beneficial Brain Drain hypothesis that skilled migration can be 
good for sending country through the incentives it creates for training, that 
increase supply of skilled labour. The study was based on two surveys of 
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overseas doctors working in UK- a small telephone survey and a larger 
internet and postal survey. The data is based on the subjective statement of 
migrant doctors themselves. In summery their result suggested only relatively 
weak links between migration possibilities and decision to study medicine 
from which they concluded that the educational channel of beneficial effect of 
Brain Drain is not particularly plausible. However about 45% doctors 
interviewed in small survey send remittances to home country. On average 
remittances were 16% of their incomes in UK. Considerable number of 
doctors (about 50% also showed intention to return back to country. The result 
suggests that remittances and return migration are more important then 
educational incentives for sending country to gain from migration. 
 Commander et al. (2004a) is another work that tried to address the 
issue of Brain Drain. This work is based on a dataset of 225 Indian software 
firms.  The data set provides a detailed look at output and skill composition of 
these firms and their exposure since 1999 to 2002 to the loss of skilled 
personnel to firms in developed countries. They concluded that the results, on 
balance, are not generally consistent with an adverse Brain Drain story. In the 
first place, the software industry has been marked by a variety of types of 
cross-border mobility, much of them are temporary. Firms in the sample 
reported that very significant shares of their workforces performed some parts 
of their works on or off site in developed countries. Further a significant 
number of those employed have experiences of working in a developed 
country. Moreover, the share of skilled workers with such experience has 
tended to be positively associated with current and lagged incidence of skilled 
migration from the firm. They concluded that it points to the presence of 
network effects as well as confirming the importance of temporary mobility. 
 The limiting factor of the two papers is that they are trying to 
investigate only the impact of the high skilled migration from two sectors- 
doctors and engineers. As mentioned earlier, considering skills as just high or 
low skill is a gross mistake that the literature in general seems to suffer. Skills 
can be severely different from each other. Foreign market can demand any of 
them plus not all high skills are demanded by foreign country.  For example in 
most countries law profession is considered as respectable and high income 
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SURIHVVLRQ EXW WKH\ GRQ¶W KDYH IRUHLJQ GHPDQG Another way to look at the 
issue is that foreign market may demand low skills instead of high skills such 
as nurses or chefs for restaurant instead of doctors and engineers. Thus 
according to Brain Gain hypothesis more people in home should be trained in 
these skills instead of becoming doctors and engineers. Based on this 
argument it appears that there is a great need of empirical works aimed at 
identifying the effects of foreign market demanding particular skills, in the 
skill formation of the country of emigration. 
 
 
 
5. Migration, Remittances and Economic Development 
 
 Governments and International bodies are recently emphasising on 
migration and remittances to meet the goal of development. In order to 
understand the linkage between international migration and economic 
development we first need to know how fulfilment of the development goals 
can be facilitated by international migration. In this section we will devote our 
discussion on this topic. This emphasis of linking migration and remittances to 
economic development can be observed in a number of recent initiatives of 
UN, World Bank, IOM and other organisations. Though the development 
discussion often refers to the gain of developing countries, the developed 
countries in reality also can receive substantial benefit from international 
migration. Thus we first discuss it in the context of developed countries and 
later on discuss in relation to developing countries. 
 
5.1. Developed Countries 
 
5.1.1. Declining Labour Force 
 
 Why developed countries recruit migrants from other countries? The 
question is simple to meet the labour market needs. It is well known that the 
labour forces of developed countries are declining gradually. As mentioned in 
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the World Bank (2006), the wage group that supplies the bulk of labour force 
(15-65 yrs) is expected to peak near 500 millions in 2010 and then fall to 
around 475 by 2025. In Japan the labour force has already started to shrink. In 
Europe it has reached the peak in 2007-08. For USA the peak will come 
around 2015. Thus there will be a great shortage of labour force in those 
countries in near future.  It is needless to say the fall in labour force will be 
accompanied by a rise in dependency ratio. 
 
5.1.2. Demand for Additional Workforce 
 
Point base immigration system is now a common practice in developed 
countries. The aim of point based immigration system is to acquire high 
skilled and wealthy manpower from other parts of the world. While the reason 
behind high skill is the market demand for such manpower, the reason behind 
wealthy manpower is capital transfer and exclusion of immigrants from social 
security benefits to keep entitlements exclusive to natives. In addition 
immigrants often fulfil the demand of labour in jobs disliked by natives such 
as cleaning, construction, manufacture, agriculture etc. As mentioned in 
Verma (2003) the agricultural sector of Canada in sixties felt shortage of 
labour as domestic workers were unwilling to work in farms in rural areas 
even at a high market wage rate. The presence of immigrants is probably 
keeping wage rates of these services within affordable limit.  
 
5.1.3. Enhancing Tax Base 
 
Migrants are probably helping to enhance the tax base of the developed 
countries. The dependency ratio of the developed countries is rising gradually. 
Thus there is a need to generate extra revenue to fund the public expenditure 
such as roads, infrastructure, health services, education etc. A planned 
migration program can lower the fiscal burden of natives to some extent. 
(Storesletten 2000) analysed the case where government faces increased fiscal 
pressure due to ageing of population. He showed that regulated programme 
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aiming to allow entry of young high/medium skilled can contribute in 
sustaining the fiscal policies of government. 
A common perception in developed countries is that income of 
immigrants are low thereby their contribution to tax revenue is low. In 
addition, it is thought that illegal migrants do not pay any tax at all. Thus 
immigrants are considered as a burden for a country in term of public 
expenditure. This view is quite faulty. Legal migrants pay income tax 
according to their wages but are often not eligible for receiving social benefit 
because of conditions attached to visa documents. Some work permit holders 
are required to work for a certain period of time (e. g. 5 years) before they can 
apply for permanent residency and get entitlement to receive public funds. But 
before this time period they are not legally considered eligible to receive all 
the benefits as applicable to residents. Even illegal migrants do pay tax; a 
simple example of it is consumption tax like VAT. Some illegal migrants 
obtain counterfeit tax identification number to obtain jobs. The tax they pay 
can effectively be higher than legal workers (Lipman 2006). In addition many 
people of developed countries receive substantial amount of unemployment 
benefit. As migrants are usually young, employed and citizens of other 
countries they are usually excluded from receiving the benefits. But they are 
subject to payment of same taxes as natives. Thus transfer of benefit from 
migrants to natives is the most likely the case.  
 
5.2. Developing Countries 
 
 There are a number of channels through which international migration 
can facilitate the fulfilment of development goals of poor developing countries. 
In many developing countries remittances is an important part of export 
earnings. The remittances are expected to enhance investment, reduce poverty, 
improve health and educational expenditure. In addition migration can induce 
formation of additional human capital. The return migrants can be source of 
dissemination of knowledge and technology from developed to developed 
countries. But to what extent international migration is actually fulfilling the 
objectives is an empirical question. We will briefly discuss some issues below. 
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5.2.1. Consumption, Investment and Remittances 
 
 A common perception in developing countries is that a substantial 
fraction of income from remittances is used in unproductive things like 
personal consumption, purchase of land and building residences etc. But it is 
often not understood that these increased consumptions are really important 
for the families unable to meet minimum requirements of food and shelter. 
Thus the importance of remittances to boost up househoOGV¶VWDQGDUGRIOLYLQJ
needs to be properly recognised. A recent study has showed that a 10 percent 
increase in per capita official remittances leads to 3.5 percent decline in the 
share of people living in poverty (World Bank 2006, page 120-121). Though 
there is claim that remittances may lead to further inequality but evidences are 
not so far clear (World Bank 2006).  
 Furthermore the studies are showing that migration can also spur 
investment expenditure by households. In Mexico it has been found that 
households with international migration spent more on investment and less on 
consumption than other households of same income level. Similarly another 
study on Egypt showed that households receiving more income from 
remittances spent more on investment expenditures (Taylor 2006). On the 
other hand some studies also showed that migration and remittances may have 
negative effects on investment. In Pakistan migration was found to effect non- 
farm investment negatively. The result suggests that the factors, such as 
absence of male members, can be more important than binding resource 
constraints. Nevertheless the household with return migrants are found to 
invest substantially higher in non-farm and agricultural lands (Mansuri 2007). 
Another interesting work is Yang (2008) that studied the effects of exchange 
UDWH VKRFNV RQ )LOLSLQR PLJUDQWV¶ KRXVHKROGV GXULQJ ¶V ILQDQFLDO FULVLV
The income shock due to appreciation of foreign currency was found to have 
negligible effect on consumption. Instead households have been found to 
increase educational expenditure, taking children out of labour force, raised 
work time in self employment and have started capital intensive 
entrepreneurial activities.  
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 Network effect is perhaps another channel through which migration 
can enhance investment. Migration creates demand for local products in 
foreign ethnic market. This demand can enhance investment in production, 
procurement and processing of those local products in country of origin. In 
addition wealthy and established migrants are found to invest in business not 
just in the locality but all over the country of origin. Thus migration and 
remittances in many ways can spur investment expenditure. 
 
5.2.2. Educational, Health Expenditure and Human Capital 
 
 The increased earning through remittances is expected to be used for 
increased educational and health expenditures. A number of studies have 
showed that migration and remittances do have positive effects on the level of 
health and educational expenditures of households (World Bank 2006, Acosta 
et al. 2007, Mansuri 2007). The effects of migration on endowment of human 
capital of a country have received extensive attention of theoretical literature. 
As already discussed there are claims that migration can have positive effects 
on human capital formation of a country. But the claim is yet to be confirmed 
by empirical literature. Besides there are some evidences that migration can 
negatively influence human capital formation by raising the endowment of 
locally unproductive human capital thus can deprive the country of necessary 
human capital. McKenzie (2006) has found that migration can negatively 
influence educational attainment such as it lowers the completed years of 
education by 1.4 years for boys and 1.7 years for girls. As an explanation it is 
stated that children aged 16-18 migrate to obtain work thus drop out of schools. 
With migration, future return to education in home is lower for children who 
intend to migrate, thus aspirations of education are lower. Moreover, absence 
of migrating parents results in less supervision and there is a need to undertake 
household works in place of migrant adults.   
 The effects of return migration in this regard needs to be studied. In 
Stark et al. (1997) return migration plays crucial role in enhancing human 
capital endowment. But the work experiences gained by migrants in a foreign 
country may not be useful in country of origin or may not add anything above 
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the experiences of similar types of works at home. This is broadly applicable 
to all types of professions like doctors, engineers, technicians, teachers etc. It 
is however possible for these people to introduce new technologies back home 
using the experiences they have gained such as the use of new medical 
equipments. Enhanced human capital due to migration may increase a 
FRXQWU\¶VDELOLW\RIOHDQLQJIURPDIRUHLJQWHFKQRORJ\EDVH/HH$JDLQ
sole reliance on foreign experience and externally innovated technologies may 
hinder the way of development of domestic technologies and professionals.     
 
 
5.2.3. Migration and Labour Market 
 
 Migration may influence the labour market of country of origin in two 
ways. As already mentioned, migration may increase investment expenditure 
thereby create additional employment. But the country may experience 
shortage of manpower specially skilled manpower. The shortage of manpower 
may result in lower investment (Mansuri 2007) and low educational 
attainment by children of migrating parents (McKenzie 2006). Remittances 
may induce people to become less active as indicated by Acosta (2007). But 
when a country is characterised by large disparity of income and high income 
region feel shortage of manpower due to international migration, the country 
may observe internal migration within regions. This is a very interesting issue 
to explore as internal migration here can be caused by both the shortage of 
manpower and enhanced capital investment. Empirical studies in this regards 
is highly desirable. 
 
5.2.4. Macroeconomic Effects of Remittances 
 
 Macroeconomic importance of remittances is substantial. In many 
countries of the world remittances are almost as important as the exports of 
commodities (see chapter 2). Remittances is found to be a stable source of 
income of a country. It can be counter cyclical (World Bank 2006) as 
remittances may increase during hard times like financial crisis, natural 
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disasters political conflicts as migrants may send additional funds to help their 
families and friends. Remittances can improve a countries credit worthiness 
which makes access to international finance easier. Several banks of 
developing countries such of Kazakstan, Mexico, El Salvador recently have 
been able to raise external finance by securitisation of remittances.      
 From the discussion provided in this section the linkages between 
migration, remittances and economic development should be clear. Migration 
does not provide solution to all problems and not all the time it has positive 
effects. However migration is now an indistinguishable element of the world 
economy. Hence international bodies are emphasising on initiatives to make 
maximum use of migration and remittances to meet the development needs. 
We have therefore devoted the following section to discuss about the 
initiatives of international bodies about international migration and economic 
development. 
 
6. International Initiatives and Bilateral and Multilateral 
 Aspects of International Migration 
 
International migration is now increasingly viewed as a multilateral 
phenomenon which involves a large number of countries through traditionally 
it is viewed as a unilateral or bilateral matter. In this respect special 
importance is given to the Mode 4 of GATS. In this section we briefly discuss 
about it. In addition we also discuss about the temporary migration and 
bilateral migration agreements. 
 
6.1. WTO and Mode 4 of GATS 
 
It is now well recognised that it is not possible to contain the movement of 
people from one country to another country. Thus it is now regarded that 
migration should be well managed in order to a stop it becoming a global 
µ%DG¶ LQVWHDG RI JOREDO µ*RRG¶ and Mode 4 of GATS provides a unique 
opportunity for more effective management of temporary movement of 
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workers across borders for the supply of needed services in another country 
(Katseli 2006). GATS is in fact the only genuine global agreement relating to 
migration (Hatton 2006, Borde 2007). The aim of GATS or General 
Agreement for Trade in Services is to regulate services trade and the Mode 4 
of GATS covers movement of natural persons. GATS is one outcome of 
Uruguay round negotiation leading to formation of WTO in 1995. The other 
two are GATT and TRIPS (Agreements on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights).  
GATS defines four ways through which services can be traded, also 
known as mode of supply and Mode 4 or Movement of Natural Persons is one 
of them. Other three are Crossborder supply or Mode 4 (Services supplied 
from one country to another e.g. international telephone calls), Consumption 
abroad or Mode 2 (Consumers from one country making use of a service in 
another country e.g. tourism) and Commercial presence or Mode 3 (A 
company from one country setting up subsidiaries or branches to provide 
services in another country e.g. a bank from one country setting up operations 
in another country). It is important to note that tKH µ0RYHPHQW RI 1DWXUDO
3HUVRQV¶ RU 0RGH  GRHV QRW FRYHU permanent migration or self employed 
people seeking employment in foreign country staying in foreign country2.  
  The progress of Mode 4 in international labour movement is still 
negligible. The reliable estimates are still unavailable but as appears estimated 
Mode 4 trade accounts to only about 5 percent of total services trade 
(Magdeleine 2008). The reason for the slow progress of Mode 4 trade is the 
unwillingness of countries to open borders for Mode 4 trade. It is argued that 
Mode 4 is unworkable because it is not flexible enough. International 
migration requires shared responsibility of both sending and receiving 
countries (Panizzon 2008). GATS does not impose such positive obligations. 
 In the recent WTO rounds it had been observed that both developed 
and developing countries are reluctant to open up their borders for Mode 4 
trade (Winters 2005). The developing countries are increasingly seeking 
                                                 
2
 Reader may look at WTO website http://www.wto.org/ and Handbook of 
Trade in Services edited by Matto et al. (2008).  Bossche (2008) gives a 
detailed discussion of WTO rules and comparison between agreements. 
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access to developed countries labour market under Mode 4. However trade 
negotiators and politicians from US and EU argue that Mode 4 is unworkable, 
particularly for semi-skilled and unskilled service providers, as source 
countries cannot guarantee return and hence temporariness (Friedman and 
Ahmed 2008). On the other hand developing countries are also nervous to 
offer boldly under Mode 4. Along with social and racial concerns, as they also 
fear resistance of unskilled workers to immigration (Winters 2005). There are 
also divisions of interests among the developing world which explains why 
strong coalition is not growing up. For example, commonwealth citizens 
receive favourable treatments in several temporary migration schemes. 
Applying MFN clause would increase competition thereby would reduce 
benefit. For example the Indian doctors in UK (Winters 2005) and Filipino 
workers in Japan (Friedman and Ahmed 2008). 
 Hence the progress of Mode 4 negotiation is still not very encouraging, 
but one should not be disheartened so soon. It took about 40 years to reach a 
global agreement on goods trade. The idea of trade in services is still very 
young. Many countries are now willing to enter into bilateral migration 
agreements to control and manage migration. The bilateral agreements are 
though substituting Mode 4 to some extent, lessons of future multilateral 
negotiations can also be learned from them ( Friedman and Ahmed 2008). 
What needed here are some studies aiming to depict the need of multilateral 
migration management like Mode 4. Only a few attempts this regard has been 
taken. Further research in the respect is highly desired. 
 
 
6.2. Temporary Migration and Bilateral Migration Agreements  
 
 Temporary migration implies that migrants will stay and work in a 
country for some prefixed time period and afterwards must return back to 
home. However the people of receiving countries often fear that temporary 
migrants can become permanent, gain voting power and may induce change in 
social, ethnic and cultural characteristics of receiving countries. The fear to 
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some extent comes from previous experiences with migration such as German 
Guest Workers¶ Programme (RUHS 2006).  
The western developed countries are recently showing renewed interest 
for temporary migration programmes. Nevertheless temporary migration 
programmes are very effectively working for a substantially long period of 
time in oil rich Middle Eastern countries. After development of oil exports, the 
countries felt acute shortage of labour force which led to large increase in 
recruitment of both skilled and unskilled workers from other countries 
especially Asian countries (Castles and Miller 2009).  Asian workers come 
under short term contract (generally only one or two years). Private agencies 
were established in the sending countries to recruit labour but some 
governments actively promoted contracts for their construction companies and 
workers. Major destination countries in Middle East are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Oman, Bahrain, UAE and Qatar. These six countries together formed the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) that among other things, addresses the demand 
for migrant labour as well as to their requirement to control and management 
of migrant population. They follow a system called Kafala system in which all 
migrants need sponsorship from a permanent resident of Gulf. The migrants 
can never become permanent resident no matter how long they stay (Longva 
1999).  
The migration in gulf is certainly a very good example of effective 
management of temporary migration programmes but often criticised for its 
abusive practices (Castles and Millers 2009, page 160, Longva 1999). 
Migrants are not allowed to bring dependents, change jobs, often segregated 
into barracks and have to work in harsh weather for very long hours. Many 
migrants are exploited by agents and brokers who take a substantial amount of 
fees. The wage offered to the workers varies considerably. For example wages 
of housemaids in GCC countries are Philippines Dh 1,470 ($400), India Dh 
1,100, Sri Lanka Dh 825, Bangladesh 750 (Gulf News 2008a). The wage rates 
probably reflect relative bargaining power of countries.  Asia is the largest 
source of unskilled labour force thus the competition among Asian countries is 
also fierce. This is certainly undermining the bargaining power of labour 
exporting countries as they require finding the balance between promotion and 
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protection of migrant labour force (IOM 2003). For example recently 
Philippines raised the minimum wage of housemaid to 400 dollars which 
caused a 50% drop in demand (Source: Migrants Right 2008). The huge 
labour supply also enables arbitrary exercise of power by importing countries.  
Recently one Bangladeshi worker killed a Bahraini citizen after a dispute. In 
response Bahrain Government stopped recruitment of further labour from 
Bangladesh and was considering to deport other remaining workers (Source: 
Gulf News 2008b). Here the excess supply of labour is probably the prime 
reason that permitting and encouraging a country to take extreme measure of 
punishing the whole community for the fault of an individual.  
 In the other parts of the world we can also observe temporary 
migration programmes but their coverages are small relative to total labour 
force (OECD 2004, page 22). However they deserve attention as successful 
examples of migration programmes that ensure temporariness (Friedman and 
$KPHG  2QH KLJKO\ FLWHG SURJUDPPH LQ WKLV UHJDUG LV µ&DQDGD¶V
6HDVRQDO$JULFXOWXUDO:RUNHUV3URJUDPPH¶&6$:3LQDXJXUDWHGLQDV
a pilot programme between Canada and Jamaica to allow 264 Jamaican 
agricultural workers to come to Canada temporarily to harvest tobacco in 
Southern Ontario. The programme was implemented because of inability of 
Canadian agricultural sector to meet the demand of labour even during the 
high period of unemployment. Under CSWAP Canada does not process any 
worker under private contract or any other private means. Canada gives 
notices to Mexican and Caribbean counter parts about the labour requirement. 
Mexican and Caribbean counterparts accordingly process it.  
CSWAP has incorporated few mechanisms to ensure temporariness of 
PLJUDWLRQ6XFKDVZRUNHUVDUHUHTXLUHGWRVWD\LQJURZHU¶VSURSHUW\IRU IUHH
and not allowed to change the job without permission. Authorities give 
preference to married workers that can serve as collateral against non return. 
Caribbean agreement involves a 25% compulsory saving scheme for each 
payroll period where the deduction is given back to the workers after returning 
back to home ( Ahmed and Friedman 2008). 
 Examples of successful temporary migration programmes can be 
drawn from many other parts of world. For example, Spain Ecuador 
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agreement to combat illegal migration, Germany-Poland agricultural labour 
programme (Friedman and Ahmed 2008, OECD 2004). All programmes 
apparently share a common attribute that is workers who return back is given 
preference for re-entry thus the incentive to return is higher. 
 We will end the discussion with some discussions on bilateral 
migration agreements. The developed countries are now showing renewed 
interest for entering into bilateral agreement. More than 176 agreements 
(OECD 2004) are now operating in OECD countries. Considering the other 
parts of the world the total number of bilateral agreements would be much 
higher. Preferential trade agreements are not prohibited in WTO but they are 
rather exceptions then rules. Though they are generally disfavoured by WTO, 
in recent period the countries are engaging in PTAs with each other, which is 
against the spirit of multilateralism of WTO.  
Bilateral agreement is however better than having no agreement. In 
Asia receiving countries are reluctant to enter in to bilateral agreements (Go 
2006). The most common argument raised by receiving countries for their 
reluctance to enter into any formal agreement is that foreign workers are 
subject to the same laws and regulations as nationals, consequently, they do 
not need any special attention. Moreover, since the terms of employment are 
negotiated by workers and private employers/agencies, it is held that 
government intervention is not necessary since it is a private sector business. 
However the countries are recently moving away from this view and 
becoming more interested in intergovernmental negotiations in managing 
migration. 
 Apparently bilateral agreements are replacing the multilateral 
migration agreements. But such multilateralism is not achievable in near 
future as evident from the dismal achievement of Doha round. Hence bilateral 
agreements can be used as an instrument to temporarily fulfil the needs of both 
sending and receiving countries. It can also address the issues related to the 
welfare of migrant workers. As already discussed the lessons of bilateral 
agreements may pave the way for multilateralism. Though some studies have 
pointed that bilateralism in migration conflicts with the spirit of 
multilateralism it is still too early to provide such judgement. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
 In this chapter we have reviewed some issues linked with international 
migration. International migration has many facets, thus it is difficult for 
anyone to gain a proper understanding of the issues linked with international 
migration. This review will help us to overcome this problem to some extent. 
The review is however by no mean complete and a few topics (such as trade 
and factor mobility) have not been covered. But nevertheless the review done 
in this present chapter will guide us in the analysis to be done in the coming 
chapters of the thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Optimal Migration policies with Unskilled Labour 
Migration and Competition for Remittances 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent time economists and policy makers are given special attention to 
remittances for its role in the economies of many countries. Actually in many 
countries workers remittances receipt are as high one tenth of the Gross 
Domestic Product1. The importance given to remittances is observed in the 
efforts of developing countries to send people to work abroad. Through their 
efforts, developing countries are engaging in competition with each other in 
international labour market. We often find references of such competition in 
government reports or newspaper articles. There is however little or no 
discussion in economic literature about competition of countries in 
international labour market.  
Intuitively it suggests that the competition of countries should confer 
some market power to the labour importing countries. To what extent this is 
happening is an issue worth further deliberation. Whereas economic literature 
is almost silent, the discussions available in the publications of various 
organisations are also in this regard to some extent vague. For example IOM 
report on labour market in Asia (IOM 2003) references of such competition 
have been given a number of times (e.g. page 21, 39, 73) without any detailed 
discussion on the nature of such competition except for mentioning that the 
competition among stakeholders is severely undermining the bargaining power 
RI WKH FRXQWULHV DV WKH FRXQWULHV UHTXLUH WR EDODQFH EHWZHHQ µSURPRWLRQ¶ RI
RYHUVHDVHPSOR\PHQWDQGµSURWHFWLRQ¶RIPLJUDQWV0RVW Lmportant source to 
                                                 
1
 Philippines 10.62%, Lebanon 20.31%, Guatemala 11.96%, El Salvador 17.78% Source: 
World Development Indicators 2008, see also Chapter 2 
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have idea about the competition is perhaps the newspaper articles. Such as 
when following a demonstration in front of Bangladesh High Commission in 
mid 2007, Malaysia decided to stop importing workers from Bangladesh, 
Bangladeshi newspapers published news of deep concern on the possibility of 
shift of labour market to other less developed Asian countries. These types of 
articles are published in Bangladeshi newspapers from time to time. Further 
hints about ongoing competition among stakeholders can be obtained by 
studying the bilateral migration agreements and/or labour recruitment 
procedures of contractual/temporary migrant workers. One example is 
&DQDGD¶V6HDVRQDO$JULFXOWXUDO:RUNHUV3URJUDPPHZKLFKKDVWZRGLIIHUHQW
bilateral agreements with Mexico and Caribbean countries for temporary 
migration of agricultural labour. In 2001, Canada for the first time decided to 
meet the two counterparts together to negotiate wage related issues but 
agricultural employers in Canada objected fearing increase of bargaining 
power of workers (Verma 2003, page 60).  Similar tendency is observed in 
Asia. Here labour importing countries are reluctant to enter into agreements as 
foreign labour recruitment is regarded as a private matter though the true 
reason can be easily attributed to the existence of large pools of unskilled 
labour in Asian countries. As mentioned by Go (2006) bilateral agreement in 
Asia is rather an exception than rule. Receiving countries in this regard are 
probably more organised. In Middle East Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, 
Bahrain, UAE and Qatar together have formed Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) that addresses the demand for migrant labour as well as to their 
requirement to control and manage migrant population. They follow a system 
called Kafala system in which migrants need sponsorship from a permanent 
resident of Gulf (Longva 1999). There exists no such coalition of labour 
sending countries. Recently Philippines raised the minimum wage rate of 
housemaids to 400 dollars which caused a 50% drop in demand (Source: 
Migrants Right 2008). As reported, India also attempted to do so. Thus the 
labour sending countries in Gulf are probably setting their policies unilaterally, 
which may have adverse effects on the welfare of all labour sending countries. 
 This chapter develops a model to analyse the effects of competition for 
remittances in the international labour market. We assume that two countries 
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are exporting labour to a third country. The two countries act as Cournot-type 
competitors as they want to maximise their national income by sending labour 
to the third country. The third country uses tax policy to fulfil its national 
objective. Hence the third country acts as a Stackelberg leader. We are 
considering tax as a proxy of various monetary and non monetary 
barriers/costs involved in migration which is set above the administrative costs 
in receiving country. 
 As mentioned before the competition among the sending countries has 
not attracted attention of the mainstream economic literature. The analysis of 
migration and remittances in the literature is mainly unilateral or bilateral. A 
substantial number of studies have tried to identify the determinants of 
migration and in most concise form reason of migration can be attributed to 
wage differential between sending and receiving regions. Among other 
determinants of migration one may state of improvement of standard of living, 
IDPLO\UHXQLRQVDIHW\DQGVHFXULW\HWF,QWKHµ1HZ(FRQRPLFVRI0LJUDWLRQ¶
migration is similar to a portfolio investment by a family where the risk of 
depending on single labour market is reduced by diversification. Remittances 
in this regard is viewed as an outcome of implicit contract of migrants with 
families staying behind (Stark 1991, Rotte and Volger 1998).     
 Similar to mainstream migration literature we also regard that the wage 
differential is the main motive of migration. In the paper, the countries allow 
international migration for the benefit they receive. The sending countries 
receive remittances, which increases national income. Thus in principle a 
sending country will try to send as much labour as possible as long as the 
benefit of migration is above the cost of migration. However as both the 
countries try to do it simultaneously the benefit does not depend entirely on a 
FRXQWU\¶V willingness to send people abroad. In addition the policies of 
receiving country also have effects. The policy objectives of receiving country 
may reflect the interest of special group such as workers or capitalists. 
Workers may try to keep migration low to have high wage rate. The capitalists 
may want to import more migrant workers at low wage rate to maximise 
surplus. These different and conflicting objectives of different stakeholders of 
migration together determine the benefit of migration for sending and 
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receiving countries. Our aim will be to look at the different policy stands of 
countries given potential benefit of migration and competition among 
stakeholders. 
The way we have modelled migration in this chapter has similarity 
with the migration of unskilled people. One of the differences between skilled 
and unskilled migration is that unskilled migrants are incapable of migrating 
directly as can be done by the skilled migrants. Recently unskilled migration is 
increasingly taking place through inter governmental negotiation. We 
therefore assume that the outflow of migrants are directly controlled by the 
sending countries thereby we only deal of the subset of migrants who are 
relatively unskilled. This way of modelling unskilled migration is limiting the 
policy variables available to the sending countries. But we can still observe a 
few interesting results. One of it is the use of discriminatory tax policy by the 
receiving country on the basis of labour endowment. The results are not 
surprising but very relevant in providing guidelines in formulating migration 
policies. 
 The idea of the competition to some extent came from Chau and 
Kanbur (2006) that modelled the competition between two Southern countries 
in labour standard and showed that Northern importing countries can take the 
benefit away from Southern countries by increasing tax rate. Instead of labour 
standard, we have assumed that the countries compete by sending labour. It is 
also to be noted that the structure of the model is similar to the models of 
strategic trade especially of Brander and Spencer (1985). A few papers have 
incorporates import tax in Brander-Spencer framework. The paper has some 
similarities with them. Though strategic trade theory is regarded as very 
important in the analysis of trade policies, so far no attempt can be observed to 
use it in analysis of international migration policies. This chapter can be 
considered as one of the first attempts. 
 The organisation of the chapter is as follows. In the introductory 
section we have already introduced the background of the chapter. The second 
section introduces the model, basic notations and clarifies the mechanism of 
unskilled labour migration. The third section deals with some comparative 
statics results. The forth section discusses the determination process of tax 
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rates of the importing country. The fifth or the last section concludes the 
chapters. 
  
2. The Model 
 
2.1. Basic Assumptions and Notations 
 
We assume that there are three open economies C , I  and U  
producing two internationally traded goods - 1X  and 2X . Prices of goods are 
fixed. We select the units in a way that price of one unit of good is equal to 1. 
Thus relative price of two goods is just 1. Labour endowment is fixed, denoted 
by iL  for country },{ ICi and uL  for country U . 
 The production functions of good 1 and good 2 are given respectively 
by  111 iii LXX   and  222 iii LXX  where },,{ UICi . The wage should be 
equal to the marginal products hence without complete specialisation marginal 
products of two sectors of a country should be equal which also should give 
the wage rate of the country. Otherwise the labour will migrate from one 
sector to another within a country. However we assume that the technology 
and labour endowment of the countries are such that country C  and I  
specialise in the production of good 1 and country U  specialises in production 
of good 2. This assumption will help us to simplify the analysis. But it is also 
to be noted that in the general equilibrium model with one factor and 
incomplete specialisation, wage differential at international level is non-
existent hence is the incentive for international migration. Thus to have wage 
differential existing at the international level in an incomplete specialisation 
setting, we need additional assumption, such as, existence of some kind of 
dualism which allows wage of unskilled workers to differ across nations. With 
this assumption it will also be possible for us to extend our model from two 
goods to more than two goods case. 
As we are assuming that country C  and I  specialise on producing 1X  
the wage in country i  is given as- 
1
1
i
i
i L
X
w w
w 
 evaluated at iL . Similarly the 
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wage rate in country U is given as
2
2
u
u
u L
X
w w
w . We assume that ui ww   which 
initiates migration. We assume that migrants repatriate all the income back to 
the home country. The national income of the home is then given by the 
output produced in the sector 1 plus the remittances received. We may assume 
FRQVXPHUV¶ SUHIHUHQFH LQ D ZD\ ZKHUH WKH FRXQWULHV DOZD\V FRQVXPH ERWK
goods. With specialisation the countries should then export the good which 
they specialise and import the other one. We assume that migration does not 
change this pattern of comparative advantage. As migration effects the 
production and consumption of goods in the countries under consideration, it 
may also change the world price levels and may reverse the pattern of the 
specialisation and wage differentials as assumed before. As the aim of the 
analysis is not to evaluate the welfare from trade and/or changes of 
comparative advantage, we assume fixed price throughout to keep our analysis 
simple. It should also be mentioned that we are considering a partial 
equilibrium setting where the world may consists of many countries whereas 
we are only considering migration between the three countries. But the model 
can be extended by allowing more sending and receiving countries. It is also 
possible that the countries under consideration produce more than just two 
goods and migration and trade may have some consequences in those sectors. 
To simplify our analysis we are restricting our analysis within just two sectors 
of the economy. The incorporation of more sectors may change our results 
substantially. 
 It will be convenient to assume some specific functional forms of the 
production functions to facilitate further analysis. Let us assume that 
production of 1X  in },{ ICi  is depicted by the following function- 
 
2
1
1
111 2 iii
LbLaX  
 
where 1iX  denotes the amount of 1X  produced in },{ ICi , 1iL  is total 
amount of labour used in production of 1X , 1a  and 1b  are coefficients. 
Differentiating with respect to 1iL , marginal product of labour in sector 1X  is 
obtained as 111 iLba  . Therefore MPL varies between 1a and iLba 11  . 
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 The production of 2X  is given as- 
 
222 ii LaX    
 
where 2a  is the amount of labour required to produce one unit of 2X  and 2iL  
is the amount of labour used for production of 2X . Differentiating with respect 
to 2iL , the MPL is obtained as 2a . Hence, country },{ ICi  switches labour 
from 2X  to 1X  if the value of marginal product of labour in 1X   is greater 
than the value of marginal product of labour in 2X . that is, iff - 
 
 
  2111 aLba i !  
Or, 
111
21
iLba
a
!  
 Let us assume that 
iLba
a
11
21 ! . Thus with trade },{ ICi necessarily 
specialises in producing 1X . Without migration the workers of 
},{ ICi therefore receives wage   ii Lbaw 11  . 
 On the other hand assume that country U  has linear production 
technology for 1X , which is written as 111 uuu LaX  , where 1uL  is the amount 
of labour used and 1ua  is the coefficient. By differentiating with respect to 1uL , 
we get the marginal product of labour as 1ua . Production in sector 2X  is 
defined by the following function- 
 
 
2
2
2
222 2 u
u
uuu L
bLaX  
 
 
where 2uL  is the amount of labour used in production of 2X  in U . Again by 
differentiating with respect to 2uL  we get the marginal product of labour in 
country U  as  222 uuu Lba  . Thus marginal products varies between 2ua  and 
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uuu Lba 22  . Country U  specialises in production of 2X  iff 
  122 uuuu aLba ! .  Let us assume that,   122 uuuu aLba ! . U  therefore 
specialises in production of 2X . Without migration, the workers of U  
receives wage 
uuuu Lbaw 22  . 
 With migration wage in U is given as  2222 ICuuuu LLLbaw  . 
We assume that 1uu aw !  throughout as such the country still specialises in 
production of 2X  after migration. We also have the assumption that 
iuuu LbaLba 1122 !  such that wage received by labour is higher in country 
U  which initiates migration.  
 Finally we consider the following game- in the first stage country U  
sets its tax policy. Given the tax policies of U , country C  and I  compete 
with each other in sending labour to U .  
 
2.2. Defining Unskilled Migration between Country i  and U  
 
 In this section we will consider that labour can move from one country 
to another country. For this purpose the mechanism of such movement is 
needed to be defined. In this paper we assume that the governments of sending 
countries control migration thus they act in way that maximises national 
income. The national income is calculated by adding the output produced 
within the country with the remittances received. This assumption may seem 
unlikely at first look but actually largely captures the pattern of unskilled/low 
skilled labour migration observed in developing countries. 
 An alternative is to assume free migration, that is, people can move 
freely without any restriction of sending and receiving countries. In reality this 
is an exception rather than the rule. Except for a few regions such as 
µ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶SHRSOHDUHQRWDOORZHGWRPLJUDWHIUHHO\WRDQRWKHUFRXQWU\
In a few countries people are not even allowed to emigrate freely as 
governments can directly restrict migration or can use indirect control like 
non-issuance of passport. Where free migration is possible the present 
structure is obviously not valid (We explore the possibility in chapter 5).  
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 To migrate without governmeQW¶VDVVLVWDQFHWKHPLJUDQWVILUVWQHHGWKH
capability of searching jobs by themselves. Unskilled low income workers of 
most developing countries do not have that capability. For example let us 
think that a construction project in Middle East needs 100 manual workers. It 
wants to recruit the workers from a country like India, Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Pakistan or Philippines. It is possible to recruit skilled (doctors, engineers) 
workers directly by publishing advertisements in internet and newspapers. But 
it is not possible to recruit unskilled workers from a poor developing country 
by just publishing advertisements in that way as the advertisements will not 
reach the low income people living in rural areas. To overcome this problem 
the companies recruit workers directly from these countries through recruiting 
agencies who have agents at grass roots levels.  
 This recruitment process is now disfavoured by most countries. The 
employment contracts are often very abusive, the recruiters/agents often take 
high application fees, give false documents etc. The benefit of migration is 
often misappropriated by the middle agents. But migration is truly important 
not just for the migrants and the companies but also for the respective 
governments. The receiving countries here meet the shortage of manpower, 
the sending countries in return receives remittances. Hence governments have 
stepped in to take control of labour recruitment process. Through inter 
governmental negotiations, governments now set up the rules to govern the 
migration related issues. The bilateral migration agreements observed 
worldwide depict direct involvement and interest of governments in this 
matter. Many countries now express their interest directly to the respective 
JRYHUQPHQWV ,Q &DQDGD¶V $JULFXOWXUDO :RUNHUV¶ 3URJUDPPH &DQDGD
mentions yearly demand to respective government authorities of Mexico and 
Caribbean countries. In reply Mexican and Caribbean governments facilitate 
recruitment according to the Canadian requirement (Verma 2003). South 
Korea since  LV UHFUXLWLQJ ODERXU IURP %DQJODGHVK XQGHU µ(PSOR\PHQW
3HUPLW6\VWHP(36¶ZKHUHZRUNHUVDUHUHFUXLWHGRQO\WKURXJKWKHUHVSHFWLYH
government bodies (Bangladesh Economic News 2010). Given the above the 
assumption of government controlled international migration is an appropriate 
assumption for unskilled migration. 
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 The objective of sending countries is to maximise national income 
through remittances. Therefore they will allow migration as long as 
remittances is higher than the marginal product at home. The receiving 
country fulfils its own objective using migrant labour. The migration in this 
model takes place between the sending countries and the firms of receiving 
countries. The government of the receiving countries in reality here often 
practise quota system. The recent Brain Grain literature is based on this 
argument. But quota is appropriate mainly for the high skilled migration. 
Example of quota is HB-1 visa system in USA or recent German Green Card 
system. Most developed countries now-a-days are also exercising point based 
migration system for screening high skilled people. In the paper instead we 
assume that the receiving countries use tax policies to control and receive 
extra benefit from migration. This will help us to evaluate the effects of 
competition of sending countries in international migration. 
 Another argument could be that though even if the governments of 
sending countries have direct interest, it is the individual migrants who decide 
whether they want to migrate or not. This argument cannot be ignored. To 
ensure that we impose condition that the net wage received by the migrants is 
higher than the wage of country of origin. We clarify it below. 
 
2.3. National Income Equations and Solutions of Migration 
 
We assume following national income equations for sending countries- 
 
       2222222121 2 iijiuuuiiiii LTLLLbaLLbLLaY ¹¸·©¨§        (4.1) 
 
where ± 
 
},{ ICi  and ji z . 
iY = National income of i . 
2iL = Migrants from country i  to country U . 
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2jL = Migrants from country j  to country U . 
iT = Tax imposed by country U on migrants of country i . 
 
 As can be observed, the above equation has two components. The first 
part is the output produced within the country. The second part is the 
remittances send by workers working in U . The remittances are nothing but 
wage multiplied by total migrant workers. It is also assumed that migrants 
send the entire wage back to home country. In reality migrants do keep some 
income in country of immigration, buy properties or make investments. Here 
we are considering temporary migration and there is no reason for temporary 
migrants to keep income in the country of immigration. The assumption of full 
repatriation of income will allow us to capture temporariness of migration as 
well as will make analysis simpler. 
It is also assumed that receiving country imposes tax on the income of 
migrants. This tax is a proxy of immigration related monetary and non- 
monetary cost imposed by the country of immigration which is above the 
administrative cost of allowing immigration. This tax reflects the fact that in 
many parts of the world, migrants must pay tax but may not receive the benefit 
in return. Immigration tax is a controversial and debatable issue in the 
economics of public sector. A common misconception prevailing is that 
immigrants receive all the benefits but do not pay equal amount of tax which 
leads to higher amount of tax burden on the natives. Razin and Sadka (2002) 
has showed that as low income migration grows, median voters may prefer 
low tax rates in a fear of leakage of tax revenue to low income migrants.  This 
approach of using the concept of median voters is highly questionable. As 
mentioned by Leibfritz et al. (2003) tax revenue and distribution is a dynamic 
process. For example young immigrants who are now going to school can be 
regarded as using up significant amount of public contribution. But when they 
will grow up they will contribute to public revenue by paying tax. Similarly 
those who are now paying tax may at a later period of life get higher return 
through pension. Another study showed that since 1980s the average skill of 
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immigrants has increased compared to the average skill of native population 
(Jasso et al. 1998). If it is assumed that immigrants are paid according to the 
skill levels, the income tax contribution of immigrants should also be higher. 
Another misconception is that illegal migrants do not pay tax but consume all 
the public services such as road, transportation, medical services etc. But in 
reality illegal migrants do pay tax, a simple example of which is consumption 
tax like VAT. In addition many illegal migrants by cars, houses, do businesses 
which have significant contribution in tax revenue. Many illegal immigrants 
obtain counterfeit tax identification numbers and may pay income tax higher 
than other low income earners (Lipman 2006, 2009). It is not unlikely that 
some illegal immigrants receive social benefit using counterfeit documents. 
Thus before providing final comment it must be properly understood whether 
migrants in reality pay higher or lower tax compared to the benefit they 
receive in return. Temporary migrants in this regard are likely to be the net 
losers. Within the short period of stay it is not possible for them to bring 
family and children, thus they are excluded from receiving the health and 
schooling benefits UHFHLYHG E\ SHUPDQHQW UHVLGHQWV¶ IDPLOLHV %XW WKH\ DUH
subject to payment of all type of taxes as applicable to permanent residents.    
 In the model we are considering temporary migration allowing full 
repatriation of the earnings back to home country. The receiving country as 
usual imposes tax which is redistributed to the natives. When forming the 
strategy, the sending countries therefore take the tax rates into consideration. 
As the price level is fixed, the higher income ensures higher level of welfare 
for a country. The objective of country i  then is to maximise national income 
with respect to 2iL  given the tax rates. Both countries assume that other 
country will keep the number of migrant labour same. Differentiating with 
respect to 2iL  and setting the derivatives equal to zero following two reaction 
functions for country C  and I  are obtained- 
 
      222211221 2 IuCuuuCCu LbTLbaLbaLbb     (4.2) 
      222211221 2 CuIuuuIIu LbTLbaLbaLbb     (4.3) 
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To check that the income from abroad is higher than the wage at home, 
let us write the reaction functions as- 
  
     222112222 iuiiijiuuu LbLLbaTLLLba    
 
 
where },{ ICi  and ji z . Thus wage received by migrants minus tax is 
higher than the wage that can be obtained at home.  We derive this result as 
foreign wage minus tax is actually showing the price of migrant labours. It 
must be higher than the wage or marginal product at the home that is the 
marginal cost of labour export. 
 The two equations can be solved for 2CL and 2IL . The second 
derivatives are negative as- 
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 As can be observed, the cross second partial derivatives are smaller 
than own second partial derivatives in absolute value. Smaller absolute values 
of cross partial derivatives ensure that the solutions are stable. To obtain the 
solutions let us write equations (4.2) and (4.3) in matrix form as- 
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 Let Z  be the matrix of coefficients. The determinant is 
2
2211 )(3)4( uu bbbbZ  , thus determinant is positive and inverse exists. 
$SSO\LQJ&UDPHU¶VUXOHWKHIROORZLQJVROXWLRQV are obtained- 
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22112 2 uIuCC bBbbBZL        (4.4) 
and, 
  22112 2 uCuII bBbbBZL        (4.5) 
where,  
    iuuuii TLbaLbaB  2211  
 
 From the two solutions it is not possible to identify which country 
exports more labour. It depends on the amount of initial labour endowments 
and the tax rates. In later sections we shall see how tax rates are imposed by 
country U .  
  
 
3. Comparative Statics 
 
 In this section we are interested to see how changes in the tax policy of 
U  effects the income and labour export of i . It will be convenient to describe 
the comparative static results first and then to show how there were derived. 
The results are described in proposition format.  
 
 
Proposition 4.1: If tax rate ( iT ) for one country increases then labour export 
from that country decreases but labour export from the other country 
increases. Total labour export decreases. 
 
Proof: 
 Assume that only tax rate for country i  has been changed. 
Differentiating the reaction functions of equations (4.2) and (4.3) with respect 
to iT  we get-  
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 From the equations, the solutions obtained are- 
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 Therefore if the tax rate for a country is increased by U then labour 
export from that country decreases but labour export from the other country 
increases. Adding the two we get- 
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 Thus overall labour export by the two countries decreases.  Ŷ 
 
 
 
 The situation depicted in proposition (4.1) can be expressed using 
following diagram. 
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 In the diagram the country I ¶V UHDFWLRQ IXQFWLRQ is given by line (1) 
and country C ¶VUHDFWLRQIXQFWLRQLVJLYHQE\OLQH7KHHTXLOLEULXPODERXU
supplies by both countries are given by A  where the two reaction functions 
intersect. Now assume that the tax rate for country C  has been increased by 
U . As can be observed from equation (2) it reduces the intercept and shifts 
WKH FRXQWU\¶V UHDFWLRQ IXQFWLRQ OHIWZDUG 7KH QHZ UHDFWLRQ IXQFWLRQ LV
indicated as (3). At the new equilibrium B , the labour export from I  
increases and the labour export from C  decreases. But together the labour 
export decreases. The proposition comes directly from the requirement of the 
stability of the system. For stability it is required that the labour export should 
be in absolute value more responsive to change in own tax rate than the 
change of other countries tax rate.  
 
 
 
 
2CL  
2IL
 
B 
A 
(2) Country C ¶s     
reaction function 
(1) Country I ¶s reaction 
function 
(3) Country C ¶VQHZ
reaction function 
Figure-4.1 
Equilibrium Labour Export 
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Proposition 4.2: If U  increases the tax rate for a country, national income 
of that country decreases and income of the other country increases. 
 
Proof: 
 Assume that the tax rate for country Ci   has been increased. The 
income equation of country C  is- 
 
       2222222121 2 CCICuuuCCCCC LTLLLbaLLbLLaY ¹¸·©¨§   
 
 Differentiating with respect to CT  we get- 
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 First order condition of equation (4.2) implies that the first term of the 
expression is zero. Therefore we obtain- 
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 For country I  the national income equation is- 
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 Differentiating with respect to CT  we get- 
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 As the first term of the expression is equal to zero by first order 
condition of (4.3), we get- 
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 Consequently, national income of C  decreases and national income of 
I  increases as CT  increases.        Ŷ 
 
 The proposition is showing how the tax policy followed by country U  
has effects on the national income of two labour exporting countries. When 
labour export by C  is in equilibrium, marginal increase of tax rate reduces 
remittances, thereby the national income falls. On the other hand labour export 
by C  falls, thereby labour export and remittances received by I  increases. 
 We may also want to see what happens to the national output of U  if 
U  increases the tax rate. To see that note that the national output equation of 
U  is-  
 
   2222222 2 jiuujiuuU LLLbLLLaY     (4.6) 
 
 By differentiating with respect to iT  we get- 
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 We have already found in proposition (4.1) that increased tax rate 
reduces migrant labour supply. Therefore total output of the country must fall.     
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4. Determination of Tax Rates 
 
 We have until now discussed about the effects of tax policies on labour 
migration and national income of the sending countries. In this section we turn 
our attention to the receiving country. It brings us to the first stage of the game 
where U  sets the tax policies foreseeing the labour export of C and I . The 
tax policy in addition also depends on the national objective of the receiving 
country. We have seen that imposition of tax rate reduces the national output 
of U . Then imposition of tax rate must have other reasons. Sometimes 
presence of strong lobby is regarded as the reason for imposition of import 
barriers. The same argument can be applicable here for labour import. For 
example a strong trade union or a lobby of workers may disfavour 
immigration. The lobby of capitalists may favour immigration. We do not 
know which force is working in which country. Therefore we are going to 
analyse the matter assuming few different cases to evaluate how tax policy 
will be used if one of the cases is applicable to any country. We can consider 
other tax-transfer policies such that the income of the capitalists may be 
transferred to the workers through tax. But we are confining ourselves to only 
three cases to keep the analysis simple and comparable.  
 
Case 1: U  wants to maximise national income. 
 
 Assume that country U  aims to maximise the total income of 
permanent residents. It implies that U  maximises the total national output 
minus the remittances. Thus there is a redistribution of a part of income of the 
migrants to the residents of U . The objective function in this case is written in 
following manner- 
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 In the above equation we have deducted the wages remitted by 
migrants from national output of the country. Here we are interested to know 
if the country is going to impose positive tax rates or not. Unfortunately the 
calculation of this equation turns out to be more complicated than it initially 
appears. However we can express the most important observation by 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4.3: If the receiving country wants to maximise the national 
income of the residents it may not always impose positive tax rates on 
migrants.  
 
Proof: 
 To prove the proposition, let us assume that only the tax rate for 
country C  has been changed. Then differentiating equation (4.7) with respect 
to CT  and assuming that tax rates are initially zero we obtain-  
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 Thus the first part of the equation is negative but as 2CL  is positive the 
expression can be negative or positive. Thus when tax rates are zero, 
imposition of positive tax rates do not necessarily increase national income of 
the residents of U .       Ŷ 
 
 We may want to calculate the equation (4.8) further to obtain a bit 
more clear picture. However the calculation does not clearly depict what is 
happening. But it depends on the size of relative labour import. To see it let us 
assume 121   ubb , hence    222 4
1
CIC
C
UN LLL
T
Y  w
w
. Therefore if 
22 3 CI LL !  then imposition of positive tax on C  hurts country U . 
 The result we have is not unexpected but interestingly it depends 
largely on the responsiveness of the two countries to changed tax rates. The 
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income of the residents here is calculated by deducting the wages of migrants 
and adding the tax revenues to national output. We have seen before that 
national output falls if tax rate is increased. Additionally as migration 
decreases, the wage of workers increases. Hence the output minus the wage of 
migrants falls. The country now nevertheless experiences an increase in the 
per capita tax revenue. If the increase in tax revenue can compensate the loss 
of output minus remittances, the national income increases. It is interesting to 
note that negativity or positivity of the expression depends on the relative 
magnitude of 
C
C
T
L
w
w 2
 and 
C
I
T
L
w
w 2
. We already know that the summation of two 
terms is negative. Imposition of tax rate will result in income loss for U  if the 
gap between them is sufficiently bigger, that is if labour supply from C  
decreases but the labour supply from I  does not increase by that extent. But if 
the gap between the two is close to zero then imposition of positive tax can be 
proved beneficial for country  U .      
   
 
Case 2: U  wants to maximise the total income of permanent workers. 
 
 In this case we assume that U  aims to maximise the income of 
permanent workers. Normally it is thought that permanent workers income 
that is wage rate is highest when there is no migration and for mainly this 
reason migration receives objection from the native population. However it is 
often not rational for a country to completely prohibit migration as it supplies 
the labour to increase production to meet the necessary requirements. To 
balance it the country may offer some extra facilities to the permanent workers 
and a part of it may come from the migrants, especially temporary workers. 
 Thus here we are pointing to the discriminatory benefit of tax system. 
As pointed out already migrant workers may face strong discrimination in 
term of tax benefits. Many countries provide special social security benefits, 
where foreign workers contribute significantly by paying tax but are not 
considered eligible to receive benefits in return. One example of it is 500 
pounds grant (for job seekers) given by UK government on child birth. This 
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grant is likely to keep prices of baby products high. Foreign nationals, though 
paying taxes, are not eligible for the grant but they are purchasing from the 
same market where prices are artificially high because of the grant. Another 
benefit of local residents comes through low market prices in sectors where 
foreign workers work. Foreign unskilled workers mainly work in sectors like 
agriculture, food processing, cleaning etc. many of these jobs are usually 
disliked by local population. Foreign workers participation in these sectors 
helps to keep prices low, thereby makes real income of local workers high. 
 How participation of foreign workers in food sector is keeping the 
prices low and its impact on income and poverty level of country of 
immigration is a very important issue to discuss. It requires further substantial 
analysis. We will not analyse this issue in this chapter. Here we are only 
concentrating on the redistributional effects of tax revenue. The result 
obtained can be stated by following proposition- 
 
Proposition 4.4: The receiving country will impose positive tax rates in order 
to maximise the income of the permanent labour.  
 
Proof: 
 
 The income equation of permanent labour can be written as-  
 
   222222 jjiiujiuuuLU LTLTLLLLbaY     (4.9) 
 
 As shown in the above equation, U now maximises the summation of 
wage of permanent workers and tax revenues. By evaluating the derivative 
when iT s are zero we get- 
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 Thus imposition of tax increases the income of workers when tax rates 
are zero. Hence the government will impose positive tax in order to maximise 
income of permanent labour.        Ŷ 
 
 The result is not surprising.  As tax is imposed the migration falls, the 
wage rate increases. Hence workers enjoy higher wage rate. The permanent 
workers in addition receive the tax collected from migrants. Therefore the 
income of workers increases. The most important aspect of this case is that it 
will allow us to look at the process of imposition of tax rates as it is relatively 
simple to calculate. To do that we will first calculate the optimal tax rates as 
done below-  
    
Optimal tax rates 
 
  To find the optimal rates of taxes, we differentiate the equation (4.9) 
with respect to CT and IT  and set the derivatives equal to zero as- 
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and 
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 The second derivatives from equation (4.9) are- 
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where-    22211 34 uu bbbbZ   
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 The calculations to get solutions (see appendix) from the above two 
equations are a bit tedious but we finally get surprisingly simple result that is- 
 
  CuC LbaaT 11221        (4.12) 
  IuI LbaaT 11221        (4.13) 
 
 iT s are positive as by assumption iu Lbaa 112 ! . From the two 
equations it can be seen that the country with more labour endowment pays 
more tax, the country endowed with less labour pays less tax. The above 
solutions and the solutions for labour exports can be expressed by following 
proposition- 
 
Proposition 4.5: The country with higher labour endowment pays higher tax 
rate and supplies more labour. The labour supply of a country increases 
(decreases) if labour endowment of that country increases (decreases) and it 
decreases (increases) if labour endowment of the other country increases 
(decreases). 
 
Proof:  
 We have already shown in equations (4.12) and (4.13) that the country 
with higher labour endowment pays higher tax rate. By substituting CT and IT  
in equations (4.4) and (4.5) and after necessary calculation we get- 
 
  21122 321 uICIC bbLLbZLL       (4.14) 
 
 If IC LL !  then the sign of equation is positive. That is IC LL !  implies 
that country C  pays more tax and exports more labour.  
 The solutions of labour export are given in the appendix. From that it 
can be seen labour export of a country increases with decrease of other 
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countries¶ labour endowment and decreases with the increase of other 
countries¶ labour endowment. The labour export increases with the increase of 
own labour endowment and decreases with the decrease of own labour 
endowment.         Ŷ 
 
 There is a very simple intuitive explanation. The workers of labour 
endowed country receive lower wage in home country. Thus the difference 
between wages received in U  and in own country is higher for the country 
with higher labour endowment. U can extract higher rent by charging higher 
tax rate. As labour supply is not perfectly inelastic the country can exercise 
power when buying labour from international market. Here the relation 
between labour supply and tax rate is downward slopping, which is like a 
revenue function of a monopolist. In case of downward slopping demand a 
monopolist charges higher price on the buyer with lower elasticity of demand. 
Similar result has also been obtained in our analysis which has been stated 
below- 
  
Proposition 4.6: The country with higher labour endowment has lower tax 
elasticity of labour supply. If labour endowment of a country increases 
(decreases) then the labour supply of the other country becomes more elastic 
(inelastic).    
 
Proof:  
 The elasticity is defined as 
i
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w
 K  where TiiK implies own tax 
elasticity of labour supply of country i . As 
i
i
T
L
w
w 2 s are same for both countries, 
the elasticities depend on how the ratio 
i
i
T
L 2 changes with the change of labour 
endowment. In the appendix we have obtained that- 
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 The first terms of the expressions are negative, but in total the 
expressions must be positive because of positivity of tax rates and labour 
supplies. By deducting (shown in the appendix) them we obtain 
I
I
C
C
T
L
T
L 22 !  
when IC LL ! .Thus, the country with higher labour endowment has lower tax 
elasticity of labour supply.  
 By looking at the equation (4.15) we observe that if 2IL  increases 
(decreases) then 
C
C
T
L 2 decreases (increases) and the labour supply become more 
elastic (inelastic). Similarly by looking at the equation (4.16) we see that if 
2CL  increases (decreases) then 
I
I
T
L 2 decreases (increases) and the labour supply 
of country I  become more elastic (inelastic).    Ŷ 
  
 
  The proposition has very important policy implication. It is known that 
monopolist varies price until the demand become elastic. Here we observe that 
when the labour endowment of a country increases, then the labour supply of 
the other country become more elastic. It implies greater power of the 
importing country in extracting rent. Thus competition between the countries 
renders greater power to the labour importer. 
 Here we may point to the similarity of our model with Brander-
Spencer analysis (Brander and Spencer 1985). Brander and Spencer proposed 
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a similar model where two countries export goods to a third country. They 
analysed the strategies of setting up of optimum export tax/subsidy of 
exporting countries. A few papers KDYH H[WHQGHG %UDQGHU DQG 6SHQFHU¶V
DQDO\VLV WR LQFOXGH LPSRUWLQJ FRXQWU\¶V SROLF\ UHVSRQVH VXFK DV *DWVLos 
(1990) and Hwang and Mai (1991). In general it has been found that if the 
importing country practises discriminatory tariff policy, then tariff rate is 
higher for the most cost efficient exporter. It is not an exception in our model 
too. Here the most cost efficient sending country (opportunity cost of 
migration is low) sends more migrants and receive higher tax burden. It may 
be questioned that if such discriminatory tax policy is observed in reality. As 
already discussed migrants do pay taxes in many forms. But such taxes should 
be same for all type of migrants. To find out discriminatory tax rates one 
needs to look at monetary and non monetary conditions attached to entry and 
social security benefits. Analysis of such differential tax rates is not readily 
available. But it is well known that similar to differential tariff regime, the 
migrants from different countries face different type of entry costs to access 
the labour market of a host country. Similar to differential tariff regimes, the 
labour importing countries are now willing to enter into different bilateral 
migration agreements with different countries (Winters 2005) to target specific 
skills from specific countries. The agreements obviously set different 
opportunity costs of migration for workers of different countries. An empirical 
analysis to compare the entry barriers of immigrants from different countries 
will be in this regard very useful.          
 
 
Case 3: U  PD[LPLVHV D ZHLJKWHG DYHUDJH RI SURGXFHUV¶ LQFRPH DQG
earnings of permanent workers, plus weighted tax revenue.  
 
 The third case we are going to consider is the situation where the 
country U  wants to maximise a weighted average of workers¶ and producers¶ 
income. As we have already discussed when migration is allowed workers¶ 
income is highest when migration accompanies a positive amount of tax. 
However this tax rate harms the SURGXFHUVDVLWUHGXFHVWKHSURGXFHUV¶VXUSOXV
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7R UHVROYH WKH LVVXH JRYHUQPHQW PD\ SXW ZHLJKW RQ WKH SURGXFHUV¶ DQG
ZRUNHUV¶ LQFRPHZKHQVHWWLQJXSWKHWD[SROLF\SOXV LWPD\JLYHDZHLJKW WR
decide who is going to receive the tax revenue. We can therefore write the 
income equation as- 
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where 10 ddT  is the weight and ^ `TTZ  1,max . If T  is equal to 1 then the 
country only gives importance to the income of workers. If T  is zero the 
producers receive all the importance in the objective.  As UY  shows the 
countries¶ national output, the first term of the equation show the weight given 
WRWKHSURGXFHUV¶VXUSOXV7KHVHFRQGWHUPVKRZVWKHZHight given to workers 
earnings.  
 After differentiating and necessary calculation we obtain- 
 
 
C
I
I
C
C
CCuuuu
C
U
T
LT
T
LTLLbLb
T w
ww
w)) w
w 22
22221 ZZZTTS  (4.18) 
And, 
 
I
I
I
I
C
CIuuuu
I
U
T
LT
T
LTLLbLb
T w
ww
w)) w
w 22
22221 ZZZTTS  (4.19) 
 
where, 222 ICuu LLLL   and 
i
j
i
i
T
L
T
L
w
ww
w ) 22 . Note that 2CL  and 2IL  are 
the solutions of labour exports obtained in the first stage, thus to get optimal 
solutions of tax rates we need to replace them with the solutions obtained in 
equations (4.4) and (4.5). But the calculations turn out to be very tedious. 
However it can be seen from equations (4.18) and (4.19) that unlike case 2, 
imposing tax may not always be welfare improving thus positive solutions 
may not exist. That is welfare may not increase when tax rates are initially 
zero. Also imposition of positive tax will necessarily reduce producers¶ 
surplus when the objective is to maximise only the producers¶ surplus. As can 
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be observed in equations (4.18) or (4.19), Z  and T is then equal to zero. As 
0) , producers¶ surplus reduces with the imposition of tax rate. 
The calculations to obtain the solutions of above two equations yields- 
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To see which country pays higher tax burden by deducting the 
solutions of two countries we get- 
           ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
)
) 
212
221212
1
2221
uu
uuuu
jiji bbb
bbbbbbQQTT TZ
ZT
 
 
Or,  
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  The result obtained is very long and not clear as we have not discussed 
about the sign of 1M  and the last part of the term (in bracket). However the 
result reduces to that of case 2 if we assume 1 T . Then we have- 
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 Therefore we get the same result like case 2 as before that is ji TT !  if 
ji LL !  that is the country with higher labour endowment pays higher per 
capita tax rate.  
 Another point to be noted about the proposition that the country may 
impose negative tax that is subsidise migration in order to attain the objective. 
,WFDQFHUWDLQO\EHDFDVHZKHQWKHFRXQWU\ZDQWVWRPD[LPLVHWKHSURGXFHUV¶
surplus plus tax revenue. The result is discussed in the following proposition- 
 
Preposition 4.7: Country U may subsidise migration in order to maximise 
the surplus of producers plus tax revenue. 
  
Proof: 
 We will demonstrate the proposition for a special case when 0 T  so 
that only producers¶ surplus is given weight. Also for simplicity of calculation 
assume that 1221    ubbb . Then after doing necessary calculation with 
equation (4.20) we obtain- 
 
     jiiuui LLLaLaT  12481     (4.21) 
 
 As    iuu LaLa ! 12  the sign of the expression is always positive 
when ji LL !  or ji LL  . Otherwise the sign of the expression can be negative. 
If the sign is negative then negative tax (subsidy) is the optimal solution.  
          Ŷ 
 
 Though in some cases U  may subsidise migration, it will still practice 
discriminatory tax/subsidy regime. The tax/subsidy depends on the relative 
labour endowments. As can be seen from equation (4.21), if labour 
endowment of country  i  increases the tax rate increases or subsidy rate falls. 
On the other hand if labour endowment of j  increases, the tax rate falls or the 
subsidy rate increases. It then opens the possibility of positive tax rate for a 
country and subsidy for another country. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
 In this paper we have developed a model where two countries compete 
for exporting labour to a third country. The concept of competition and 
cooperation is still a new idea in international migration. International bodies 
are encouraging and facilitating dialogues between countries in international 
migration issues. These dialogues may in near future pave the way for a global 
consensus on migration.  
 In order to understand how international migration works it is 
important to realise the interests of different stakeholders of migration. Our 
paper could be useful to shed some lights on this issue. In our model two 
countries aim to maximise national income by sending workers to a third 
country. The third country designs migration policy according to its national 
objectives. The importing country resorts to discriminatory tax policy in order 
to maximise income. We have not analysed collusion in this paper but 
exporting countries may resort to collusion by jointly controlling labour export. 
But collusion is so far not observed in the activities of labour exporting 
developing countries. On the other hand importing countries are forming 
groups to jointly manage and control immigration. Joint management of 
migrants by Kafala system in Gulf and point based migration system followed 
by some developed countries can be cited as examples of migration 
collaboration by importing countries. 
 International migration serves two fold purposes. It can improve the 
income and help to reduce poverty level of poor developing countries. In 
developed countries it is important to fill shortage of manpower. But 
developed and rich countries restrictive migration policy is limiting the benefit 
of migration. The developing countries on the other hand only tend to 
emphasis on remittances and not realising how their unilateral labour export 
policy is limiting the potential benefit of migration and leading to higher 
exploitation. The benefit of international migration is a multilateral issue 
involving both labour exporting and importing countries. Such realisation is 
required for any future initiative linking migration and economic development. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Case 2: 
 
Setting the derivatives equal to zero and after necessary calculations equation 
(4.10) and (4.11) become- 
 
         2112111212221 2222 uIuCuuuIuC bLbabbLbabbabTbbT  
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Similarly   IuI LbaaT 11221   
Now substituting them in equation (4.4) ± 
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Similarly 2IL  is obtained from equation (4.5). Deducting them- 
 
  21122 321 uICIC bbLLbZLL    
 
Calculation of elasticity 
 
We will only show the calculation of 
C
C
T
L 2
 in detail which as per our previous 
results- 
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Calculating the ratio for the other country and by deducting we get- 
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As IC LL !  or IC TT ! , the value is positive.
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Chapter 5 
 
Optimal Migration Policies with the Presence of Skilled 
Migration and International Competition  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The recent literature on human capital migration (Mountford 1997, Beine et al. 
2001, Stark and Wang 2002) has pointed toward the beneficial effects of 
skilled migration through the incentive it provides in forming additional skills 
in the country of emigration. Though the claim does not have overwhelming 
support (Schiff 2006) it is playing a significant role in modifying the 
FRPPRQO\SHUFHLYHGEHOLHYHDERXWVRFDOOHGµ%UDLQ'UDLQ¶ZKHUHPLJUDWLRn is 
viewed only as a way of channelling the precious human capital from poor 
countries to the rich developed countries. Though Brain Drain issue is still 
dominating the mainstream migration literature, the other aspects, specially 
the remittances sending aspects of migration increasingly receiving more 
importance from the economists and policy makers as remittances has become 
a major source of foreign currency receipt in many countries. Some 
developing countries in this regard are specially emphasising skilled migration 
as the wage and employment opportunities of skilled people are relatively 
higher compared to the unskilled people. Hence now a days we observe the 
endeavour of governments to send both skilled and unskilled people to work 
abroad. We also notice intergovernmental negations and agreements to control 
and manage the exit and entry of migrants, employment duration, wage rate, 
labour right etc. Entry to a foreign country is often contingent upon meeting 
these conditions fixed in intergovernmental negotiation. 
The involvement of governments as described above is now 
widespread in case of unskilled migration. It is now increasingly becoming 
difficult for unskilled people to migrate without the involvement of 
JRYHUQPHQWV *RYHUQPHQWV¶ LQWHUYHQWLRQ KRZHver is still limited in the 
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migration of skilled people. Skilled people are actually enjoying a kind of free 
migration facility similar to that observed in some special zones like European 
Union or the university graduates of the Caribbean region (Winters 2008, page 
535). The reason can be attributed to the fact that recruitment of skilled people 
directly from a foreign country is possible through advertisement of vacancies 
in newspapers and internet. Skilled people can look for the vacancies there and 
make applications.  Thus skilled people can easily enter a foreign country for 
work once the application is accepted and the employers issue the letter of 
sponsorship. In addition developed countries are now practising high skilled 
migration programme where migrants with special skills are granted work 
permit which leads to permanent residency. Most countries at present do not 
impose or not in a position to impose any exit barrier to the people leaving the 
country in this manner.  
Whereas advertisements published in newspapers and internet is 
largely inappropriate for recruitment of unskilled people from poor developing 
countries. This actually is an important feature that makes migration of skilled 
and unskilled people different. Instead of using advertisements, the employers 
in past relied on recruiting agencies working at the grassroots levels. Now the 
countries involved are disfavouring this privately managed recruitment of 
unskilled migrants and gradually moving toward government controlled 
migration. 
Given the above observation we reckon that skilled and unskilled 
migrants need to be treated differently. In the previous chapter we have 
analysed the optimal policies of governments given unskilled migration, 
remittances and international competition. The policy taken by the sending 
countries government took the form of controlling the volume of migration.  
Skilled people are still migrating kind of freely, thus thinking of direct control 
is inappropriate in case of skilled people. We may nevertheless think about 
indirect exit barriers such as emigration tax that can be imposed on migrants. 
We normally do not observe such exit barriers in practice, except for some 
control over the issuance of passport. Stark and Wang (2002) has referred to 
such an exit barrier imposed by Chinese Government where not all those who 
can safely expect to have higher earnings abroad can leave, because the 
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government does not grant emigration visas or passports liberally. But such 
barriers now a days are exceptions rather than the rules.  
Many countries in reality are promoting skilled migration. We are here 
questioning this policy. To address the question in this chapter we are 
modelling migration in a way that people are allowed to move freely from one 
country to another country. Thus we are working with the subset of world 
migration where free movement of people is allowed or where people can find 
MREZLWKRXWJRYHUQPHQWV¶DVVLVWDQFHQHJRWLDWLRQ:HDUHUHIHUULQJWRDJURXS
that is likely to be high skilled which almost all countries of the world are 
relatively open in accepting and governments are not in a position to exercise 
power to stop migration. This subset of world migrants is also likely to be 
relatively wealthier though not necessarily true in all cases.   
Similar to chapter 4 we assume a game where workers from two 
counties migrate to a third country. As the sending country cannot directly 
control migration they use tax policies to control migration to maximise 
national income. The tax should be regarded as various types of monetary and 
non monetary barriers that can be used by the government of sending countries. 
The third country foresees the policies of the sending countries and sets it own 
tax policies given the policies and migration from the sending countries. As in 
chapter 4, the tax should be considered as various monetary and non- 
monetary barriers above the administrative costs imposed by the receiving 
country with the aim to transfer some income of the migrants in its national 
income account. It is to be noted that we are modelling that the benefit a 
country receives though migration is the benefit of remittances. Skilled 
migrants are also regarded as the source of other types of benefits such as 
investment, human capital formation and business links. Nevertheless 
remittances is the most tangible and immediate benefit of migration and 
deserves proper attention. 
 The modelling here is similar to the literature of strategic trade policy, 
specially the model proposed in Brander and Spencer (1985) and Brander 
(1995) where two countries engage in strategic trade to export to a third 
country. In non-cooperative situation both countries provide positive subsidy 
to maximise welfare if the goods exported are substitutable. Gatsios (1990) 
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extended the model by looking at the optimal tax policy of the importing 
country. He found that the country should practice discriminatory tax policy to 
maximise welfare where the most efficient producer receives higher tax 
burden. Contrary to Brander and Spencer (1985) we have found that sending 
countries should tax the skilled migration and this tax policy improve the 
welfare of the other sending country. In case of receiving country we see that 
receiving country uses discriminatory tax policy and tax burden is higher for 
the country with highest labour endowment. This result is similar to Gatsios 
(1990) where the efficient producer receives the highest tax burden. 
 Strategic trade has received considerable attention from economists 
and is referred extensively in the literature of economic policy making. It is 
really surprising to see that economic literature paid no such attention to 
competition among countries in international migration. The reason is 
probably that in past people migrated from one country to another country 
mainly for permanent establishment. The linkages between international 
migration and economic development were evaluated only in the context of 
the Brain Drain problem.  Since 1970s especially after the boom of the oil rich 
economies in Middle East we can observe the emergence of temporary 
migration for remittances. Given that remittances constitute a substantial 
portion of national income of many countries economists have started to 
emphasis on the importance of remittances in economic development. 
Competition among the countries for remittances is certainly having effects on 
the benefits of migration. But still we can only find vague reference of 
competition in some policy literature without any clarifying discussion. For 
H[DPSOH LQ WKH ,20V SXEOLFDWLRQ µ/DERXU 0LJUDWLRQ LQ $VLD¶ UHIHUHQFHV RI
competition have been provided a number of times without any detailed 
discussion on the nature of such competition (IOM 2003).  We believe that the 
work of the chapter will be able to fill up this gap of the existing economic 
literature and will be very useful in the migration policies of developing 
countries.  
The chapter has been organised as follows. In the first introductory 
chapter we have described the background of the paper. Second section 
describes the model and identifies the conditions of equilibrium migration or 
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labour export by sending countries. The third and fourth sections deal 
respectively with the optimum emigration and immigration taxes. The fifth 
section is concluding section and also provides policy recommendation based 
on the analysis of the paper. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1. Basic Assumptions and Notations 
 
We adopt a model similar to the model used in chapter 4 where there 
are three open economies C , I  and U  producing two internationally traded 
goods - 1X  and 2X . Prices of goods are fixed. We select the units in a way 
that price of one unit of good is equal to 1. Thus relative price of two goods is 
just 1. Labour endowment is fixed, denoted by iL  for country },{ ICi and 
uL  for country U . 
 The production functions of good 1 and good 2 are given respectively 
as  111 iii LXX   and  222 iii LXX  where },,{ UICi . As in chapter 4 we 
assume that technologies and labour endowments are such that country C  and 
I
 specialise in production of good 1 and country U  specialises in production 
of good 2.  
As we are assuming that country C  and I  specialise on producing 1X  
the wage in country i  is given as- 
1
1
i
i
i L
X
w w
w 
 evaluated at iL . Similarly the 
wage rate in country U is given as
2
2
u
u
u L
X
w w
w . We assume that ui ww   which 
initiates migration and migrants repatriate all the income back to the home 
country. The national income of the home is then given as the output produced 
LQ WKH VHFWRU  SOXV WKH UHPLWWDQFHV UHFHLYHG  :H DVVXPH FRQVXPHUV¶
preference such that the countries always consume both goods. Hence without 
migration C  and I  should export the good 1 and import good 2. U  on the 
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other hand exports good 2 and import good 1. We assume that migration does 
not change this pattern of comparative advantage. As migration affects the 
production and consumption of goods in the countries under consideration, it 
may also affect the world price level and may reverse the pattern of the 
specialisation and wage differentials as assumed before. As the aim of the 
analysis in not to evaluate the welfare from trade and/or changes of 
comparative advantage, we retain the assumption of fixed price throughout to 
keep our analysis simple.  
Similar to Chapter 4 we assume special functional forms of production 
functions. Let, production of 1X  in },{ ICi  depicted by the following 
function- 
 
2
1
1
111 2 iii
LbLaX  
 
 
where 1iX  denotes the amount of 1X  produced in },{ ICi , 1iL  is total 
amount of labour used in production of 1X , 1a  and 1b  are coefficients. 
Differentiating with respect to 1iL , marginal product of labour in sector 1X  is 
obtained as 111 iLba  . Therefore MPL varies between 1a and iLba 11  . 
 The production of 2X  is given as- 
 
222 ii LaX    
 
where 2a  is the amount of labour required to produce one unit of 2X  and 2iL  
is the amount of labour used for production of 2X .  Differentiating with 
respect to 2iL , the MPL is obtained as 2a . Hence, country },{ ICi  switches 
labour from 2X  to 1X  if the value of marginal product of labour in 1X   is 
greater than the value of marginal product of labour in 2X . that is, iff - 
 
 
  2111 aLba i !  
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Or, 
111
21
iLba
a
! . 
 Let us assume that 
iLba
a
11
21 ! . Thus with trade },{ ICi necessarily 
specialises in producing 1X . Without migration the workers of },{ ICi  
receive wage- 
 
ii Lbaw 11   
 
On the other hand assume that country U  has linear production 
technology for 1X , which is written as-  
 
111 uuu LaX   
 
where 1uL  is the amount of labour used and 1ua  is the coefficient. By 
differentiating with respect to 1uL , we get the marginal product of labour as 1ua . 
The production in sector 2X  is defined by the following function- 
 
2
2
2
222 2 u
u
uuu L
bLaX  
 
 
where 2uL  is the amount of labour used in production of 2X  in U . Again by 
differentiating with respect to 2uL  we get the marginal product of labour in 
country U  as  222 uuu Lba  . Thus marginal product varies 
between 2ua and  uuu Lba 22  . Country U  will thus specialise in production of 
2X  iff- 
 
 uuu Lba 22  > 1ua  
Or,   uuu u Lba
a
22
11 !  
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 Let  uuu Lba 22  > 1ua . Country U  therefore specialises in production 
of 2X . Without migration, the workers of country U  receives wage- 
 
uuuu Lbaw 22   
 
 With migration wage in U is given as  2222 ICuuuu LLLbaw  . 
We assume that 1uu aw !  throughout as such the country still specialises in 
production of good 2X  after migration. We also have the assumption that 
iuuu LbaLba 1122 !  such that wage received by labour is higher in country 
U  which initiates migration. 
 The game we consider can be described as follows. First the importing 
country that is country U sets it tax policies for migration. Given the tax rates, 
C  and I  sets their migration tax policies. Given the tax policies, the migrants 
of C  and I migrate to country U , until the net wage of migration is equal to 
the home wage.  
 
2.2. Equilibrium Migration between Country i and U  
 
 In the previous sub-sections we have defined the model and showed 
the conditions under which country i  specialises in production of good 1X  
and country U  specialises in production of good 2X . In this section we will 
define the mechanism of migration and find the amount of equilibrium labour 
export. As already discussed it is assumed that workers are freely allowed to 
migrate from one country to another country.  There is no restriction from both 
sending and receiving countries on the movement of labour between countries. 
This is true for migration of both skilled and unskilled labour of some special 
developed countries such as the countries of European Union. But for 
migration from developing to developed country it can only be true for the 
skilled migration.  
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As mentioned before instead of using direct quantitative restriction, 
both sending and receiving countries assumed to be using taxes on the income 
of migrants.  Let iD  be the tax imposed by country i  on the income of 
migrants of country i  /HW XV FDOO LW µGRPHVWLF¶ WD[ IRU i . Similarly let iT  be 
the tax imposed by country U  on the migrants of country i  and call it 
µIRUHLJQ¶ WD[ IRU i . Then following two equations must be satisfied in the 
migration equilibrium assuming full information, perfect mobility and no 
travel cost- 
 
   2112222 CCCCICuuu LLbaDTLLLba     (5.1) 
 
   2112222 IIIIICuuu LLbaDTLLLba     (5.2) 
 
 Hence the wage of migrants minus domestic tax and foreign tax must 
be equal to the wage received by domestic workers. Solving the equations 
following solutions are obtained- 
 
  22112 uIuCC bGbbGVL        (5.3) 
and  
  22112 uCuII bGbbGVL        (5.4) 
 
where- 
 211 2 ubbbV   and 
    iiuuuii DTLbaLbaG  2211  
 
 We assume that 0!iG , because to initiate migration the wage rate in 
U  must be higher than the wage rate in i  plus the taxes. 
 We have plotted equation (5.1) and (5.2) in Figure-5.1 to look at the 
equilibrium more carefully. We have plotted 2CL  in the vertical and 2IL  in 
horizontal axis. The line 1 corresponds to equation (5.2) of country I  and line 
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2 corresponds to equation (5.1) of countryC . Two lines have been assumed to 
intersect at point A . 
 
 
  
 It is to be noted that a country can affect WKH RWKHU FRXQWU\¶V labour 
export by changing its domestic tax rate.  As can be seen in the Figure-5.1, by 
reducing domestic tax rate, country C  shifts the line 2 to line 3, where 
stability requires that country I  will cease to have any migration. 
Nevertheless, it is not the case that reduced tax rate is always associated with 
net welfare gain for the labour exporting country. The change of tax rates can 
have beneficial or detrimental effects, which we will analyse in the next 
sections.   
 
 
3. Imposition of Domestic Tax 
 
In the previous section we have defined our model and found the 
equilibrium amount of labour export given the domestic and foreign tax rates. 
In this section we analyse the imposition of domestic tax rates of the exporting 
2IL  
2CL  
Figure-5.1 
Labour Migration Equilibrium 
A 
(2) Labour market equilibrium 
condition of  C  
(3) New equilibrium condition of  C  
(1) Labour market equilibrium 
condition of  I  
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countries. It can be considered as the second stage of the game. In the first 
stage the importing country imposes tax rates. Given the tax rates the 
exporting countries select the tax rates taking in to consideration the possible 
changes in labour migration. It will be useful to first look at the effects of the 
domestic tax on the equilibrium labour export. Differentiating equation (5.3) 
and (5.4) with respect to iD  and after necessary calculation we obtain-   
 
 2112 u
i
i bbV
D
L  w
w 
 
and, 
 212 u
i
j bV
D
L  w
w
 
 By adding we get-  1122 bVD
L
D
L
i
j
i
i  w
ww
w
. Thus the labour export of 
country i  decreases but that of j  increases. The overall labour export 
decreases. The above result is obtained as labour migration responses more in 
absolute value to its own tax rate compared to its response given the change of 
RWKHU FRXQWU\¶V WD[ UDWH $V WKH FRXQWU\ i  increases it domestic tax rate, the 
migrants of i  found that income at home is higher than the net income they 
are receiving by working in U . Hence some migrants pull themselves out 
from U . As wage rate in U  increases, labour migration from j  increases. But 
in total, labour migration decreases. 
 Given the above result below we state one of the most important 
results of the chapter- 
 
Proposition 5.1: The countries will impose positive domestic tax to maximise 
national income. 
 
Proof:  
In order to prove the proposition we first need to define the income 
equation of sending countries. Income equation of country i  is written as- 
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 22222222121 2 iiiiijiuuuiiiii LDLTDLLLbaLLbLLaY ¹¸·©¨§  
 
 
 Hence national income is the summation of the output produced at 
home, the wage remitted by migrants working in U  and total amount of 
domestic tax. It can be seen that domestic tax cancels out from the equation. It 
is not surprising as workers pay domestic tax to country i  for migration, they 
cannot send that amount again as remittances. We are also assuming full 
repatriation of remittances by the migrants. Thus the equation becomes- 
 
       2222222121 2 iijiuuuiiiii LTLLLbaLLbLLaY ¹¸·©¨§         (5.5) 
  
By differentiating the income equation of i  in equation (5.5) we get-    
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 Using migration equilibrium condition of equation (5.1) or (5.2)- 
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 Setting 0 w
w
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Y
 we get 0!iD , or differently for 0 iD  we have-  
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 Therefore optimal domestic tax is positive. 
          Ŷ 
 
 The proposition has substantial implication in the migration policies of 
poor developing countries. It shows that sending countries can not depend 
only on labour export to maximise national income. They also need to control 
it by imposing positive tax. The result can be compared with that of Brander 
and Spencer (1985) where subsidy acts as a transfer but positive subsidy is 
required for the profit shifting effects. Here we however see that instead of 
subsidy the country should tax the migrants. In this paper without tax 
apparently too many people migrate to U . Tax discourages some people to 
migrate. Thus wage received by migrants increases and the domestic output 
increases. Thus national income increases. 
 We are also interested to know if the positive domestic tax has 
anything to do with the competition from another country and the positive 
foreign tax. Let us first assume that country j  is inactive or no more in the 
system such that out of equation (5.1) and (5.2) we have only one equation1. 
The existing equation therefore has no 2jL  term. Then again differentiating the 
equation (5.5) we obtain- 
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 Using the migration equilibrium condition stated in footnote 1- 
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 Equilibrium condition is given as 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 Setting 0 w
w
i
i
D
Y
 we get 0!iD . Therefore optimal domestic tax in no 
strategic situation is also positive. To see it more clearly note that if 0 iD  
then we have-  
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 Thus with or without the presence of competition from other exporter 
the country must pursue the policy of positive domestic tax. Interestingly 
positive domestic tax has nothing to do with foreign tax being positive. 
Irrespective of foreign tax rate, the country must pursue positive domestic tax 
policy. The following proposition however shows that in strategic situation 
domestic taxes imposed by the countries do have effects on each other. 
 
Proposition 5.2: Marginal increase in domestic tax rate by country i  will 
imply increase of income of country j . 
 
Proof:  
  
The income equation of j  is 
 
       22222222121 2 jjjjiuuujjjjj LTLLLLbaLLbLLaY ¹¸·©¨§  
         ....(5.6) 
 
Differentiating income equation of j  in equation (5.6) with respect to 
iD  and after necessary calculation we get- 
 
  012221 ! ww  bLbbDVDY iuujij  
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 Hence the country j  experiences an increase in income.  Ŷ 
 
 This proposition is quite obvious but very interesting. If country i  
increases domestic tax, it reduces migration from i  and thus increases demand 
in receiving country, increasing wages there. Hence, with same migration, 
country j  should be better off. The migration from j  will increase but not 
that much to bring down the wage rate exactly to the previous level. Thus with 
higher wage rate and higher migration, j will experience higher income.  
 Interestingly, the competition among the countries is not really 
harming each other. The countries have unilateral incentive to impose positive 
tax but it does not reduce the income of other country but instead increases the 
income. However if a country decides to follow the policy of subsidising 
migration or reduce its tax rate, it will be harmful for the other country. As we 
see, migration subsidy cannot be the optimal policy response of sending 
countries. 
 
 
3.1. The Optimum Domestic Tax 
 
 As has been discussed, the selection of optimum domestic tax can be 
considered as the second stage of the game. In the first stage the leader U  sets 
the foreign tax. In the second stage country C  and I  set domestic tax rates to 
maximise national income. Thus the game is to be solved using backward 
induction which involves finding the solutions for optimum domestic tax rates 
assuming the tax rates of U  given. Country i  also considers that the other 
country j  will keep the domestic tax unchanged. It means that i  maximises 
following the income equation same as equation (5.5) varying domestic tax iD . 
 
       22222222121 2 iiijiuuuiiiii LTLLLLbaLLbLLaY ¹¸·©¨§   
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 The 2iL s are here function of iD s and iT s where ^ `I,Ci . The 
country i  when selecting the domestic tax rate iD  consider that the other 
country j  keeps its domestic tax rate jD  fixed. Hence we get a Bertrand type 
competition for setting domestic tax rates. We have already seen from 
proposition (5.1) that i  will have positive domestic tax in order to maximise 
national income irrespective of the domestic tax rate of j . Therefore positive 
solutions of domestic tax rates exist that satisfy the first order condition of 
maximisation. Now differentiating the income equation of i  with respect to iD  
and setting the derivatives equal to zero and using the migration equilibrium 
condition as stated in equation (5.1) and (5.2) we get following two reaction 
functions for country C  and I (calculations shown in appendix)- 
 
       IDIuuCDCuuuuIuuC TwbbTwbbbbbDbbbbD   22212222121 3  
and, 
       CDCuuIDIuuuuIuuC TwbbTwbbbbbbbDbbD   22212212122 3  
 
where- 
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 The second derivatives are - 
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 Hence the second derivatives have signs as required for stability. 
6ROYLQJWKHWZRHTXDWLRQVXVLQJ&UDPHU¶VUXOHZHREWDLQ- 
 
    BTwATwHD IDICDCC  1      (5.7) 
  
108 
    BTwATwHD CDCIDII  1      (5.8) 
 
where  
      03 42221221 ! uuu bbbbbH  
     03 32212212 ! uuuu bbbbbbA  
   02 212122 ! uuu bbbbbB  
 
 The solutions apparently look a bit long, but in reality they are quite 
simple. We already know from proposition (5.1) that domestic taxes are 
positive. To look at the solutions a bit more clearly let us assume that 
121   ubb . Then after necessary calculations we get- 
 
    jDjiDii TwTwD  25211      (5.9) 
 
 Thus in the calculation we have obtained the solutions of second stage 
of the game for optimal domestic tax rates. Proposition (5.1) implies that 
0!iD  is positive. However it is not possible to directly observe it from 
equation (5.9) as it depends on the values of other parameters namely, 1a , 2ua , 
iL ¶VDQG uL  given 121   ubb . Nevertheless this simplification will be useful 
to look at the solutions of foreign tax rates in next section. From equation (5.7) 
and (5.8) it can nevertheless be seen how changes in foreign tax rates have 
effects on domestic tax rates. We state it using following proposition.  
 
Proposition 5.3: If foreign tax rate for i increases then the optimal domestic 
tax rate of i  decreases and that of j  increases. 
 
Proof: 
 Differentiating the solutions of iD  from (5.7) or (5.8) with respect to 
iT we get- 
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 Therefore the optimal domestic tax rate for i  decreases and that of j  
increases. 
          Ŷ 
 
 This result is another very important proposition from the policy 
PDNHUV¶ SHUVSHFWLYH  ,I WD[ IRU i  is increased, then migration from that 
country decreases. Implying that domestic tax for i  is no longer in equilibrium 
and is higher than the amount required to control migration. Thus, domestic 
tax rate of i  decreases to restore equilibrium.  On the other hand as tax 
increases more people migrate from country j  as wage is now higher. Thus 
domestic tax for j  becomes lower than the equilibrium value. Consequently, 
domestic tax rate of j  increases.  
 It may be of some interest to look at the change in national output of 
U  when the exporting countries impose domestic tax rates. The see it note 
that the national output equation of U  is- 
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national output decreases, when the importing countries increases domestic tax 
rate. Hence it implies that that U  will prefer to have no domestic tax imposed 
by the sending countries. 
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4.  Imposition of Foreign Tax by U  
 
 The first stage of the game involves setting of foreign tax by country 
U . This assumption brings us close to the works like Gatsios (1990) and 
Hwang and Mai (1991) where the tax policy of importing country was 
analysed. The reason to adopt similar model is the presence of market power 
of the rich developed countries. Given the rich countries are powerful; it is 
often possible for them to move first by setting their own policy objective 
when allowing migration. The poor countries merely follows the path paved 
by such policies. Thus in our model the importing country U  acts as a 
Stackelberg leader by setting its policies. The country sets the tax rates 
contemplating that country C  and I  will set their domestic taxes to control 
migration after fixation of foreign tax rate. By foreseeing this U sets up the tax 
rates to maximise the objective function. Below we are stating some results in 
propositions- 
 
Proposition 5.4: If U increases the tax rate for i  then the labour export of i  
decreases and that of j increases. The total labour export decreases. 
 
Proof: 
 To prove the proposition we need to recall the solutions of labour 
exports in equations (5.3) and (5.4). 2iL s are there function of iD s and iT s. 
But iD s are also function of iT s. hence by differentiating equation (5.3) and 
using solutions from equation (5.7), (5.8) and proposition (5.3)  we obtain- 
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 Similarly from equation (5.4) we obtain- 
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 By adding these two- 
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 In the appendix it has been shown by further calculation that- 
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 The proposition shows that the labour export of country i  decreases 
and that of country j  increases. We have already obtained that a country 
decreases domestic tax rate if foreign tax rate on own migrants is increased, 
thereby partially offsets the rate of decrease of migration. On the other hand if 
RWKHU FRXQWU\¶V IRUHLJQ WD[ LV LQFUHDVHG WKHQ WKH FRXQWU\ LQFUHDVHV LWV RZQ
domestic tax rate, thereby partially offsets the rate of increase of migration.  
As the overall labour migration decreases, the imposition of positive tax rates 
by U  decreases the national output of U . Hence maximisation of national 
output cannot be the reason for positive migration tax. Below we explore the 
cases where the country may use positive foreign tax rates. 
 
Proposition 5.5:  U  may impose positive foreign tax in order to maximise 
the income of permanent residents. 
 
Proof:  
 The objective of the receiving country may be to maximise the income 
of permanent residents of the country. Thus it will maximise the national 
output plus tax minus the wage of migrant workers. The objective function is 
then- 
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 Thus U  aims to maximise the national output plus tax revenue 
deducting the wage remitted by the migrants. The equation is complicated to 
work with thus we will evaluate the differentiation when tax rates are initially 
zero. Thus after differentiating and assuming tax rates are zero we get-  
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 Thus the first part of the expression is negative whereas the second part 
of the expression is positive. If tax is imposed it can increase or decrease the 
income of residents. Therefore the country may also subsidise migration to 
increase national income.2        Ŷ 
 
 The proposition shows that the power of importing country is 
depending on how exporting countries respond to the changed tax rates. This 
will happen if 
i
i
T
L
w
w 2
 and 
i
j
T
L
w
w 2
are very close, then the first term of the above 
expression become almost zero and the national income of U  increases. That 
is if the migrants of country i  are to a large extent replaced by the migrants of 
country j , then country U  will not experience production and tax revenue 
losses and accordingly the income of residents will increase. This is apparently 
happening in most developed countries. These countries are highly dependent 
on foreign labour force, but still maintain a high entry barrier. The reason is 
probably the existence of large pool of skilled and unskilled workers in the 
global market who are willing to migrate and work in developed countries. 
                                                 
2
 Assuming 121   ubb  we obtain   22272 ijiiU LLLT
Y  w
w
. Therefore if 
22 ji LL  , the income increases but if 22 ji LL z , income may increase or 
decrease. 
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These barriers are effectively increasing the entry cost for foreign labour force. 
However proposition (5.5) also suggesting that the countries may also practise 
the policy of subsidising migrants.   
We are interested to know the relationship between the labour 
endowment and tax burden received by a country. To check it we will work 
with a case where the country U wants to maximise the income of its 
permanent native workers. Not surprisingly, if the country wants to maximise 
the income permanent workers that is wage plus tax revenue then it imposes 
positive tax rate. The income of the permanent workers is given as-  
 
   222222 jjiiujiuuuLU LTLTLLLLbaY   
 
 By differentiating we get the following- 
 
i
j
j
i
i
ii
j
j
i
i
uu
i
LU
T
L
T
T
LTL
T
L
T
LLb
T
Y
w
ww
w¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
w
ww
w w
w 22
2
22
2  
  
 When tax rates are initially zero, the value of the derivatives are 
positive as-  
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As from proposition (5.4) we have 022 ¸¸¹
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. Hence the country 
will use positive foreign tax on the migrants. Thus positive solutions of tax 
rate exist that satisfy the first order condition of maximisation. It is essential to 
check the second derivatives. By differentiating again with respect to iT  and 
jT  we see that- 
 
  
114 
02 22
2
w
w w
w
i
i
i
LU
T
L
T
Y
 and 02 2
2
!w
w ww
w
j
i
ji
LU
T
L
TT
Y
 
 
 The second derivatives have desired signs as required for stability. In 
order to obtain the solutions of tax rates we need to set the derivatives equal to 
zero. The solutions of the equations are painstaking as 2iL s are functions of 
iD s and iT s. On top of that iD s are functions of iT s. Therefore the 
calculations involve substituting 2iL  from (5.3) and (5.4) and then 
substituting iD s from equation (5.7) and (5.8).  Only carrying the calculation 
for tax rate for country C  we get- 
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where Diw , H , A  and B are as defined before. For the solutions we also need 
to carry out the calculation for country I  too and then find the solutions using 
&UDPHU¶VUXOH7KHFDOFXODWLRQLVJRLQJWREHWHGLRXVDQGDSSDUHQWO\QRFOHDU
solution is going to come out. We can here resort to simplification as done 
before assuming 121   ubb . By carrying out the calculation with 
simplification we obtain following solutions- 
 
Diui w.L.T 500500        (5.10) 
and,  
Djuj w.L.T 500500       (5.11) 
 
 We are now in a position to see which country pays higher tax rate and 
exports more worker; it is given in the following proposition- 
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Proposition 5.6: The country with higher labour endowment pays higher tax 
rate and exports more labour compared to the country with lower labour 
endowment. 
 
Proof: 
 In order to find which country pays higher tax rate let us subtract 
equation (5.11) from (5.10). Then we obtain- 
 
   jiDjDiji LL.ww.TT    500500  
 
 Therefore the country with higher labour endowment pays higher tax 
rate. Further the calculation in appendix shows that 22 ji LL !  if ji LL !  
          Ŷ 
 
 
 The wage rate of the country with higher labour endowment is low. 
Hence the difference between foreign wage and domestic wage is large. The 
receiving country can exploit this gap by imposing higher tax rate on labour 
endowed country. The result is to some extent similar to that of Gatsios (1990). 
When looking at the tax policy of importing country in a third country 
strategic trade model, he found that importing country has incentive to impose 
higher tax rates on most efficient producer. In our case, the country with 
higher labour endowment has lower opportunity cost of migration, and that 
country faces higher tax burden.  It is also interesting to note that (shown in 
appendix) we obtain ji DD !  if ji LL ! . Hence the exporting country should 
also impose higher tax rate if it is endowed with a large pool of willing 
migrants. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
 In this paper we have worked with a model to analyse the effects of tax 
competition of labour sending and receiving countries. We have assumed a 
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model where two countries export labour to a third country. In addition to 
receiving extra workers to increase the output of the economy, the third 
country uses taxes on immigrants in order to fulfil its national objective. The 
sending countries also impose tax on emigrants to maximise national income. 
We have assumed that people are free to migrate and work in other countries. 
Thus the only way governments can control or restrict migration is by using 
emigration and immigration taxes. 
 We have first derived equilibrium amount of migration using the 
labour market equilibrium conditions. Given that foreign wage is higher then 
the domestic wage people migrate from both sending countries to the third 
receiving country. As expected, the labour export responds to the opposite 
directions for the two sending countries. That is if tax rate (domestic or 
foreign) is increased for one country, the labour export of that country 
decreases but labour export of the other country increases. We also note that 
unrestricted migration is not actually maximising the benefit of the sending 
countries. To maximise the national income, sending countries should also 
impose positive emigration tax. The result is contrary to the fact that many 
developing countries are now actually subsidising/encouraging skilled 
migration. This result to some extent LVLQOLQHZLWKWKHLGHDRIµ%KDJZDWL7D[¶ 
(Bhagwati and Dellalfar 1973). Apparently without tax too many people 
migrate which makes wage earned in abroad low. Emigration tax restricts 
migration and wage earned by the migrants rises. In analysing how receiving 
country imposes tax we have noted that to maximise the income of permanent 
residents, the country may impose positive or negative (subsidy) immigration 
tax. But if the objective of the country is to maximise the income of permanent 
workers then it resorts to positive tax. We have found that it imposes different 
tax rates for different countries. The country with more labour endowment 
pays more tax.  As the wage rate in the country with more labour endowment 
is low, the earning they receive from migration is initially relatively high. The 
receiving country uses this gap of earning to enhance its benefit by imposing 
higher tax rate. This result obtained is consistent with the result of our 
previous chapter where we assumed that immigration is completely controlled 
by sending country.  
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 What lessons can we learn for the analysis done in this paper? We 
assume free migration on the assumption that the countries are not in a 
position to control the outflow of migration. When considering the developing 
countries, these migrants mainly belong to the class of skilled/wealthy people. 
As obtained in the analysis free migration without any domestic barrier does 
not maximise the welfare of sending countries. This result has some similarity 
with the works on Brain Drain literature where benefit of migration through 
human capital formation is obtained only when not all people can migrate. 
Developing countries here are apparently pursuing incorrect policy. They are 
providing encouragement to both skilled and unskilled migration. Emigration 
of skilled people can be promoted when it brings benefit to the country. The 
governments need to properly evaluate if skilled emigration in reality is 
bringing benefit to their countries.  For example, the skilled migration can 
bring benefit when skilled people can conduct research and development in 
the country of immigration that can also be shared by the country of 
emigration. In addition as suggested by the recent Brain Drain literature 
skilled migration can provide incentive to form additional human capital. In 
this case skilled migration can also be promoted. If skilled migration does not 
bring benefit then it should be discouraged. However the governments of 
developed countries are apparently pursuing the policy of encouraging 
/supporting skilled migration without any proper policy evaluation. 
 The policy recommendation for the developed migrant receivers is that 
they should pursue discriminatory tax policy. If migration does not response 
much given the changes of tax rate then they should also impose positive tax 
rates. In reality developed countries are doing exactly the same. The migrants 
from developing countries are facing higher barriers but as income gap is very 
high the barriers are not greatly hindering the willingness of people to 
immigrate. The barriers can come in the form of visa processing time, high 
application cost, mandatory health check up, language proficiency requirement 
etc. In addition to the high application cost, immigrants remain ineligible to 
receive social benefit for a substantial period of time (e.g 5 years), though they 
may remain liable to pay taxes for the whole period of time. Because of high 
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income gap, these barriers have little effects on the immigration from 
developing country. 
 The lesson for the developing countries that they should not take the 
benefit of migration as granted. The policies need to be devised to control the 
skilled migration and to bring the benefit from it. If outflow of skilled people 
is not beneficial then the country should increase the exit barrier for the skilled 
migrants. In this regards the governments can consider taxing the 
organisations providing immigration services. This will be an immense task 
given the social-political influence of the groups to be effected by policy 
changes. Another solution is to ensure the benefit of all parties by mutually 
beneficial negotiation such that the world acts cooperatively in migration 
matters. Given the segmentation of the world such negotiation is unlikely to 
take place in near future.  
 
 
Appendix 
 
1.  Calculation of domestic tax 
 
The national income equation of country C  is given as- 
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Differentiating with respect to CD  and setting the derivative zero we get- 
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Using migration equilibrium condition of equation (5.1)- 
  
119 
 
02222222  w
ww
ww
w w
w
C
I
Cu
C
C
Cu
C
C
C
C
C
D
LLb
D
LLb
D
LD
D
Y
 
 
Now using the equation for equilibrium labour migration of (5.3) and (5.4) and 
as    uuuiDi LbaLbaw 2211   we obtain by further calculation the 
reaction function of country C  - 
 
       IDIuuCDCuuuuIuuC TwbbTwbbbbbDbbbbD   22212222121 3  
 
Similarly the reaction function of country I  can be obtained. 
 
 
 
 
2. Proposition 5.4: 
 
We get- 
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By calculation we get- 
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3. Proposition 5.6: 
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Chapter 6 
 
Openness of Labour Market, Migration, R&D and 
Economic Welfare 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Except a few regions, most countries of the world regulate their labour 
markets unilaterally. The regulatory bodies sometimes design policies with the 
aim of accepting the inflow of labour from foreign countries. Sometimes the 
regulatory bodies aim at reducing the inflow of labour from foreign countries. 
When the labour market is open firms can recruit low cost labour from outside 
and it may aIIHFWWKHILUPV¶FKRLFHRI5	'LQYHVWPHQW,QWKLVFKDSWHUZHDUH
going to analyse how opening of labour markets affects the R&D choice of 
firms and consequently changes economic welfare.  
Economic literature of migration shows that this openness brings 
benefit to both the source and host countries. There are also some papers 
addressing detrimental effects of such migration. From the source countries¶ 
point of view the main points of interest of the economic literature have been 
WKH EHQHILFLDO RU GHWULPHQWDO HIIHFWV RI PLJUDWLRQ WKURXJK µ%UDLQ 'UDLQ¶ RU
µ%UDLQ*DLQ¶6WDUNand Wang 2002, Schiff 2006 for a review). There are also 
some works showing the beneficial effects of migration on the source 
countries¶ population through remittances receipts (World Bank 2006). For the 
host countries the reason for opening the labour market is mainly the shortage 
of required labour force. But recently the countries are also recognising the 
importance of migration in financing fiscal deficits (Storesletten 2000).  The 
economic literature is also concerned about the detrimental effects of openness 
in the host country. Such as immigration can have negative effects on the 
employment and wage opportunities of local people.   
The migration literature mainly takes the firms¶ choice of R&D as 
exogenous and then analyses the effects of increased migration. However 
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Bretschger (2001) and Lundborg and Seregstrom (2002) within the framework 
of endogenous growth theory have analysed the firms¶ choice of R&D given 
the migration. They both used quality ladder growth models where firms 
conduct R&D to develop new quality products. In Lundborg and Seregstrom 
Northern high tech producers compete for producing high-tech high quality 
product and Southern countries compete for producing low-tech low quality 
product. Immigration depresses real wage of Northern workers, Northern 
firms respond by devoting more resources to R&D activities and innovations 
occur more frequently in each industry. Bretchger (2001) analysed the effects 
of increased supply of skilled and unskilled labour on R&D and long term 
development. Increased supply of skilled labour increases the R&D by 
lowering cost, but the increase in the supply of unskilled labour may 
unfavourably influence the long term development through the incentive it 
provides in the expansion of traditional sector compared to the sector that 
conducts R&D.   
In this chapter we have addressed process innovation where firms 
engage in R&D to reduce the production cost of already developed product.  
We assume two firms situated in two different countries engage in strategic 
trade with each other that serves a unified market of the two countries. In 
addition to production, the firms can conduct labor saving research. Opening 
up of labour market reduces the wage rate in the country of immigration. We 
then analyse the changes of equilibrium R&D investment and welfare. The 
structure we have adopted has similarity with the standard models of R&D 
rivalry such as Spencer and Brander (1983). The model and analysis done here 
also has similarity with Marjit and Mukherjee (2008). Recently increasing 
numbers of firms are outsourcing their production to foreign countries because 
of availability of cheap labour. Marjit and Mukherjee (2008) analysed the 
effects of outsourcing on R&D expenditure of firms.  They have shown that 
outsourcing and R&D can be complimentary or substitute, and the relationship 
depends on factors like market size and skill differentials between the workers. 
They have shown that under some conditions outsourcing may reduce the 
R&D investment and therefore may increase the price of product. Instead of 
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outsourcing in this paper we analyse the effects of openness and migration on 
ILUPV¶FKRLFHRI5	' 
The key assumption here is that opening up of labour market reduces 
the wage rate of labour in the country of immigration. It can be justified in the 
follows way. Firstly it can happen as migration increases the supply of labour. 
With downward slopping marginal product curve additional labour will then 
reduce the wage level. In previous two chapters we have analysed such 
consequences of migration. Secondly, even if labour supply does not increase, 
openness poses threat of migration to the native labour force. The threat of 
migration may reduce their bargaining power and thereby may reduce the 
wage rates. Here it is possible to link our analysis to General Agreement of 
Trade in Services (GATS) of WTO. The Mode 4 of GATS considers 
movement of people as a service trade where importing countries make 
binding commitment for allowing foreign labour service providers to access 
their labour market. Hence wages of migrants are really the price of labour 
services procured from abroad. Like any other product it can be procured from 
any willing seller of a product. It is normal to assume that reservation wage 
rates in developing countries are lower than the reservation wage rates of 
developed countries. Therefore we may assume that it is possible to recruit 
migrant labour from poor developing countries at a lower wage rate compared 
to the wage rate of natives. This assumption may receive some objections as in 
some countries minimum wage rate is a binding condition. But we also should 
note that there is no upper limit of wage rates in these countries. Therefore 
migration may reduce the high wage rates charged by native people for some 
particular services.  
We have adopted a model of strategic trade between developing and 
developed countries as we reckon that many Southern countries such as 
Mexico, China, India and Eastern European countries are competing with the 
developed countries in the product markets as well as exporting skilled and 
unskilled labour there. If migration of labour shapes the use of technology in 
Northern developed countries, it also does so in the Southern labour exporting 
developing countries. We have thus utilised the framework of strategic trade to 
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capture the effects of openness of labour market on both developing and 
developed countries. 
 It can be argued that the lower wage rate reflects the intrinsic 
productivity of the labour, that is immigrants and natives are not perfect 
substitute in production and research. Lundborg and Seregstrom (2002) 
regarded that North and South experience wage differential as high-tech R&D 
can only be conducted by the workers of the North.  We regard no such 
productivity difference. In many instances we see direct recruitment of 
Southern workers by the employers of North. Many high tech firms of 
Developed countries are operated by immigrant workers. For example Alacron 
(1999, page 1390) mentioned of a case study of an Indian student working in 
Oracle corporation where out of 20 engineers 10 were immigrants. He also 
mentioned of a notion that high tech firms of Silicon Valley are paying the 
skilled temporary migrants one third less than the payment of U.S. workers. 
Hence if immigrants earn low wage then it can simply be attributed to the low 
reservation wage of the immigrants.   
 One important contribution of the present paper is the analysis of the 
effects of skilled and unskilled migration differently. Acknowledgement of 
this difference allows us to link our analysis with the Brain Drain literature 
and relevant policy issues. The analysis in this chapter is pointing towards the 
benefit of skilled migration through the channel of increased R&D. We are 
assuming that native workers are displaced by low cost migrant workers or at 
least they experience a reduction in the wage rate. Even then they may gain 
from opening up if it increases output and lowers price level. It should be 
noted that though we have analysed the effects of openness and migration on 
output and price, their effects on overall welfare have not been addressed in 
this chapter as we have restricted ourselves to a partial equilibrium analysis.  
 The overall structure of the chapter is as follows. We have already 
provided introduction in the first section. In the second section we introduce 
the basic model and provide solution of equilibrium R&D. In the third section 
we analyse the effects of openness on the R&D of the firms by distinguishing 
the migrants in skilled and unskilled group. The forth section analyses the 
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similar effects by allowing no skill difference of the migrants. The fifth that is 
the last section provides concluding remarks.  
 
 
 
2. The Basic Assumptions, Equations and Solutions 
 
2.1. The Assumptions and Model 
 
 There are two countries 1 and 2 producing commodity Q  using labour. 
The production of Q  in each country is controlled by a single firm, which 
produces it for the home country and trade it to the other country. We will thus 
use the term firm and country interchangeably. The inverse demand function is 
given as- 
 
 
 21 qqap        (6.1) 
 
where p  is the price of the product, iq  is the amount produced by the firms in 
country 21,i  . 
The production technologies used in the firms are different. In firm 1, 
O  amount of unskilled labour is required to produce a unit of good. In firm 2, 
this amount is E . Besides producing, each firm can also conduct labour 
saving research that reduces the unit labour requirement of production. Hence 
the firms perform two tasks: R&D and production. We consider that the firms 
need different types of workers for these activities. The unskilled workers are 
used in production but the skilled workers are used in R&D. The wage rate for 
unskilled labour in i   is given as uiw  and for the skilled labour, it is siw . We 
assume throughout that 21 uu ww !  and 21 ss ww ! , that is wage rates are higher 
in country 1 which gives the incentive for migration. Institutional reasons such 
as a stronger trade union or low reservation wage can be the reason for wage 
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difference. In the following analysis, we will define the wage rates of 
unskilled and skilled workers in country 1 as  1uuwD  and 1sswD  where- 
 
1 uD  if no migration,
1
2
u
u
u
w
w D  if migration 
 
1 sD  if no migration ,
1
2
s
s
s
w
w D  if migration. 
 
 Hence the wage rates with migration and open labour market are lower 
than that of the closed labour market. We keep the wage rates of country 2 
unchanged while for simplicity assume that wage rates of country 1 become as 
low as the wage rates of country 2. The assumption regarding the wage of 
country 2 is not unrealistic. If country 2 is endowed with large pool of labour 
force then migration of some people would not have much effect on the wage 
of country 2. In addition we are only considering the possibility of migration 
thus if no migration takes place then wage rates would remain unchanged. For 
country 1 the wage rates after migration should be somewhere between the 
pre-migration wage rates of two country.  For simplification, we have taken 
the assumption that wage rates fall to the level of pre-migration wage rate of 
country 2. This simplification does not change the qualitative results. Though 
we know that wage rates, we do not know the types of labour employed in 
firm 1. They can be native or migrants or both. To simplify the expression, we 
are defining all situations by migration. We assume that both types of workers 
of two countries are perfect substitutes. We also assume that no transport cost 
is associated with trade. There is also no cost of international migration. Some 
of these assumptions are not fully realistic but they will help us to concentrate 
on the main issue that is the effects of openness and migration on R&D 
LQYHVWPHQWVDQGFRQVXPHUV¶ZHOIDUH 
 We consider the following game. At stage 1, the firms determine R&D 
investments. Conditional on the R&D investments, at stage 2, they take their 
output decisions like Cournot oligopolists. We solve the game through 
backward induction.  
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2.2. Second Stage of the Game 
 
,QFRXQWU\WKHILUP¶VPD[LPLVDWLRQSURElem in the second stage can 
be written as- 
 
11
21
1
1
qwqa Max uu
,i
iq ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§  ¦
 
ODS
     (6.2) 
 
 The first order condition for maximisation yields- 
 
02 121
1
1   w
w
uuwqqaq
ODS
     (6.3) 
 
 Similarly for the firm 2, we have- 
 
22
2,1
2
2
Max qwqa u
i
iq ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§  ¦
 
ES
     (6.4) 
 
 Again from the first order condition we obtain- 
 
02 221
2
2   w
w
uwqqaq
ES
     (6.5) 
 
 The own and cross second partial derivatives are respectively 
022
2
 w
w
i
i
q
S
 and 01
2
 ww
w
ji
i
qq
S
 where ^ `2,1i and ji z . Hence the 
solutions are stable. Now by solving (6.3) and (6.5), we obtain- 
 
3
2 21
1
uuu wwaq EOD         (6.6) 
3
2 12
2
uuu* wwaq ODE        (6.7) 
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 Hence the total output and price are given as- 
 
3
2 21
21
uuu** wwaqqQ EOD        (6.8) 
3
21
21
uuu*** wwaqqap EOD       (6.9) 
 
 The profit in the second stage by the firms are therefore given as- 
 
 
9
2 221
1
uuu* wwa EODS        (6.10) 
 
9
2 212
2
uuu* wwa ODES        (6.11) 
 
 
2.3. First Stage of the Game 
 
 
Firms in the first stage select the R&D so that the second stage profit 
net of the R&D cost is maximised. For firm 1 and 2, we get respectively 
 
      11
2
2211
1 9
2 RcwRwRa uuu  EDO3
  (6.12) 
      22
2
1122
2 9
2 RcwRwRa uuu  DOE3
  (6.13) 
 
where, 
  iR = is the level of R&D. 
 
 ii Rc = is the cost of R&D of firm i  
 and 0cO , 0cE , 0!cic  
 
 The first order conditions are- 
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 c c w
w
1121
1
1 2
9
4
cwwwa
R uuuuu
DOEOD3
  (6.14) 
  2212
2
2 2
9
4
cwwwa
R uuuu
c c w
w EODE3    (6.15) 
   
 Assume that the second order condition of the maximisation problem is 
satisfied. In order to simplify the calculation and analysis we may assume an 
explicit functional form of unit labour requirement, that is- 
 
   1111 RbR  TO  
   2222 RbR  TE  
 
 Hence unit labour requirement falls as the level of R&D increases. In 
addition we assume that the research cost is given by    
2
G
isi
ii
RwRc  , where 
0!G  and siw is the wage of skilled workers (scientists, engineers) in country 
i .  It shows that in order to have iR  level of R&D the firms need to employ 
 
2
G
iR
 amount of skilled workers and pay siw  to each worker. The shape of the 
function depends on the value of G . If it is less than 1 then the cost function is 
strictly concave. If it is equal to 1 then the function is a straight line. If it is 
more than 1 then the function is strictly convex, implying that the research 
cost increases at an increasing rate. For our analysis we will assume that 2 G  
hence cost function is strictly convex. This assumption will simplify the 
calculation but not unrealistic as we are considering process innovation where 
aim of the research is to reduce production cost. The cost of the research here 
can increase at an increasing rate as it gradually becomes harder to reduce 
production cost. 
To capture skilled migration we use the coefficient sD  in firm 1. 
Therefore, the cost of R&D in firm 1 with 2 G  is- 
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2
2
11
11
RwRc ssD   
 
where  1 sD  if no migration ,
1
2
s
s
s
w
w D  if migration. We can therefore 
rewrite equations (6.12) and (6.13) as-   
 
    
29
2 211
2
22221111
1
RwwRbwRba ssuuu DTDT3  
 (6.16) 
    
29
2 222
2
11112222
2
RwwRbwRba suuu  DTT3
 (6.17) 
 
 By differentiating equation (6.16) with respect to 1R and using the first 
order condition that is setting  0
1
1  w
w
R
3
 we get the following reaction function 
of firm 1- 
 
 22
1
22
11
1221
2
1
22
11
1221
2
1
2
1111
1 89
4
89
484 R
wbw
wwbb
wbw
wwbwbwabR
uuss
uuu
uuss
uuuuuuu
DD
D
DD
DTDTD

 
   
        ««6.18) 
 
Where 1221
2
1
2
1111 484 uuuuuuu wwbwbwab DTDTD   is negative as 
 1 1 1 2 22 0u u ua w wT D T  ! . We also assume that 089 212211 ! uuss wbw DD  to 
ensure 01 !R  when 02  R . The own cross partial derivative is given as- 
 
 1212212
1
1
2
98
9
1
ssuu wwbR
DD  w
3w
 
 
 As we have assumed before own partial derivative is negative. The 
cross second partial derivative is given as- 
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 Similarly from equation (6.17) by differentiating with respect to 2R  
and setting  0
2
2  w
w
R
3
 we obtain-  
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 Again 2112
2
22222 484 uuuuu wwbwbawb DTT   is negative. The second 
derivatives are- 
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4
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 We again assume that 089 22
2
22 ! us wbw  to ensure that 02 !R  when 
01  R . The equations can be written in matrix form as- 
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 The denominator is- 
212
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2
1
22
2
2
1 81727248 ssssuussuuuu wwwwbwwbwwbb DDDDM   
 
 Assume that the denominator is positive as required for stability. As 
the trace of the matrix is negative the equilibrium is stable. The solutions 
obtained as- 
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3. Effects of Migration on R&D and Welfare 
 
 In this section we are going to analyse the effects of migration on 
equilibrium R&D of the firms. Since the analysis of innovation by both firms 
is cumbersome, we first want to see how migration alters the equilibrium 
outcomes when either firm 1 or firm 2 innovates. Then it will be easy to 
understand the effects of migration under innovation by both firms, since this 
situation will be a combination of other two cases. A summary of the results 
obtained is given below in Table-6.1: 
 
Table-6.1 
Summary of the Results (R&D with migration) 
Country performing R&D Skilled Unskilled 
Country 1 High Low if  
    2212 uuunm wwwa EO !  
Country 2 No 
change  
Low 
Simultaneous R&D 
(Skills are different) 
High No clear result 
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3.1. Only Labour Importing Firm 1 Does R&D 
 
 Assume that only labour importing firm, i.e., firm 1 does R&D. Hence, 
R&D of the other firm is assumed fixed. Therefore, the second stage solutions 
remain as before but in the first stage, we have only equation (6.14) that 
determines the R&D investment of firm 1. We can state the result in the 
following proposition- 
 
Proposition 6.1: If only firm 1 does R&D, migration of unskilled people 
decreases (increases) R&D if     2212 uuunm wwwa EO ! .  
 
Proof:  
 
 Without migration 1 uD . Therefore equation (6.14) becomes-   
 
  c c 112129
4
cwwwa uuu OEO     (6.22) 
 
 With migration 
1
2
u
u
u
w
w D . The equation (6.14) becomes- 
 
  c c 122229
4
cwwwa uuu OEO     (6.23) 
 
Evaluating the marginal benefit of R&D at no migration equilibrium 
R&D, the LHS (6.22)  !  LHS (6.23) if- 
 
      222121 29
42
9
4
unmuunmunmuunm wwwawwwa OEOOEO c!c  
Or,     2212 uuunm wwwa EO !  
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 Therefore if   2212 uuunm wwwa EO !  it implies that marginal 
benefit of R&D is higher in no migration case, hence R&D needs to be 
reduced with migration. If the opposite of the inequality holds i.e.  
  2212 uuunm wwwa EO   then equilibrium R&D is higher with migration. 
          Ŷ 
 
 Figure-6.1 has been drawn to facilitate understanding of the situation. 
To plot we have utilised equation (6.16). In the figure we have shown the 
intersection of marginal benefit and marginal cost curves that determines 
equilibrium level of R&D. As we have drawn both marginal benefit and 
marginal cost curves are positive and upward slopping. The reason is that both 
total benefit and total cost are convex, that is they increase at an increasing 
rate with R&D. Marginal cost starts from the original as it is zero without any 
R&D.  
As shown in the diagram, without migration, the marginal benefit is 
equal to the marginal cost at point A . With migration the slope of marginal 
benefit curve falls but the intercept may increase or decrease1. In the diagram 
we have drawn three marginal benefit lines. The middle one as we have 
mentioned shows the situation without migration. The bottom line depicts the 
situation when marginal benefit shifts down after migration. If marginal 
benefit shifts down the new equilibrium is given by point B . As we can 
observe in the diagram, the level of R&D at point A  is larger than the level of 
R&D at point B . Consequently, the R&D investment of firm 1 is lower with 
migration.  The top line illustrates the case when marginal benefit shifts up 
after migration. As shown in the diagram the new equilibrium when marginal 
benefit shifts upward is given by point C  where equilibrium R&D increases. 
However in this case it is not certain that R&D will always increase. The 
                                                 
1
 Without migration marginal benefit is given as- 
  1212121111 9
82
9
4 Rwbwwawb uuuu  ET  
With migration marginal benefit is given as- 
  1222122121 9
82
9
4 Rwbwwawb uuuu  ET  
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marginal benefit is now flatter, hence if marginal benefit shifts upward, it may 
intersect the marginal cost curve in a point where R&D is lower.  
 
 
 
 The effects we observe are same as the effects of outsourcing on the 
R&D investment in Marjit and Mukherjee (2008). It is same as the proposition 
1 of that paper. The marginal benefit here is given as 
  12129
4
uunmuuu wwwa DOED c . Hence wage rate operates in two places, 
inside the bracket and outside the bracket. If wage rate falls, the term inside 
the bracket increases, but through the term outside the bracket it exerts 
negative effect on marginal benefit. The overall effect depends on the 
multiplication of the two terms. The higher is a  the higher is the chance that 
MB,MC
 
1R  
nmR1  mR1  
Figure-6.1 
Equilibrium R&D with Unskilled Migration 
 (Country 1 does R&D) 
A
 
B
 
1MC  
nmMB1  
mMB1  
C  
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lower wage rate implies a lower marginal benefit of R&D. a  in the equation 
stands for market size. Therefore if a  is sufficiently large then migration, by 
supplying workers at a lower wage, reduces R&D. But for a lower a , 
declining wage rate increases the R&D investment. Therefore migration 
reduces (increases) R&D in large (small) market.  
 
 
 
Proposition 6.2: Migration of unskilled workers increases (decreases) 
welfare of the consumers if-   12 unmum ww OO ! . 
 
Proof:  
 
 The output without migration is given as- 
 
3
2 21 uunm
nm
wwaQ EO   
 
 With migration it is- 
 
3
2 22 uum
m
wwaQ EO   
 
 Therefore total output is higher (lower) with migration if- 
 
 
3
2
3
2 2221 uumuunm wwawwa EOEO !  
or,   12 unmum ww OO !  
          Ŷ 
 
  In the above, 2umwO  and 1unmwO  respectively stand for total cost of 
production of one unit of good with migration and without migration. If total 
cost of producing one unit of output is lower, then it will induce the firm to 
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increase output to obtain higher profit. With migration, total output and 
welfare is always higher if R&D is higher as both the unit input requirement 
and wage rate are lower. However if migration reduces R&D, total output and 
welfare increases (decreases) if   12 unmum ww OO ! , i.e., if marginal cost of 
production of one unit good is lower (higher) after migration. Hence, 
migration can increase welfare even if the input requirement is higher. Such as 
when wage rate falls by a large amount but input requirement does not 
increase by that much. Combining with proposition (6.1) we may therefore say 
that if market size is relatively small, labour market openness, which creates 
the possibility of migration, may increase welfare by reducing the price level. 
But if market size is relatively large, migration may increase the price level.  
  
 
Proposition 6. 7KH OHYHO RI 5	' DQG FRQVXPHUV¶ ZHOIDUH LV KLJKHU ZLWK
migration of skilled people if only firm 1 does R&D.  
 
Proof: 
 
 We will use equation (6.16) to demonstrate the proposition. As only 
firm 1 conducts R&D the equation can be written as- 
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Differentiating with respect to 1R  and setting the derivative equal to 
zero we obtain- 
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The numerator remains unchanged with migration of skilled people. 
Therefore with migration R&D increases as 089 21
2
11 ! uss wbwD  and 
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21 ss ww ! . The welfare is higher with migration as the input requirement falls 
with migration i.e. mnm OO ! .       Ŷ 
 
We can use a diagram like Figure-6.1 to analyse what happens if only 
skilled people migrate. We have described the situation in Figure-6.2. The 
migration of skilled people does not change the slope and intercept of the total 
benefit function as production is conducted by using unskilled labour. 
Therefore marginal benefit remains the same. But the total cost falls. As 
marginal cost is always zero with no R&D, the new marginal cost line also 
starts from the origin. Hence the marginal cost pivot down from the origin 
after the migration. Now assume that originally without migration we had 
marginal benefit equal to marginal cost at a point like A . After migration new 
equilibrium is obtained at point B . At point B  the level of R&D is now higher. 
Therefore migration of skilled people increases R&D if only the labour 
importing country conducts R&D.  
 
MB,MC
 
1R  
mR1  nmR1  
Figure-6.2 
Equilibrium R&D with Skilled Migration 
 (Country 1 does R&D) 
 
B
 
A
 
nmMC1  
mMC1  
1MB  
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We can relate the above arguments with the literature on the economic 
benefit of international migration and Brain Drain. The analysis done in this 
section presents a channel of potential cost and benefit of migration. In 
proposition (6.1) we have seen that unskilled migration changes the 
production cost and consequently alters the level of R&D of the firm. If 
market size is larger then unskilled migration may reduce R&D and welfare. 
This is pointing towards the detrimental effect of unskilled migration in a large 
market controlled by a single large firm. In this case the firm may want to 
utilise the advantage presented by low labour cost, as an alternative of putting 
resources on research and development. This effect is to some extent similar to 
the effect where firm obtains monopoly right and delays further development 
of the product to full extraction the benefit out of existing innovation. 
However if migration of skilled people takes place, given the level of 
unskilled wage rate, it is profitable for firm to increase R&D. Consequently 
welfare also increases. Thus, it points towards a beneficial effect of Brain 
Drain. Given the limitation of Southern countries in performing research, the 
migration of skilled people to North is fostering development of products in 
the North. But both Southern and Northern countries are sharing the beneficial 
effects of the product development. The development of computer hardware 
and software can be cited as examples as the products are mainly developed in 
the developed countries but the benefit of development is shared by the whole 
world. The result here somehow echoes that of the paper of Grubel and Scott 
(1966) on international flow of human capital. They mentioned that the largest 
benefit of people migrating abroad can come through the pure research of 
scientists and engineers. If the work condition in new country is better the 
productivity is high, so native country gains more from scientists emigrating 
outside given the products of basic research are free goods. 
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3.2.  Only Labour Exporting Country Does R&D 
 
 In this section we are assuming that only firm 2 conducts R&D. 
Therefore, at stage 1, only firm 2 determines the R&D investment while firm 
¶V5	'LQYHVWPHQWLVIL[HG,WLVQRZLPPHGLDWHWKDWWKHRSHQQHVVRIODERXU
market does not influence R&D directly. It only works by the competition in 
the product market as firm 1 may now use the low cost labour for production. 
The effects on the R&D of firm 2 and the welfare are expressed by following 
proposition- 
 
Proposition 6.4: If only firm 2 conducts R&D then migration of unskilled 
ZRUNHUV UHGXFHV 5	' RI WKH ILUP  7KH FRQVXPHUV¶ EHQHILW LV KLJKHU
(lower) without migration if     21
2
uu
u
nmm
ww
w
! EEO . 
 
Proof:  
 
 Without migration we have- 
 
  221229
4
cwwwa uuu c c EOE   
 
 With migration it is- 
 
  222229
4
cwwwa uuu c c EOE  
 
As E c is negative the expressions for marginal benefits are positive. 
Evaluating the benefits at the equilibrium R&D without migration, we obtain 
R&D without migration is higher as 21 uu ww ! .  
In order to find consumers¶ welfare we need to compare the output 
levels. Without migration it is given as-  
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3
2 21 unmu
nm
wwaQ EO   
 
With migration- 
 
3
2 22 umu
m
wwaQ EO   
 
Therefore welfare is higher (lower) without migration if- 
 
 
3
2
3
2 2221 umuunmu wwawwa EOEO !  
Or,     21
2
uu
nmmu
ww
w

! EEO  
Ŷ 
 
 The intuitions of the results are as follows. Firm 1 now employs labour 
at a lower wage rate. Thus, given all other things are equal, it can afford to 
increase production. It implies that country 2 reduces the production, which in 
turn implies reduction of labour saving R&D. The output of firm 2 thus is 
lower7KHFRQVXPHUV¶ZHOIDUHGHSHQGVRQWKHWRWDORXWSXWSURGXFHG)LUP
now increases the output but firm 2 reduces output. Welfare is higher if firm 1 
produces extra output after compensating the reduction of output by firm 2. 
This condition holds if   21
2
uu
nmmu
ww
w

! EEO . We can see that, the higher is the 
wage gap, the higher is the chance that welfare is higher. However higher 
wage gap implies lower R&D by firm 2. Welfare increases if the wage gap is 
higher but the level of R&D does not change to that extent. However if the 
wage gap is lower and R&D decreases by a large extent then welfare reduces.  
 Migration of skilled worker will not have any effect on the R&D 
expenditure as firm 1 does not perform R&D. Actually there is no rationale for 
migration of skilled worker if only firm 2 does R&D. 
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3.3. Simultaneous R&D by Both Countries 
 
 In this section we assume that the countries conduct R&D 
simultaneously. In order to simplify analysis we will utilise the specific 
functional forms already developed in section 2. We have previously 
calculated the reaction functions of firms 1 and 2. From the reaction functions, 
we have calculated equilibrium R&D investments. But the calculations of the 
effects of migration on equilibrium level of R&D are cumbersome and clear 
cut results are difficult to obtain. Therefore, in this section the reaction 
functions will be sometimes plotted to evaluate the effects of migration. To 
facilitate plotting of the reaction functions, they can be written in the 
following manner. 
 
22
1
22
11
2121
2
1
22
11
1221
2
1
2
11111
1 89
4
89
484 R
wbw
wwbb
wbw
wwbwbwabR
uuss
uuu
uuss
uuuuuuu
DD
D
DD
DTDTD

  
           ««6.24) 
 
 
2
2121
2
2
2
22
11
1122
1 4
89
4
484 R
wwbb
wbw
wb
wwaR
uuu
us
uu
uuu
DD
DTT  2    (6.25) 
 
 Here both equations have been expressed as a function of 2R . The 
equation (6.24) comes from the reaction function of firm 1 in equation (6.18). 
It shows what will be the particular value of the R&D of firm 1 given the 
R&D of the firm 2. The equation (6.25) is the reaction function of firm 2 
which comes from equation (6.19). The way it has been written says what 
must be the value of 2R  to get a particular value of 1R .   
 
 
                                                 
2
 Later we will write it as   2
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2
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 to 
facilitate analysis. 
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3.3.1. If Only Unskilled Workers Migrate 
 
 The first case we analyse is what happens if only unskilled people 
migrate. Therefore sD is always equal to 1. However if no migration takes 
place then 1 uD . Consequently without migration for firm 1- 
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If migration takes place then 
1
2
u
u
u
w
w D . Consequently- 
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 We have 089 22
2
11 ! us wbw  as required for stability. In addition, for 
positive output it is required that   02 2211 ! uuu wwa TDT  implying that  
 22111112212121111 24484 uuuuuuuuuuuu wwawbwwbwbwab TDTDDTDTD   , 
is positive. Hence the intercept term is positive and the slope term is negative. 
In the intercept term, with migration, the term in bracket is bigger but the term 
outside is smaller. Therefore when plotting, it is not possible to say if intercept 
in the 1R  axis with migration increases or decreases. However the intercept in 
2R axis increases
3
. With migration the slope is however definitely flatter4. We 
have plotted the reaction functions of firm 1 without and with migration in 
Figure-6.3 by denoting (1). The solid line denoted by (1) shows that reaction 
function without migration and the broken line denoted by (1) shows the 
                                                 
3
 When 01  R  without 
migration
221
2211111
2121
1221
2
11111
2 4
484
4
484
u
uu
uu
uuuu
wbb
wbwbab
wwbb
wwbwbawbR TTTT   , 
with migration it is 
221
2212111
2 4
484
u
uu
wbb
wbwbabR TT  .  
4
 See the appendix for formal derivation. 
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reaction function with migration. We have assumed that the intercept has 
decreased (the broken line) but it may also increase. Such a situation is shown 
by the dotted line denoted as (3). Also note that 1R  of firm 1 has been placed 
in vertical and 2R  of firm 2 has been placed in horizontal axis. 
As can be seen in the diagram, firm 1 may start with a higher R&D and 
then decreases LWDVWKHRWKHUFRXQWU\¶V5	'LQFUeases, but the rate of decrease 
is lower with migration. The shift of intercept in 1R  axis is largely dependent 
on the value of a , i.e., the market size. As the denominator is higher with 
migration, to have an upward shift of the intercept, the numerator must also 
increase and this increase needs to be relatively larger than the increase of 
denominator. If a  is very large then a small fall in wage rate is likely to 
reduce the numerator by a large extent. If a  is not very large the decrease in 
numerator is likely to be small and may even increase the numerator. That is 
why we may see higher intercept in 1R  axis with migration
5
. 
 
 
                                                 
5
  Comparing the numerator of the intercept before and after migration and 
assuming bbb   21  and TTT   21   we obtain that the numerator increases 
with migration if 212 uu wwa TT  .  
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 For firm 2, using equation (6.25) if no migration then- 
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 If migration then- 
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We have plotted the reaction functions of firm 2 in Figure-6.3 by 
denoting them as (2). The solid line denoted as (2) is the reaction function 
without migration and the broken line denoted as (2) is the reaction function 
with migration.  The first part must be positive, therefore with migration the 
2R  
1R  
(1) Reaction functions of firm 1 
(2) Reaction functions of firm 2 
(3) Reaction functions of firm 1 after 
migration when intercept in vertical axis 
is higher  
Figure-6.3 
Equilibrium R&D with Unskilled Migration 
 (Simultaneous R&D) 
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first part increases implying the intercept in 1R  axis increases. The slope is 
also steeper with migration. The intercept in the 2R  axis however falls with 
migration as can be directly observed from equation (6.25) assuming 01  R . 
It is not possible from Figure-6.3 to say if equilibrium R&D will 
increase or decrease after migration. With migration the cost of production in 
firm 1 is lower. According to proposition (6.1), if the market size is large then 
firm 1 in this situation may reduce R&D. But it can also increase the R&D if 
the market size is relatively small. Firm 2 is now no longer inactive. Hence it 
can increase or decrease R&D in response to the change of production and 
R&D of firm 1. As it is difficult to evaluate what happens here we can refer to 
the proposition (6.1) and (6.2) to look at it a bit more clearly. In proposition 
(6.1) and (6.2) we have seen that when firm 2 is inactive, with migration if 
R&D increases, then total output increases. However output of firm 2 falls as 
can be observed from equation (6.7). Firm 2 then must reduce the R&D as 
marginal benefit of R&D falls in equation (6.15). Hence equilibrium R&D of 
firm 2 must fall. On the other hand we have also seen in proposition (6.1) that 
migration may reduce R&D if market size is relatively large. If total output 
increases then again the output of firm 2 falls and consequently firm 2 must 
reduce R&D. But if total output deceases then output and marginal benefit of 
R&D of firm 2 increases. Hence firm 2 should increase R&D. We may also 
think what happens if R&D of firm 1 remains the same. According to the 
previous argument total output increases therefore the output and R&D of firm 
IDOO&RQVXPHUV¶ZHOIDUHGHSHQGVRQWKHWRWDORXWSXW$VRXWSXWRIRQHILUP
increases and the other firm decreases the total welfare depends on the relative 
changes of the outputs of two firms. 
 
 
3.3.2. If Only Skilled Workers Migrate 
 
 If only skilled workers migrate then uD  is always equal to 1. 
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Proposition 6.5: If only skilled workers migrate then the R&D of firm 1 
increases and the R&D of firm 2 decreases. 
 
Proof: 
 
 The equilibrium R&D of firm 1 in equation (6.20) is given as- 
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where, 
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 Therefore only the denominator changes with migration. As  21 ss ww !  
the denominator decreases with migration (see appendix). Hence equilibrium 
R&D of firm 1 increases with migration. 
 We can not similarly calculate the R&D of firm 2 from equation (6.21) 
as the denominator and numerator both change. However in equation (6.15) if 
marginal benefit if R&D is evaluated at the no migration equilibrium R&D we 
get mnm MBMB 22 !  as- 
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 In addition by looking at the reaction function of firm 2 in equation 
(6.19) we see that firm 2 reduces R&D for higher equilibrium R&D of firm 1. 
Therefore R&D of firm 2 falls with migration of skilled people.  Ŷ 
 
The results of the proposition are as we have expected. Firm 1 can now 
conduct R&D relatively cheaply. Its marginal benefit of R&D is higher than 
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marginal cost at the previous level of R&D. Hence firm 1 increases R&D. The 
output increases and price falls. For firm 2 marginal benefit of R&D reduces 
with migration. Hence firm 2 reduces R&D.  
To look at the matter further we have plotted the reaction functions of 
two firms in Figure-6.4. To see how the R&D changes as the wage rate of 
skilled people changes assume that all other parameters of equations are same. 
Therefore assuming bbb   21 , TTT   21  and uuu www   21  equations 
(6.18) and (6.19) are rewritten as- 
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In the Figure-6.4 we have indicated the reaction function of firm 1 
using the flatter lines denoted by (1). The flatter broken there line indicates the 
reaction function of firm 1 with migration. The steeper line denoted by (2) has 
been used to indicate firm 2. If migration takes place, both firms experience 
the same wage rate i.e. 2sw  for the skilled people. Given all other things equal 
the reaction functions of both firms are exactly the same with migration. Both 
firms have exactly same R&D. The equilibrium is indicated by point B , 
where the solid steeper line and the flatter broken line have crossed. Now we 
want to see if the firm 1 instead faces the wage 1sw , how it alters the reaction 
functions and equilibrium R&D? 
 By looking at the equations we can see that the reaction function of 
firm 2 remains unchanged. But firm 1 now has a new reaction function. As 
21 ss ww ! , and the numerator and denominator both are negative, the intercept 
of firm 1 in the vertical axis decreases.   
 The denominator of the slope term is also higher for firm 1 as 21 ss ww ! . 
Hence the slope falls in absolute value. The reaction function is therefore 
IODWWHU LPSO\LQJ WKDW ILUP ¶V UHDFWLRQ WR FKDQJH LQ WKH FRXQWU\ ¶V 5	' LV
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relatively small. Looking further at the equation it can be seen that the 
intercept term of the firm 1 in the horizontal axis remain unchanged. The new 
reaction function is given by the solid line indicated as before by (1). The 
intersection of the reaction functions is now given by A , implying the R&D 
of firm 1 is lower and that of firm 2 is higher.  
 
 
 We have given interpretation of the diagram in opposite order to 
explicitly describe the effects of migration on the R&D investment. Without 
migration the firm 1 faces 1sw  with migration it faces 2sw . As we can see the 
firm 1 increases R&D when facing wage rate 2sw . On the other hand firm 2 
reduces the R&D. Hence availability of skilled people at a low cost gives 
advantage to the firm 2. But migration takes the advantage away.  
 
 
 
 
2R  
1R  
B
 
A
 
(1) Reaction functions of firm 1 
(2) Reaction function of firm 2 
Figure-6.4 
Equilibrium R&D with Skilled Migration 
 (Simultaneous R&D) 
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4.   If There Is No Skill Difference  
 
 This section follows as a special case of the analysis done in previous 
sections. We assume here that there is no difference between wage rates of 
skilled and unskilled people. It is actually a simplification of the case where 
migration of both skilled and unskilled people takes place and both countries 
conduct R&D simultaneously. We have presented this result as many papers 
have not taken the difference between skilled and unskilled people into 
consideration.  
Based on the above assume that wage is 1w  in country 1 and it is 2w  in 
country 2 and 
1
2
w
w
su    DDD . This can occur in all cases, i.e., innovation 
by firm 1, innovation by firm 2 and simultaneous innovation by both firms. 
We will first look at how it alters the result of section 3.1 that is when only 
firm 1 does innovation. In Figure-6.1 we have seen that the marginal benefit 
curve of firm 1 shifts with migration. This shift may increase R&D if market 
size is relatively small and may decrease R&D if market size is relatively large.  
In Figure- 6.2 we have seen that migration of skilled people shifts the R&D 
cost curve and increases R&D. The present case is a combination of both 
figures where both marginal benefit and marginal cost curves shift.  Here as 
marginal cost falls R&D increases. This increase is further enforced if market 
size is relatively small. However if market size is large it will dampen the 
positive effect of cost reduction. R&D can even decrease if market size is 
relatively very large.  
 
Proposition 6.6: If there is no skill difference and if only firm 1 conducts 
R&D then the R&D investment reduces (increases) with migration if 
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a
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Proof : 
 
 In the appendix we have calculated the equilibrium R&D of firm 1 as- 
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Ŷ 
 
 The similarities of proposition (6.1) and proposition (6.6) are clearly 
observable. Proposition (6.1) shows that if a  is sufficiently large then 
migration reduces R&D. Similarly in this proposition if a  is sufficiently large 
it reduces R&D. We may compare the critical value of a  in the two 
propositions by further calculation. However the calculation involves different 
wage rates which are not directly comparable and turns out to be complicated. 
See appendix for the calculation of a  in proposition (6.1). 
 
Proposition 6.7: If there is no skill difference and only firm 2 conducts R&D 
then equilibrium R&D reduces with migration. 
 
Proof: 
 
 In the appendix we have calculated equilibrium R&D of firm 2 as- 
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 As 21 ww ! , the numerator increases with migration. Therefore 
mnm RR 22 ! .          Ŷ 
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Hence the result obtained is consistent with the proposition (6.3). Firm 
1 does not conduct any R&D. Nonetheless migration reduces the production 
cost for firm 1, therefore firm 1 increases output and price falls. The marginal 
benefit of R&D of firm 2 falls. In response firm 2 reduces R&D. 
The calculations with simultaneous R&D do not give clear-cut results. 
Therefore, we plot the reaction functions to get ideas about the effects of 
migration. From equation (6.20), we get for firm 1 under no migration- 
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 Under migration, we obtain for firm 1- 
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It can be seen that the slope is flatter in case for migration as the 
denominator is larger. In the intercept term, the denominator and the 
numerator both increase with migration.  Hence the intercept can be higher or 
lower after migration. We have plotted the reaction functions in Figure-6.5 by 
denoting them with (1). As before the solid line is the reaction function 
without migration. The broken line is the reaction function after migration 
where we have assumed that the intercept has decreased. But the intercept may 
also increase as shown by the dotted line denoted by (3). As we have 
discussed before if market size is relatively small then migration may increase 
the intercept term. Otherwise it may decrease the intercept term.  
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 For firm 2 if no migration- 
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 The intercept is given by the first two terms. As the denominator 
decreases, the intercept increases. The denominator of the slope term also 
decreases implying steeper slope. In the diagram the reaction functions of firm 
2 are indicated by steeper lines denoted by (2).The reaction function without 
migration is given by the solid line. The reaction function with migration is 
given by the broken line. The overall change is therefore ambiguous as we can 
2R  
1R  
A 
B 
(1) Reaction functions of firm 1 
(2) Reaction functions of firm 2 
(3)  Reaction function of firm 1 
when intercept in vertical axis is 
higher after migration 
Figure-6.5 
Equilibrium R&D No Skill difference 
  (Simultaneous R&D) 
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have intersection in any place. Here as firm 2 increases R&D, firm 1 decreases 
R&D but the rate is lower with migration. Similarly R&D of firm 2 is lower 
with migration if firm 1 conducts no R&D. It also reduces R&D with the 
increase of R&D of firm 1, but the rate is lower with migration. The final 
equilibrium is not known, but as we have drawn in the diagram, initially the 
intersection was at A . After migration the intersection is at B . It should also 
be noted that if market size is relatively smaller resulting in higher intercept 
for firm 1, then R&D of firm 1 will always increase. From the previous 
discussion in section 3.3.1 we know that if R&D of firm 1 increases or 
remains unchanged it will reduce the R&D of firm 2. However if R&D of firm 
1 decreases then R&D of firm 2 may increase if total output falls.  
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
In the paper we have analysed the effects of openness of labour market 
DQGSRVVLELOLW\RIPLJUDWLRQRQWKHOHYHORI5	'DQGFRQVXPHUV¶ZHOIDUH7KH
analysis has been done within the framework of a strategic trade model where 
two firms situated in two countries compete in the joint market of the two 
countries. The R&D is conducted to reduce the production cost and thereby to 
increase profit which gives rise to R&D rivalry. In order to capture the effects 
of openness of labour market we assumed that it makes wage rate of skilled 
and unskilled people lower in the labour importing country.  Mainly three 
types of cases have been analysed. Firstly when only the labour importing 
country conducts R&D, secondly when only the labour exporting country 
conducts R&D and thirdly when both countries conduct R&D simultaneously.   
The paper is to some extent supporting the recent literatures on the 
beneficial effects of international labour migration. The literature claims that 
benefit of international migration can occur though increased incentive on 
human capital formation. This paper points to another channel that is through 
the channel of increased R&D. If R&D is higher, production of output can be 
higher and consequently price can be lower. Migration as we have seen, 
though not all the time, can increase the level of R&D, increase output and 
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reduce price level. R&D always increases when we consider possible 
migration of skilled people. The migration of unskilled people sometime can 
have negative effects on R&D but can still increase output because of lower 
production cost. 
 One important thing to note that not all the countries are capable of 
conducting high level of R&D though it is possible for them to train the 
professionals required for conducting R&D. Examples of such professions can 
be computer engineers, aeronautical engineers, marine engineers, 
pharmaceutical and chemical engineers etc. Recent Brain Drain literature 
claims that international migration is beneficial as it gives incentive to acquire 
these skills. But in reality if these professionals cannot migrate, it is often very 
difficult for them to find works that fit well with the skills. For example it is 
possible for many countries to train pharmacists and chemists relatively 
cheaply, though they do not have a large pharmaceutical sector. The 
knowledge they can acquire thus is not very useful for their countries and 
brings little benefit.  
In this paper we can see that the abundance of trained people can bring 
benefit through R&D channel. It these people can migrate and find suitable 
jobs abroad, they can contribute in production of goods at a relatively lower 
price that can be imported back by the home country. It can still bring benefit 
if the labour exporting country has a large production sector but incapable of 
conducting R&D.  
The migration of unskilled people is in general regarded as beneficial 
for the labour exporting country. But the policy makers of developing 
countries still maintain the view that migration of skilled people is harmful.  
As we have discussed it is not true in all cases. For example most developing 
countries do not have a large hardware production sector. But computer 
hardware engineers can migrate to Northern developed countries relatively 
easily. The research and production conducted in North are bringing benefit to 
the whole world. Thus migration of computer engineers should not be branded 
as harmful without pointing out towards the alternative uses. 
A few things also need to be mentioned before we conclude the chapter. 
In this chapter we have analysed the non-cooperative behaviours of firms with 
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simultaneous R&D. The case of sequential game is also worth considering, 
especially when one country can easily replicate other countries R&D in the 
later stages. In this regards we may also think about R&D spillover in both 
cooperative and non cooperative VLWXDWLRQV '¶DVSUHPRQW DQG -DFTXHPLQ
1988). As many Southern developing countries are now highly capable of 
replicating the Northern R&D in short period of time, this case deserves 
analysing.         
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
 
3.3.1. 
Migration in our case reduces the value of uD . To find out the effect of the 
change of uD  on the slope we can differentiate the slope term of the reaction 
function by uD . Let S  be the slope, therefore- 
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Here 1 uD . We have 1 sD  if no migration and 
1
2
s
s
s
w
w D  if migration. By 
subtracting - 
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Therefore R&D of firm 1 increases as M  falls with migration.  
 
4. 
 
Equilibrium migration if only firm 1 conducts R&D 
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Critical value of a   in proposition 6.1- 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This section is the concluding section of the thesis. In this thesis we have 
looked at the effects of competitions in international labour market for skilled 
and unskilled migration and the effects of openness of labour market and 
international migration on the R&D and consumers¶ welfare. We believe that 
the contribution of this thesis would be useful in future policy formulation of 
developed and developing countries in linking migration and economic 
development.  
 We have obtained a few interesting results in this thesis. The chapter 2 
and chapter 3 of thesis were mainly literature review chapters. We have tried 
to provide a broad overview of international migration statistics and literature 
in those two chapters. Though they formed the basis of the analysis done in 
the main chapters of the thesis, the review we have done could find some use 
in different studies to be conducted in future. 
 The main contribution of the thesis has started from chapter 4. In 
chapter 4 we have assumed as situation where two countries compete in 
sending unskilled labour to a third country. We have mainly looked at the 
policy stance of the third country. It was found that the labour importing 
country uses different tax rates for the migrants of different countries. The 
labour exporting country with higher labour endowment exports more labour 
and receives higher per capita tax burden compared to the other country. This 
result is consistent with the literature of strategic trade policy. But the analysis 
of the chapter has very important implication for the migration policies of poor 
labour exporting countries. The theoretical analyse done here may persuade 
some countries to empirically investigate the nature of discrimination faced by 
migrants in international labour market. It may also find some use in 
international migration negotiation.  
 Chapter 5 has looked at the migration of skilled people. We have 
assumed a VLWXDWLRQ ZKHUH SHRSOH FDQ PLJUDWH ZLWKRXW JRYHUQPHQW¶V
assistance. Similar to chapter 4 here labour from two countries migrate to a 
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third country. The exporting countries however here compete in setting up 
emigration tax policy. It has been found that in order to maximise national 
income the exporting countries should impose positive tax on emigration. The 
result is opposite of policy stance of many poor developing countries where 
they subsidise international migration. The findings of the chapter are 
therefore suggesting to review the policy of subsidising emigration of skilled 
people. The importing country on the other hand similar to chapter 4 uses 
discriminatory taxes. The country with higher labour endowment faces higher 
per capita tax burden.  
 In chapter 6 we have looked at the effects of opening up of labour 
market and migrDWLRQRQ5	'DQGFRQVXPHUV¶ZHOIDUH ,WKDVEHHQDVVXPHG
that two countries are engaged in strategic trade with each other. The wage 
rate of one country is higher than the other country. If labour market is opened 
wage rate of the labour importing country falls. We then have analysed how 
WKH ORZHU ZDJH UDWH HIIHFWV 5	' RI ILUPV DQG FRQVXPHUV¶ ZHOIDUH LQ WZR
countries. We have found that migration of skilled people increases R&D and 
FRQVXPHUV¶ZHOIDUH%XWPLJUDWLRQRIXQVNLOOHGSHRSOHGRHVQRWLQFUHDVH5	'
and welfare all the time. The result of the analysis can be linked with the 
literature of Brain Drain. The recent Brain Drain literature is claiming that 
migration can benefit the sending country as it gives incentive to form 
additional human capital. In this chapter we have found an additional channel 
of possible gain of human capital circulation that is through increased R&D. 
Many countries of the world are not in a position to conduct R&D though they 
can train the required personnel to conduct R&D. For example computer 
hardware engineers, pharmacists, chemists etc. If they can contribute by 
conducting research in advanced developed countries it eventually benefits 
everybody. For example computer engineers of Silicon Valley. The 
developing countries sometimes depict the tendency of branding the migration 
of skilled labour as harmful. The results of the paper show that before making 
any judgement we first need to look at the alternative uses of the skills in 
home country. 
 In summary, in this thesis we have explored some issues that have not 
so far received much attention from the economists and policy makers. The 
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issues explored here are highly relevant to the present international migration 
regime. We hope that the analysis conducted will further enrich our 
understanding of international migration. The thesis will be considered 
successful if it finds some use in future policy making of both developed and 
developing countries.  
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